Hurka considers the Falklands war a minor just causes because getting into war to deter future aggressors is not justified (Hashana 1). The motivation for the British to defend this faraway island territory by citing deterrence seemed insufficient to justify the consequences in a war proportionality calculation. However, the war should be viewed as a battle between democracy and tyranny because the British’s historic reclaim of the Island freed the people from oppression. Based on all facts, there were other independent just causes to make deterrence become a relevant benefit of the war. There are circumstances in which resorting to war is morally justified, and there are modest means to finding justice for the oppressed.
Whatever the wrongs and rights of Britain and Argentina fought over the Island, the inhabitants had the right to live freely without fear of suppression. The responsibility for the deaths perpetrated on the Island was more on the perpetrators because the British had a duty to defend the Islanders. According to Hurka’s statement, the types of benefits relevant to war can be pinned on whether war prevents aggression or major rights violations by a government. Both conditions were fulfilled; therefore, the good, achieved count not controversial against the harms caused by the war. The non-combatant status was protected, with only three civilian casualties in the war. In the end, there must be some proportion between war and cost to achieve them, such as human lives and destruction of property. It is possible to claim there was a proportionate just cause since the British successfully liberated the Island from Argentine oppressors with minimum impact on the oppressed.
Fighting war per the jus in bello (justice in war) rules is permissible even if a nation is morally wrong in resorting to war (Hashana 16). The apparent fact that the Falklands War was fought within the limits of just war rule is important. The Falklands War provides a specific counter-example to the jus in bello rule because there was little evidence of unnecessary killings. A total of three civilians out of the 900 casualties indicates only 3% of the deaths were unnecessary. Despite the Island’s sparse population and remoteness to Britain, the war outcome shows the possibility of fighting within the spirit and intentions of humanitarian laws. Nevertheless, it does not disregard the contentious question of whether the total losses of the war were justified.
It is necessary to show that all alternatives were exhausted to justify that war was a last resort. It should be noted that there was a longstanding dispute over the Island between Argentina and Britain by 1982. Negotiation proceedings pursued for fifteen years also resulted in no resolution. As far as the just war requirement is concerned, the several years of negotiation amount to sufficient exhaustion of non-violent alternatives. This argument implies that just cause for war was only possible before the aggression. The view entails the conclusion that subjects of aggression or injustice have the right to fight back or are eligible to allow others to do it on their behalf (Kamm 219). Therefore, it was only justified for Britain to intervene, given its links to the oppressed people.
The prospect of the British fighting to reclaim Falklands Island seemed inconceivable because of its sparse population and remoteness from Britain. It raises the question of whether it is right to count the prospect of success as a positive value for moral war calculation. It may seem strange to assume that predatory states have the moral right to wage war on their neighbors because of the high prospect of success. If applied in the negative (low prospect), the argument can weaken a just war cause already made on other grounds. From this point of view, one can argue that Argentina’s prospect of success validated its war proposition and justification to oppress the Islanders. In the process, Argentina attacked the British territory, warranting the prima-facie right of violent response by Britain. Based on Kamm’s analogy, it is plausible to argue that the lives and well-being of the Falklands inhabitant were not under immediate threat due to the presence of Argentine troops (219). However, the occupation of the Argentina forces imposed plenty of ground for fear because any disagreement or dissent could result in brutality or death.
Nonetheless, the effect of the war on the army might significantly undermine the British just cause for war claim. For instance, the financial and human costs of the Falklands War appear out of proportion to the territory’s value or political freedom. It seems illogical for Britain to accept greater risks for 1000 troops at the expense of 1800 people who desire to retain their government of choice. Hurka argues that war with a comparatively minor cause, like the Falklands War, needs to use volunteer soldiers to be proportionate (Hashana 14). Although troops are the primary target in a war, and their death has minimal weight, sending 1000 soldiers to death to rescue less than twice the number of people seems disproportionate. It may seem politically desirable, an act of self-defense, but not at the expense of over 300 soldiers claimed by the war.
The cost of the war in terms of military spending also raises questions about what level of expenditure would be appropriate in the case. For instance, one can evaluate the cost of the war based on alternative investments, such as hospitals, that will bring more benefits to the citizens than the war. Nevertheless, international aggression also invades homes and warrants raising the level of defensive forces one may use for self-defense. The general rule here is that some things must be done at any cost.
My proportion is that no grievances justify aggressive war as a last resort to solving conflicts. Despite Argentina’s longstanding territorial dispute on Falklands Island, it did not have a just cause for war using the high prospect of success as a justification. Nevertheless, Britain had a reasonable cause for war in response to aggression by Argentina because the wishes of the local inhabitants should be an overriding consideration for protection. Therefore, Argentina should bear the bulk of responsibility for the war since it abandoned diplomacy and resorted to coercion and violence. The fight against political aggression can be morally permitted, but proportionality and necessity judgment cannot be made with absolute precision. So, the outcomes of the war may always be subjective to several variables that, when taken together, determine the justification and success of the war. In the Falklands war case, going to war seemed the last resort since negations failed to yield a resolution while the lives of British citizens were at risk.
Work Cited
Hashana, Rosh. Hurka “Proportionality and Necessity.” Online prerecorded class, 27 Sept. 2017. Lecture.
Kamm, Frances. “9 Self-Defense, Resistance, and Suicide: The Taliban Women.” The Moral Target: Aiming at Right Conduct in War and Other Conflicts, Oxford Ethics Series, 2012, pp. 217-227.