The process of post-Cold War change in the Balkans has been approached and studied from a multiplicity of conceptual frameworks and assumptions by scholars and political analysts. The most dominant and consistent, according to Pula (2004), is the so-called ‘transition view’, which interprets a post-communist change in Eastern Europe as a struggle with the tradition of totalitarian political dispositions and a planned economy towards the model of representative democracy and market liberalism.
By relying on the transition view, this paper will aim to critically analyze the origins, developments, and outcomes of events in Kosovo from the end of the Cold War until today. Many political analysts are of the opinion that the social, political and institutional contours of the Kosovo conflict, and which led to the independence of the previously autonomous province of Serbia.
A constituent unit of the Yugoslavia federation was directly shaped by the institutional structures, ethnic disharmony, and cultural identities existing in the Yugoslav system (Pula, 2004). Although Kosovar Albanians had for long decried the authoritarian rule subjected upon them by Belgrade, it was the 1989 decision by Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic to remove the autonomy of Kosovo and bring it under the direct control of Belgrade that set the stage for the events that would later follow in the 1990s (NATO, 1999).
After the revocation of Kosovo’s autonomy, the Belgrade administration under Milosevic closed educational institutions that used Albanian language, massively discharged Kosovar Albanians from state-owned entities, suspended Kosovo’s legal legislature and administration, and introduced the Serbo-Croat language to be used as the official language in all public and secondary schools and universities (Albanian.com, 2003; Ker-Lindsay, 2009).
The Kosovar Albanians strenuously opposed this systematic oppression by Serbia and initiated passive resistance by establishing a ‘shadow state’ consisting of “a loose conglomeration of educational and cultural institutions, health services, social assistance networks, political parties, local financial councils, and a government-in-exile, all nominally coordinated by a political center led by the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) and its leader, Ibrahim Rugova” (Pula, 2004 p. 297).
Milosevic’s policy of solidifying Serbian nationalism also gave impetus to the Albanians in Kosovo to initiate nonviolent resistance to Belgrade with a view to preserve the basic framework of the region, defy the Serbian state’s authority, and elicit international support for the objective of succession (Ker-Lindsay, 2009). It can also be argued that the ethnification of politics in Kosovo contributed, in large part to the ethnic cleansing campaigns witnessed in the 1990s.
In 1998, armed confrontation between the Serb forces and Albanian militants led to the massacre of over 1,500 Kosovar Albanians and the dislodgment of an estimated 400,000 ethnic Albanians from their residences (NATO, 1999). Earlier in the 1990s, the self-determination exhibited by Albanians to establish a sovereign state led to the formation of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).
A conglomeration of guerilla militants aimed at forcefully resisting the brutal regime of Milosevic (Albanian.com, 2003) These developments, together with Milosevic’s open disregard for diplomatic efforts for peaceful resolution of the conflict, drew concern from the international community, who feared that the conflict could spread to other countries (Pula, 2004; NATO, 1999).
Some scholars argue that passive and active resistance of Albanians finally paid off by attracting international attention from the U.S. and the European Union, who initially thought that the conflict was only an offshoot of localized ethnic issues.
The UN played a significant role by passing resolution 1244, which “welcomed the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles on a political solution to the Kosovo crisis, including an immediate end to violence and a rapid withdrawal of its military, police and paramilitary forces” (NATO, 1999 para. 22). Russia, a traditional ally of the Federation of Yugoslavia, played a significant part in bringing Milosevic to agree to the terms set by the UN Security Council and voted for the resolution to ensure its passage (Pula, 2004).
The resolution along with a substantial contribution of NATO brought an end to the violence and repression in Kosovo, guaranteed the safe return of refugees displaced by the war, ensured the withdrawal of Serb military forces and the police, established an interim administration in Kosovo, and ensured the demilitarization of the Kosovo Liberation Army (NATO, 1999).
The U.S. and the European Union also contributed immensely in laying the groundwork for NATO to launch airstrikes and in the establishment of the Contact Group, which came up with various proposals on how the Kosovo conflict could be politically solved (Pula, 2004).
However, it is imperative to note that when the Kosovo conflict came into the international limelight in 1998, the U.S. and the EU felt that Kosovo did not merit independence alongside the other republics of the former Yugoslavia federation (Ker-Lindsay, 2009). However, realities on the ground soon dawned on them that the Kosovo issue was indeed not a separatist conflict as was depicted in the media.
The U.S., in particular, played a critical role in the formulation of the Dayton Peace Agreements, which developed a roadmap for the region’s autonomy and eventual secession (Ker-Lindsay, 2009). The financial assistance received from the U.S. and its Western allies to support Albanians during Milosevic’s repression also played a role in sustaining the resistance. Kosovo finally announced her independence in February 2008, a decision that was promptly accepted and recognized by the U.S. and by most members of the EU.
Reference List
Albanian.com. 2003. “Kosova.” Web.
Ker-Lindsay, J. 2009. “From Autonomy to Independence: The Evolution of International Thinking on Kosovo, 1998-2005.” Journal of Balkan & Near Eastern Studies 11, no. 2, 141-156.
NATO. 1999. “NATO’s Role in Relation to Kosovo.” Web.
Pula, B. 2004. “The Emergence of Kosovo ‘Parallel State,’ 1988-1992.” Nationalities Papers 32, no. 4, 797-826.