Introduction
Ever since the United States first drafted and ratified the Constitution, the argument over the correct way to legally and morally interpret its original text determined the decisions on the most influential cases. Some of the United States’ most groundbreaking and famous cases have been debated by the United States Supreme Court regarding the legal interpretation of the Constitution regarding the issue at hand. Brown vs. The Board of Education, Bostock vs. Clayton County, and Dobbs vs. Jackson had become a significant landmark case in the United States that has been debated due to the proper legal interpretation of the original meaning in the United States Constitution. The Supreme Court’s historical ruling over the case of Brown vs. The Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas, declared that it was unconstitutional for schools to segregate children based on their skin color.
Justice Antonin Scalia would argue that the originalist approach is the proper way to interpret the text written in the United States Constitution and that what is written must mean exactly what it says. A more objective approach can be found through Ronald Dworkin’s argument that a society can be wrong about interpreting the Constitution if not analyzed with political philosophy. Even though the legislature’s intent is essential in interpreting the law, it is not the only factor. The law should be considered in conjunction with the text of the law and the broader context in which it is applied, which corresponds to Dworkin’s perspective.
Discussion
The judge’s responsibility is to interpret the law precisely word by word. In Antonin Scalia and Gutmann, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (2018), chapter 1, “Intent of the Legislature,” Scalia argues that the primary goal of legal interpretation should be to determine the intent of the legislature. He contends that this approach is necessary to uphold the rule of law and prevent judges from imposing their personal beliefs on it. The author claims, “A text should not be construed strictly, and it should not be construed leniently; it should be construed reasonably, to contain all that it fairly means” (Scalia and Gutmann 13). In his view, judges should strive to understand the original public meaning of the law when it was enacted and should not engage in creative interpretation that deviates from it.
However, in his Comment on Scalia’s book, Ronald Dworkin argues that the text of the law should be the primary factor in interpretation. He argues that the text of the law is the most objective source of information about its meaning. Thus, judges should strive to apply the law as it is written rather than attempting to infer the intent of the legislature (Scalia and Gutmann 69). This debate is particularly relevant in cases such as Bostock v. Clayton County, Brown v. Board of Education, and Dobbs v. Jackson. In Bostock v. Clayton County (2020), the Supreme Court held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. In reaching this decision, the Court considered the text of the law, which prohibits discrimination based on sex, as well as the broader context in which the law was enacted and the legislature’s intent.
The Constitution also guarantees all citizens equality in the interpretation of the law. Similarly, in Brown v. Board of Education (1954), the Supreme Court considered the text of the Fourteenth Amendment, which guarantees equal protection under the law, in determining that segregation in public schools is unconstitutional. Moreover, in Dobbs v. Jackson (1986), the Court considered the text of the Equal Protection Clause in holding that a state law requiring women to pay higher car insurance premiums than men is unconstitutional. In conclusion, while the legislature’s intent is vital in interpreting the law, there are other factors besides this. It should be considered in conjunction with the text of the law and the broader context in which it is applied. This approach is necessary to ensure that the law is applied fairly and consistently, as demonstrated by cases such as Bostock v. Clayton County, Brown v. Board of Education, and Dobbs v. Jackson.
Additionally, the question of how to interpret laws and constitutional provisions is a complex one that has been the subject of much debate among legal scholars. In his book A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law, Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia argues that the legislature’s intent should be the primary factor in interpreting the law. He writes that the text is the essence of the law, and people should interpret every word from it because it has a precise meaning. However, only some agree with this approach. In his comment on Scalia’s book, Ronald Dworkin argues that the text of the law should be the primary factor in interpretation. He describes it in the following words: “fixed by the best interpretation of the language it used, not by what some proportion of its members wanted or expected or assumed would happen” (Scalia and Gutmann 118). Therefore, the precision in the approach to interpretation and focus on the language is the primary concern for Dworkin.
Segregation of students based on their skin color was the consequence of broad interpretation of the law’s text. This debate is particularly relevant in landmark cases such as Bostock v. Clayton County, Brown v. Board of Education, and Dobbs v. Jackson. In Bostock v. Clayton County, the Supreme Court ruled that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination based on sex, also prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. Similarly, in the landmark case of Brown v. Board of Education, the United States Supreme Court ruled that segregation in public schools violated the Constitution (Fortson, 253). Instead, the Court relied on the principle of equal protection of all citizens who abide by the law and the broader context of the Civil Rights movement to reach its decision. In contrast, Dobbs v. Jackson was a case in which the Supreme Court ruled that a state law requiring a person to show good cause before being granted a concealed weapon permit was constitutional. In this case, the Court relied heavily on the intent of the legislature, as well as the text of the law, to reach its decision.
Moreover, in his book A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law, Justice Scalia presents a vigorous defense of the textualist approach to legal interpretation. He argues that the primary goal of legal interpretation should be to determine the original public meaning of the law at the time it was enacted (Scalia and Gutmann 28). He states that judges should strive to apply the law as it is written rather than engaging in creative interpretation that deviates from this meaning (Scalia and Gutmann 28). This approach, he argues, is necessary to uphold the rule of law and prevent judges from imposing their personal beliefs on the law (Siegel n.p.). In contrast, Dworkin argues that the text of the law should be considered in conjunction with the broader context in which it is applied (Scalia and Gutmann 30). Therefore, he argues that the text of the law is only sometimes clear and that judges must sometimes consider the intent of the legislature and the broader implications of their decisions to apply the law in a fair and just manner.
In “A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law,” Richard T. Bowser discusses the various approaches to legal interpretation that judges have adopted throughout history. He examines the theories of Scalia, Dworkin, and other scholars and explores how these theories have been applied in real-world cases (Scalia and Gutmann 209). One of the critical themes of Bowser’s book is the idea that the approach to legal interpretation taken by judges can profoundly impact the rights and freedoms of individuals. Bowser emphasizes the importance of judicial independence in legal interpretation. He argues that judges should be free from political influence and have the ability to make decisions based on their understanding of the law without fear of retribution (Bowser 219). Overall, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law provides a comprehensive overview of legal interpretation theories and debates and offers valuable insights into how these theories have been applied in real-world cases.
The critical issue is whether Justice Scalia had an articulated theory of interpretation. Lawson examines how Scalia’s approach to legal interpretation has been applied in real-world cases. According to him, Scalia’s approach to legal interpretation can be described as “textualism” (Lawson 2). This approach emphasizes the importance of the text of the law in determining its meaning and seeks to apply the law as it is written without attempting to infer the legislature’s intent. Though the text of the law may be unclear or ambiguous, judges may need to consider other factors, such as the legislature’s intent or the broader implications of their decisions, to arrive at a fair and just interpretation of the law (Lawson 14). It shows that many factors can influence how judges interpret the law.
Ultimately, the approach to constitutional interpretation taken by judges can significantly impact the rights and freedoms of individuals. In some cases, a strict interpretation of the Constitution may limit the ability of the government to address pressing social issues. At the same time, a more flexible approach may allow for greater judicial flexibility and responsiveness to changing societal needs (“Constitutional Interpretation”). In addition to the theories discussed above, many other factors can influence the way that judges interpret the Constitution, including the political and social climate at the time of the decision, the personal backgrounds and experiences of the judges, and the specific legal issues at stake in the case (“Constitutional Interpretation”). As such, the process of constitutional interpretation is complex and multifaceted and continues to be the subject of ongoing debate and discussion among legal scholars.
Legal interpretation involves determining the meaning of a law or constitutional provision to apply it in a specific case. There are different approaches to legal interpretation, and scholars and judges have debated which approach is the most appropriate. One approach, advocated by Antonin Scalia, is to prioritize the legislature’s intent in interpreting the law (Berkmanas 174). This approach involves attempting to understand the original public meaning of the law. Another approach, advocated by Ronald Dworkin, is to prioritize the text of the law in interpretation (Solan 285). This approach involves applying the law as written rather than attempting to infer the legislature’s intent.
Both approaches have strengths and limitations; for instance, the legislature’s intent can provide valuable context for understanding the law. Still, it may only sometimes be precise or consistent and may not necessarily reflect the values and principles the law intends to uphold. On the other hand, focusing on the text of the law can lead to a more accurate and consistent application of the law. Still, it may not consider the broader context in which the law is being applied or the values and principles that the law is intended to uphold (Berkmanas 179). Judges need to consider both the text of the law and the broader context in which it is being applied. They should also emphasize the values and principles that the law is intended to uphold, to ensure a fair and consistent application of the law. This approach is exemplified in cases such as Bostock v. Clayton County, Brown v. Board of Education, and Dobbs v. Jackson, in which the courts considered various factors in interpreting the law.
Conclusion
The ideas of Scalia and Dworkin continue to be the subject of ongoing debate and discussion among legal scholars. Overall, it is clear that the legislature’s intent is an essential factor in interpreting the law. However, it is not the only factor and should be considered in conjunction with the text of the law and the broader context in which it is applied. This approach is necessary to ensure that the law is applied fairly and consistently. While the legislature’s intent is essential in interpreting the law, it is not the only factor to consider. The legislation should be regarded in conjunction with the text of the law and the broader context in which it is applied.
Works Cited
“Constitutional Interpretation.” Wilson Center, 2005, Web.
Berkmanas, Tomas. “The ‘Meta’-Significance of Scalia’s: Reflections on a Theory and Ethics of Judicial Legislative Power.” TalTech Journal of European Studies, 2020, 174-179. Web.
Bowser, Richard T. A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law, vol. 19, no. 2, Campbell University School of Law, 1997, 209-219. Web.
Fortson, Ryan. “Was Justice Antonin Scalia Hercules? A Re-Examination of Ronald Dworkin’s Relationship to Originalism.” Washington University Jurisprudence Review, vol. 13, no. 2, 2020, 253. Web.
Lawson, Gary S. “Did Justice Scalia Have a Theory of Interpretation?” Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law, 2017, 2-14. Web.
Scalia, Antonin and Gutmann, Amy. A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law – New Edition, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018.
Siegel, Jonathan R. “Legal Scholarship Highlight: Justice Scalia’s Textualist Legacy.” SCOTUSblog, 2019, Web.
Solan, Lawrence M. “Corpus Linguistics as a Method of Legal Interpretation: Some Progress, Some Questions.” International Journal for the Semiotics of Law-Revue internationale de SĂ©miotique juridique, vol. 33, no. 2, 2020, 283-298. Web.