Introduction
There are many approaches to ethics and moral judgments in particular. Some receive more attention than others, some get misunderstood and misapplied. This paper will outline two such approaches – Libertarian and Utilitarian – and some of the differences that set them apart from each other.
Requirements for a Moral Judgement
Although there is no concrete list of criteria for moral judgments, there are several general principles that should be followed for a judgment to be moral. Hooker (2017) lists, among other requirements, the judgment generally having “other-regarding grounds” (p. 101). That means that moral judgments generally regard those notions, actions, restrictions, and permissions that regulate connections between people, protecting the interests and welfare of other persons. Another point is that moral judgments are the ones that regard (potential) conflict between self-interest and social obligations, duties. An important distinction from the law is one more requirement, which is that moral judgments regard principles that are generally unwritten and not enforced by distinct social authorities. Those are some of the requirements that distinguish moral judgments from judgments of other kinds.
Utilitarian Principles and Possible Confusions
The principles of utilitarian ethical theory might often be misunderstood due to their (often vague) descriptions. In “Utilitarian Ethics” Anthony Quinton (1973) names two main principles of utilitarianism. The consequentialist principle states, that “the rightness or wrongness of an action is determined by the goodness or badness of the results that flow from it” (Quinton, 1973, p. 1). The definitions of good and bad are then provided in the hedonist principle: “the only thing that is good in itself is a pleasure and the only thing that is bad in itself is pain” (Quinton, 1973, p. 1). At least three main problems (misinterpretations) may be derived from those principles.
The first problem that may arise from those principles is that the definition of “good” as “pleasure” is likely to be deemed problematic by the general reader. That is due to the word “pleasure” being generally associated with anti-social behavior and (among the religious population) sin. Understandably, the word then being presented as a basis of an ethical theory that distances the reader from such theory. That said, in modern views on utilitarian ethics, “pleasure” is either described as a collection of positive effects on a person’s welfare, interchangeable with the word “happiness”, or omitted completely.
The second problem is also connected to the hedonist principle. In many cases, people do not realize or outright deny the positiveness of some actions affecting them. Sometimes such disconnect is extreme: an action that benefits them is considered hostile by them and thus makes them unhappy. One might argue that such actions must be unethical because they negatively affect an individual’s happiness and, therefore, the pleasure-pain ratio. A vibrant example of one such situation is the mandatory treatment of mentally ill persons. Even when the treatments are effective and, therefore, inarguably good for the patients, they might still view them as hostile actions (Munetz et al., 2003). Furthermore, patients suffering from severe mental disorders generally lack decision-making capacity and are unable to give informed consent to treatment. Munetz et al. (2003) argue that, since mental instability has a positive correlation with violence and greatly reduced quality of a patient’s life, mandatory treatments are more preferable from a utilitarian standpoint than non-intervention. It is a trade-off: the morality of an action in such a case is determined by whether the positives (successful treatment) outweigh the negatives (lack of consent).
The third problem arises from the consequentialist principle of utilitarian ethics. People are often blind to the potential negative consequences of their actions, and their intentions might not always align with reality. The consequentialist principle, as defined earlier, neglects those notions. For making moral judgments, modern interpretations of utilitarianism do advise on considering, apart from actual consequences, the intentions of the actor and the consequences that could be rationally expected from the action (Quinton, 1973). As with the other problems, this one is solved by examining more than just the core principles of the theory.
The Differences Between the Utilitarian and Libertarian Approaches
To understand the differences between the two approaches, one must ask two questions: “what do the approaches value most?” and “what do the approaches deem undesirable?”. The answer to these questions in regards to the utilitarian theory had been given earlier in the essay – pleasure is most valued, and undesirable are those acts which negatively impact the ratio of pleasure to pain. In libertarian theory, the most value is held by bodily autonomy and other rights of persons. Therefore, undesirable acts are those which violate one’s rights. These are the core differences between the two approaches to ethics.
When describing the libertarian theory, many use the “Crusoe model”, which defines an isolated environment with only one inhabitant. According to libertarian ethics, no action of that inhabitant in the model can be subject to ethics, since violating one’s rights requires a minimum of two actors (Rothbard, 1982). Therefore, ethics and morality can only be applied to systems with interactions between two or more actors. When viewing the same model from the utilitarian perspective, one can see the differences between the theories in action. Since any action may affect the actor’s levels of pleasure (or pain), any action might be subject to utilitarian ethics and therefore may be deemed desirable or undesirable.
Another situation that makes the differences between libertarian and utilitarian ethics clear had been described earlier in the essay. When discussing the morality of mandatory treatment of mentally ill patients, allies of libertarian ethics argue that mandatory treatment is a blatant violation of a patient’s bodily autonomy and is therefore unethical (Munetz et al., 2003). It is, however, ethical in many cases from a utilitarian standpoint, as described earlier.
Arguably, the most relevant issue dividing utilitarians and libertarians today is the issue of punishment and justice. In libertarian theory, a punishment that is proportional to the crime is justified, because the one punished cannot legally object to the punishment. That is because a) any action that the affected consented to cannot be unethical, and b) no one can contradict their actions. Since the one punished had, through their criminal act of violence, established that they do not view such violence as illegitimate, they are “dialogically estopped from […] withholding their consent” (Kinsella, 1997, p. 611). In short, in libertarian theory, punishment is justified because it is not deemed unethical. In utilitarian theory, punishment for a crime may be justified when it serves a positive function, such as deterrence or incapacitation. Deterrence serves as a guarantee that a criminal act would not be worth it to pursue. Incapacitation serves as a guarantee that a criminal would not be able to pursue a criminal act (Carlsmith, 2006). In short, in utilitarian theory, punishment for a crime might be justified if it produces positive effects or reduces potential negative effects. Those are the differences between the libertarian and utilitarian views on punishment.
Conclusion
When discussing ethics, it is important to understand both the position one defends, and the position one defends against. No theory can be compressed into a paragraph, or even in one essay or article. Hence it is vital to make sure that more than one interpretation of a theory had been reviewed before indulging in a debate or forming statements.
References
Carlsmith, K. M. (2006). The roles of retribution and utility in determining punishment. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 42(4), 437-451. Web.
Hooker, B. W. (2017). What makes a judgement a moral judgement. Journal of Political Theory & Philosophy, 1(1), 97-112. Web.
Kinsella, N. S. (1997). A libertarian theory of punishment and rights. Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, 30(607), 607-645. Web.
Munetz, M. R., Galon, P. A., & Frese, F. J. (2003). The ethics of mandatory community treatment. The Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, 31(2), 173-183 [PDF document]. Web.
Quinton, A. (1973). Utilitarian ethics. MacMillan Press.
Rothbard, M. N. (1982). The ethics of liberty. Humanities Press.