The art of war is a versatile thing with points on direct and fast actions. This idea is incorporated in all wars that happened on earth in history. Conflicts may occur due to different reasons. It can be ambitions, interests, or pretenses about territory or ethnic groups of people. Carl von Clausewitz was a great theorist of war. Living in the epoch of Enlightenment with its philosophical background Clausewitz found out the principal approaches in war. Theoretical and empirical explanations of fog and friction are taken into account by him. Carl von Clausewitz’s major points should be used for today’s practice of warfare with a special approach toward the computer age of warfare. In modern times fog and friction of war are not obsolete, and their presence in warfare proves the theory of Clausewitz due to multiple examples of war tactics of today.
Thus, in the theory of Carl von Clausewitz illustrated in his major work On War there are several points as of war realities. First, the author gives the classification of war in its types, namely limited and unlimited. Also, Clausewitz suggested two theories to be used in war tactics, such as fog and friction theories (Howard & Paret, 1976). In this prospect, Clausewitz pointed out that the fog considers the ambiguity of information in real war and possible mistakes due to a loss of right identification and uncertainty according to the enemy numbers, intent, abilities, and tactics (Howard & Paret, 1976). One of the examples shows such tactics in World War II when the army of the USSR met the opposing fascist army when the war came to an end. The tactics were concerned with the use of powerful projectors. They made the enemy blind and uncertain in their actions. They were greatly surprised, and this became a deterrent force so that the army of Marshal Zhukov could deliver a fatal blow to fascists. During the Cold War, the intelligence services of the US and the USSR widely used fog of war utilizing disinformation.
Another theory implements the use of tactics that can terminate the enemy in real war using unexpectedness or irregularity (Clausewitz & Graham, 1873). The main principle of war is to destruct the powers of the enemy (Parker, 2005). Clausewitz points out accordingly in his work: “Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.” (Clausewitz & Graham, 1873, p. 119).
In other words, it is a concise description of reality effects looking at ideas and intentions in war (Clausewitz & Graham, 1873). Here human factor of debilitation and fatigue is taken into account. Desert Storm operation in 1991 is a great example of when the friction of war took place. In tactical, strategic, and operational levels this operation could not shorten the friction and even new technologies could not help (Watts, 1996). Earlier the idea of Blitzkrieg was taken by fascists, to capture the territory of the USSR based on friction of war.
Fog and friction are modern today, notwithstanding the use of computers and other high technologies in warfare. The thing is that the terror organizations widely use such tactics by Clausewitz. It is helpful for them in using information technologies for the provision of fog and friction of war. Humanity cannot eliminate the effects of “fog and friction” in war using technological innovations. Needless to say, future wars will still apply toward Clausewitzian theoretical base. It seems that “fog and friction” will always dominate in war tactics.
The reality is that the military’s application of technology has usually created its fog and friction. Advances in technology expand the battlefield, transform the relationship between time and space and create new demands on command and control (Chapman, 2003, p. 18).
When looking at the operation in Tora Bora and the loss of Osama Binladin one can conclude that in the technological era theory of Clausewitz did not lose its significance in warfare. Furthermore, it will help one of the sides to fight and possibly win with a fewer number of soldiers and equipment. The complexity of many operations at the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first showed that the total reduction of fog and friction in war is impossible (Alberts, Garstka, Hayes, and Signori, 2001).
Another case of uncertainty in fog and friction shows the issue with Pat Tillman, the former football player, who was shot mistakenly by an American soldier in Afghanistan (The Washington Post, 2004). War in Iraq since 2003 also proved that the digital era cannot fully reduce fog and friction. Collateral damage in Iraq is a theme of great discussion when many innocents were killed due to uncertainty about the right direction of the enemies’ positions. Fog decreases the level of information clarity among strategic features of efforts maintained by the government; friction is observed in internal relations of agencies nationwide (The Strategist, 2007). In 1983 Korean Air Flight 007 was by mistake defined by the Soviet army forces from a military base in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky as a military aircraft intentionally looking for some information (Korean Air Flight 007: Encyclopedia, 2009). The aircraft was crashed with 240 passengers and 29 members of the crew aboard. “Fog and friction” caused such an accident. Though, one cannot but agree with the uncertainty and unexpectedness of such an event.
The idea of computer age warfare is vital today. This approach can resolve the problem of fog in war and the possible uncertainty of it. The implementation of new technologies powered by computers and last innovations in warfare appliances can stimulate obtaining of higher results as of sharpness of enemy’s positions identification with less number of human resources. Among such technological decisions are Network Centric Warfare Command Center (NCW) and Mission Command Center (MCC) (Information Age Warfare Quarterly, 2006). It is helpful to achieve better accuracy by controlling the actions of military forces. Such centers play a great role in terms of “enabling commanders to plug and play sensors, shooters, command, and control, and support capabilities into task-organized combat packages” (Information Age Warfare Quarterly, 2006, p. 9). Thus, increased accuracy and survivability along with customized attacks are the priorities of suchlike centers (Information Age Warfare Quarterly, 2006). In the case of identification of enemy using innovative centers, there is a threat of “fog” appearance in terms of distracting and falsifying signals from the center. Such radio wave uncertainty is a significant hazard that should be improved with proper means of technical decisions to make signals from the center genuine and protected.
Thus, the theoretical base provided by Carl von Clausewitz is widely expressed in present days. It is apparent when looking at the warfare relationships and principles, which are determined in most of today’s armies. Though, the words and statements of Clausewitz are not obsolete for contemporary realities concerned with high technologies and fast growth of the scientific innovations in the military field. Moreover, the theoretical framework of Clausewitz for the modern armies represents the so-called “skeleton” in terms of the right designs of war tactics under various circumstances. Today the theory of “fog and friction” is an instrument that causes impendence of human losses. Technical innovations are designed to decrease in some respect the level of fog and friction of war, but, unfortunately, this problem cannot be resolved.
Reference
- Alberts, D. S., Garstka, J. J., Hayes, R. E., and Signori, D. A. (2001). Understanding Information Age Warfare. Web.
- Chapman, G. (2003). An Introduction to the Revolution in Military Affairs. Austin: LBJ School of Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin.
- Clausewitz, C. V., and Graham, J. J. (1873). On war. Washington: Plain Label Books.
- Cohen, W. A. (2005). Secrets of special OPS leadership: dare the impossible, achieve the extraordinary. New York: AMACOM Div American Mgmt Assn.
- Howard, M., and Paret, P. (1976). Clausewitz, Carl von. On War, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.
- Information Age Warfare Quarterly. (2006). Volume 1, Number 2.
- Issues of Doctrine in the War on Terror. (2007). The Strategist.
- Korean Air Flight 007: Encyclopedia. (2009).
- Parker, G. (2005) The Cambridge history of warfare. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tillman Killed by ‘Friendly Fire’; Probe Cites Error Platoon Mates. (2004). Washington: The Washington Post.
- Watts, B. D. (1996). Clausewitzian Friction and Future of War. McNair Paper 52.