Introduction
Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) is a family of vehicles manufactured by various local and international corporations. MRAPs are high mobility and versatile wheeled vehicles mainly used by combatants. With their V-shaped hull and shield plating design, they offer protection and mobility of marines operating in dangerous fire areas against Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) hence saving millions of lives of combatants (Feickert, 2008, p. 116). The US operations in Afghanistan and Iraq proved that the USMC-unarmored ground vehicles were not suitable in supporting combat operations against new IEDs. Therefore, the use of MRAP vehicles was inevitable in reducing the effects of rocket-propelled grenades, IEDs, and other firearms. In 2007, the Department of Defense (DoD) initiated the MRAP program that used a customized acquisition approach, a program acknowledged by the Secretary of Defense as the most vital (Sullivan, 2009, p. 2). The acquisition program enabled DoD to rapidly acquire and field the vehicles during the operations. The paper tables the MRAP acquisition process, the long-term effects and challenges, and the budding repercussions for advancing the standard acquisition process as the major programs managed via the acquisition process. It also presents DOD’s plans to upgrade, sustain, procure, examine, and field MRAP vehicles are important elements in describing its implementation progress and rapid acquisition approach as well as challenges associated with the program.
Acquisition Process
DoD tailored the acquisition strategy due to special priority. The plan initiated minimal operational requisites, which rely not only on established technologies and availability of commercial products but also on urgent quantity production of survivable and tested vehicles (Taylor, 2007, p. 33). According to the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) 2006 acquisition plan, the Marine Corps awarded a single “source indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contract” (Feickert, 2008, p. 132) before conducting any competitive acquisition and consequently ordered the first 144 MRAPs in response to the urgent requirements.
The production entry of MRAPs was a rapid and major defense acquisition program. Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics echoed the acquisition as not only a better substitute for transporting troops in combat but also for providing advanced protection for their crews (Taylor, 2007, p. 34). Since the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and other Special Operations Command needed MRAPs for ballistic testing, the quantity demanded consequently grew rapidly (Sullivan, 2009, p. 9). Therefore, the DoD as per Joint Service requirements for procurement and mission featured three configurations of MRAPs.
In supporting these mission profiles, the first category of blast resistant underbody vehicles that the US Government sought was the smallest version of MRAP. The configuration carries a maximum of seven personnel and was mainly intended to operate in the urban environment and other restricted spaces such as “mounted patrols, reconnaissance, communications, and command and control” (Feickert, 2008, p. 155). The second category of MRAPs carries at most eleven combatants. They are multi-mission vehicles capable of ensuring maximum security, convoy escort, ambulance, medical, troop and cargo transport, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), and combat engineering. The third category is the largest of MRAPs. It is for IED clearance operations. It carries a maximum of thirteen personnel (Taylor, 2007, p. 36). However, MRAPs were bought without mission communication and situational awareness subsystem equipment. Therefore, in performing the multiple missions, MRAPs are reconfigurable in both categories to the mission standards and requirements.
In fielding of the vehicles, DOD stresses that the government takes the sole responsibility for the final integration of mission equipment packages. However, some contractors bought integration components only at their own risk because the buying was not stipulated in the contract (Feickert, 2008, p. 119). DoD also took the initiative to communicate the significance of producing survivable MRAP vehicles as quickly as possible.
DOD designed MRAP program, its highest priority acquisition that enabled contractors and other manufacturers to meet production requirements and or rapidly respond to the urgent needs. The DoD requires the contractor to provide only flexible vehicles for reconfiguration (Feickert, 2008, p. 134). The requirements restrict any design of vehicles to integrate GFE equipment such as weapon stations, crew-served weapons, ambulance litters, and communications equipment unless such requirements are specified (Taylor, 2007, p. 35). All performance, engine, and transportability requirements for both categories are set in the MRAP performance specification.
The requirement for MRAP was not only limited solely to combat operations but also to protect the vehicle and its occupants against shock, fragments, and fatal acceleration effects of mine blasts (Sullivan, 2009, p. 13). Consequently, the RFP outlines the official conditions of the prospective contractors in which MRAP RFP must submit a proposal indicating specifications for their proposed vehicle systems. The proposal and performance specification are incorporated into the systems to form the contract requirements for MRAP vehicles (Feickert, 2008, p. 145). The Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite Quantity (ID/IQ), and Firm Fixed Price (FFP) are useful elements for performance during the contract period. As per the performance specification, the initial ID/IQ contracts include two funded vehicles from each category that are used for Performance Verification Testing (PVT) (Taylor, 2007, p. 37).
Consequently, the government may award consequential delivery orders to one or more ID/IQ contracts to successful contractors upon completion of the testing. It may purchase a given minimum or/and maximum number of MRAPs (Feickert, 2008, p. 123). The contractors are not only given contracts based on the survivability of their vehicles as per the overall performance in PVT but also on the greatest ability to produce and deliver MRAPs with the shortest ramp up time in large quantity and urgently (Sullivan, 2009, p. 11). In addition, cost implications, availability of funds, and affordability are essential in awarding the contracts.
Program managed via the Acquisition processes
DoD established MRAP Task Force to integrate planning, analyze, and take actions to accelerate vehicle acquisition. According to the Secretary of Defense, “the major defense acquisition programs are those estimated to require eventual total research, development, test, and evaluation procurement expenditures of million dollars” (Sullivan, 2009, p. 8). Therefore, the acquisition of MRAPs has been growing ever since the combatants began using them in Iraq to protect their personnel. The demand was inevitable. DoD also realized that no contractor could solely and urgently manufacture and or provide the demanded MRAPs (Sullivan, 2009, p. 12). After a careful analysis, the government arranged and awarded one or more IDIQ contracts to several contractors with a reasonable value, and terminating the contracts for those vendors who could not meet the set deadline and the minimum requirements.
However, in the late 2007, the marine reduced its MRAP requirement due to a decline in IED threats, fewer MRAP losses, mobility and speed issues, and practical shift in the movement of greater quantity of supplies via airlift (Feickert, 2008, p. 152). As such, MRAPs are too large and heavy to be used in speedy operations. They cannot be deployed by airplanes or ships. In addition, MRAPs surge forces were no longer required. It also put marines on high threat roads using constant watch and airlift of equipment (Sullivan, 2009, p. 7). To counter insurgencies, it forces marines to alight and interact closely with the public. The overall reduction of MRAP requirement resulted into potential cost savings.
Consequently, the DoD pursued a very aggressive program to produce the baseline MRAP, make several upgrades, and develop MRAP II vehicles. Moreover, in 2008, MRAP program was the DoD’s highest priority acquisition program as this was meant to meet a joint service operational urgent need (Feickert, 2008, p. 111). However, vendors had the challenge in not only obtaining adequate quantities of ballistic grade steel but also producing sufficient tires to furnish the fleet and provide for replacements. Besides, there were time constraints in the integration of government equipment.
The secretary of DoD approved a special designation for MRAP as a DX rating, which requires that MRAP contracts be prioritized, accepted, and performed minus rating. In accomplishing the program, DoD made ensure that the key materials such as steel are sufficient and available to produce the required number of contracted MRAPs (Feickert, 2008, p. 135). As such, the secretary of the army initiated a program of waiving restrictions on armor plate steel thus increasing the number of countries from which DoD could acquire steel (Taylor, 2007, p. 38). They gave MRAP contracts a higher DX rating, increased tire production capacity, and allocated funds to procure an advance stock of steel and tire, which DoD identified as potential limiting factors for the MRAP industrial base.
Since the vehicles obtained had no mission equipment, integrating the equipment in time was a challenge. DoD significantly “reduced the normal scope of test and evaluation” (Feickert, 2008, p. 150) to cope with the problem. For instance, the procurement plan in 2008 placed MRAPs on contract even before operational efficiency and suitability were established resulting into costly retrofits. However, according to conventional DoD acquisition policy, any weapons should be fully tested in advance. Therefore, the urgent need to field-survivable vehicles created a phased approach that resulted in a high degree of overlap between testing and fielding of MRAPs (Taylor, 2007, p. 39). DoD ordered thousands of vehicles before PVT. It even orders more before the actual order is completed.
In an attempt to handle the testing problem, the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation endorsed the MRAP test and evaluation master plan, which has three developmental phases (Sullivan, 2009, p. 5). The first phase involves a limited evaluation by users while the second phase involves additional evaluation on endurance, presence of mission equipment, and the needed level of performance against the ballistic threat. The third phase tests and evaluates both ballistic non-ballistic performance in connection to the emerging threats and environmental effects such as altitude change, electromagnetic pulses, and lightning among others.
The MRAP vehicle program of 2009 had resulted into significant increases in the number of vehicles acquired. The program had the task order with detailed and comprehensive professional plan management services for all MRAPs and their associated systems. The documentation for acquisition, administrative, and engineering service requirements analysis comprises spiral technological insertion, production and logistics analysis support, GFE integration, and test and evaluation (Feickert, 2008, p. 140). The task order provides urgent and technical support and a continuous acquisition of MRAP vehicles. The support is inevitable in obtaining effective MRAP vehicles as it helps in synchronizing the integration of system and development of components to both MRAP and other related low-density vehicles.
Through inclusive assessments, selection, and integration of other IEDs, there is an urgent response to the universal needs of the operating forces. Therefore, the program demands a highly competent and agile management structure in order to create rapid production and deployment capability, upgrade, and field MRAPs to make them sustaining and life-saving vehicles for war fighters (Taylor, 2007, p. 40). The logistical support for the MRAPs provided by qualified contractor personnel, and various training programs developed by both the US army and Marine Corps were vital for their operations. For instance, the US Marine Corps constructed simulators to enable prospective “drivers to experience the MRAPs and potential environmental hazards before any deployment” (Sullivan, 2009, p. 3). The result was readiness and consistency across all their theaters of operations.
Conclusion
Today, nations have adopted MRAP vehicles in their operations. MRAP vehicles are essentially built with a survivable and offensive weapon system for protecting its crew against IEDs, rocket-propelled grenades, and other small firearms (Sullivan, 2009, p. 1). Several companies within and outside the United States manufacture MRAP systems, which are exploited and used by both army and marine corps engineers and even terrorists in different warfare (Feickert, 2008, p. 100). Comparable with the number of casualties it protects, the cost of acquiring MRAPs is significantly less. Even though MRAPs were successfully exploited by the United States commandants in Iraq and Afghanistan, MRAP vehicles had their drawbacks.
Reference List
Feickert, A. (2008). Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP) Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service, 25(1), 100-156.
Sullivan, M. (2009). Defense Acquisitions: Rapid Acquisition of MRAP Vehicles. Acquisition and Sourcing Management, 1(1), 1-15.
Taylor, M. (2007). Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle II Performance Specification. Program Manager Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Systems, 40(1), 33-40.