In 1993 New Zealand citizens voted, in a national referendum, to drastically amend their voting system from the British-modelled traditional first-past-the-post (FPP) to a Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) representation (Bowler & Farrell, 2006).
The genesis of proportional representation (PR) in New Zealand can be traced back to the 1950s, when the political landscape of the country witnessed a gradual breakdown of public trust and confidence in politicians and parliament, followed by large-scale disillusionment with the old two-party system (National and Labour) among New Zealanders (Bale & Bergman, 2006; Newman, 2010).
Although the PR system initially received accolades as a powerful political instrument capable of making New Zealand the most effective, most inclusive democracy globally (Little, 2005), it has continued to draw criticisms from varied quarters, with some critics suggesting that it brings into the limelight a situation where the ‘tail wags the dog’ (Vowles, 1998). This paper purposes to illuminate evidence to support assertions made by MMP’s critics that PR indeed results in the ‘tail wagging the dog.’
Simply put, PR is based on the notion that if a particular party gets 20 percent of the vote in elections, then it is entitled to 20 percent of seats in parliament. Consequently, the major driving principle of PR, according to Bale & Bergman (2006), is that political parties should be given power in proportion to the actual number of voters who vote for them.
When it comes to the MMP system as practiced in New Zealand, each voter casts two votes, with one vote meant to decide their local member of parliament (electorate vote) and the other deciding which party they would like to represent them federally (party vote).
Newman (2010) posits that “…under the MMP, the party that wins the greatest party vote on the election night is given the chance to form a government by…horse trading with potential coalition partners” (p. 1).
As already mentioned, one of the major objectives of the MMP was to bring proportionality to the electoral system (Malpass, 2010), but this objective appears not to have been met even as New Zealanders prepare to go into the referendum to determine the effectiveness of the system.
A number of situations can be used to demonstrate evidence that PR results in the ‘tail wagging the dog.’ First, the critics of MMP have argued that although PR originally meant to achieve proportionality in New Zealand’s electoral system, it inarguably led to a system whereby small parties wielded, and continues to wield, disproportionate power (Vowles, 1998; Bale & Bergman, 2006).
One important consequence of such an electoral disposition is that the party with massive voter following must negotiate with other smaller parties in order to have important policies implemented. Consequently, and contrary to the maxims of a stable and representative government, it can be argued that the MMP as practiced in New Zealand permits coalition governments to form where minority parties have in their possession a disproportionate share of power, leading to a system in which the ‘tail wags the dog.’
A case in point is the smacking debate of 2009, which revolved around the issue of whether smacking children should be viewed as a good parental correction or a criminal offense (Ritchie, 2009).
In this debate, the Green party successfully projected its anti-smacking campaign against the will of the majority who wanted the bill on smacking of children re-legalized, implying that it was the tail wagging the dog in this particular debate. To put it in perspective, MMP has brought into the fore situations in which major parties take superfluous and unpopular standpoints so as to pacify minor parties.
Another consequence, which is intrinsically related to the first, is that minority parties, even if they have no real power, are not only capable of holding the bigger parties (National and Labour) to ransom, but are also able to project their opinion in parliament (Bowler & Farrell, 2006).
Such predispositions, according to Vowles (1998), are bad for democracy because they not only lead to a more consensual type of government, but also trigger a reduction of political transparency and accountability for laws passed by parliament.
In 1996, for example, Winston Peters of the minority party New Zealand First, along with 13.3 percent of voters, held the other 87.7 percent of the voters to ransom by playing the ‘king maker’ in an exhibition of the way governments were to be created under MMP, not at the ballot box, but after, by a choice from minority parties between the two dominant parties – Labour and National (Vowles, 1998).
It is important to underline the point that the political compromises the MMP has encouraged as a result of allowing smaller parties to wield disproportionate power has not only led to a more consensual form of government as elaborated above, but “…has also contributed to ad hoc law making, an inability of government to take proper charge of [the] legislative programme, and a pork barrel politics and back room deals” (Malpass, 2010 para. 3).
For example, the government of the day is unable to take proper charge of its legislative programme due to the fact that minority parties have a greater say in controversial legislation than their vote merits. In equal measure, it is possible for the prime minister of New Zealand to be defeated by a simple majority; that is, a majority of individuals who cast their votes or refrain from voting rather than a majority of seats in the legislature (Bale & Bergman, 2006).
This effectively implies that the office of the prime minister, which is traditionally the centre of power, is unable to govern effectively as power has been delegated to the periphery. A case in point here is the secret backroom deal between the National party and the Maori party in 2008 even after it was apparent that the National party was in a position to govern after securing the support of ACT and United parties (Newman, 2010).
In respect to the New Zealand’s government not been able to either implement policies or take charge of important legislative programmes, political commentators are in agreement that MMP has only worked to perpetuate some form of centrism in New Zealand politics which has, in effect, encouraged the sidelining of important issues (Bowler & Farrell, 2006).
Evidence to back this assertion arises from the prediction by the Royal Commission, who observed that there might be prolonged periods where the New Zealand government is inarguably unable to take decisive action when doing this seems the only right way to follow (Newman, 2010).
A case in point is the sidelining of debate concerning the Maori seats, where the National party (with the majority) wish to abolish them but the Maori party (minority) wish to embed them. The perceived indecisiveness of the National party in this debate, ostensibly because it fears to loose the support of the minority party, implies that nothing progressive will be accomplished in this fundamental but unpopular area. Surely, it is a case of the ‘tail wagging the dog.’
It can also be argued that MMP has led to the proliferation of minority parties and other interest groups in parliament, setting the stage for a scenario where the stability and effectiveness of government are threatened (Bale & Bergman, 2006). The system has been accused in various quarters for not exercising fairness and, as such, always puts political parties in a collision course at the expense of passing important bills for the country to move forward. There exists compelling evidence to support this assertion.
At the 2008 national election, for instance, the 4.1 percent of the vote received by New Zealand First successfully ensured that the party had no representation in parliament, whereas ACT, with only 3.7 percent of the vote and one constituency seat, went ahead to gain 5 MPs in parliament (Gallagher & Mitchell, 2010). Such an inconsistency, in my view, can only serve to threaten the stability of government, and it is vivid pointer to the PR’s trajectory of the ‘tail wagging the dog.’
Lastly, it can be argued that the MMP system has drastically elevated the number of minorities represented in the legislature to a level of excessive overrepresentation (Gallagher & Mitchell, 2010). Such overrepresentation, according to the author, is bad for democracy as it shift power from its rightful owners according to the wishes of the electorate to place it in other peripheral locations that do not in any way enjoy the support of the majority of the electorate.
We only need to recall the overrepresentation of the Maoris to see how such an electoral and political disposition can cause elevated public outcry because of the actual or perceived fear among the electorate that the minorities are indeed calling the shots in government.
To conclude, it is indeed true that New Zealand’s encounter with PR has unconditionally demonstrated that MMP provides minority groupings with disproportionate influence, which inarguably comes at a cost to democracy (Bowler & Farrell, 2006).
Evidence have been adduced to support this claim, including how these minority parties act to circumvent the implementation of policies perceived to be of great importance to New Zealanders, how they perpetuate centrism, how they curtail political transparency and accountability, how they contribute to ad hoc law making and back room deals, and how they hold major parties to ransom.
With the coming referendum in November 2011, therefore, New Zealanders need to consider all the important issues highlighted in this paper and vote consciously on whether they want to retain the MMP system or whether its time to introduce a new electoral system.
List of References
Bale, T., & Bergman, T (2006). Captives no Longer, but Servants Still? Contract Parliamentarism and the New Minority Governance in Sweden and New Zealand. Government & Opposition, Vol. 41, No. 3, pp 422-449.
Bowler, S., & Farrell, D.M (2006). We know which one we Prefer but we don’t know really why: The Curious Case of Mixed Member Electoral systems. British Journal of Politics & International Relations, Vol. 8, no. 3, pp 445-460.
Gallagher, M., & Mitchell, P (2010). The Politics of Electoral Systems, 2nd Ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Little, G (2005). Development of MMP in New Zealand. Web.
Malpass, L (2010). Superseding MMP: Real Electoral Reform for New Zealand. The Centre for Independent Studies. Web.
Newman, M (2010). Proportionate Representation, Disproportionate Power. New Zealand Centre for Political Research. Web.
Ritchie, K (2009). Kiwis Consumed by Smacking Debate. Web.
Vowles, J (1998). Voters’ Victory?: New Zealand’s First Election and Proportional Representation. Auckland: Auckland University Press.