Introduction
This report seeks to analyze the causes of an event that took place aboard a tanker ship MV Benevela, and to offer suggestions for enhancing the company’s Bridge Resource Management training on its fleet of boats to avoid a similar incident again. An examination of other similar incidents shows that the main contributing factors to such incidents are a lack of updated navigational data, inadequate bridge team communication, and inadequate track monitoring. As such, this report will provide recommendations on how the company can improve its BRM training to ensure that these issues are addressed and prevent a similar incident from occurring.
Summary of Incident
The incident reportedly occurred when approaching a port with an inbound tanker vessel. The ship, MV Benevela, had left the navigational channel to avoid other vessel traffic in poor visibility and had run aground. An investigation into the recent accident has been launched to better understand the events that took place.
The incident occurred in the early morning hours, with the vessel just outside the port. This report will provide a comprehensive summary of the circumstances leading up to and during the incident. The ship had been traversing the navigational channel and proceeding at 8 knots, with a visibility of 400 meters. The port managers were aware of the vessel’s arrival, including the time and place.
The incident occurred at around 2 a.m. when the MV Benevela ran into another boat, the Blaze. In the dark of the night and with a lot of fog above the waters, the visibility was poor. Hence, the tanker managers were unable to see the incoming vessel in time, thus their collision.
In response, the Benevela lost its navigation course as it tried to evade the Blaze, which was too late. The impact was great, with much damage, and the ship ran aground. The crew, although in great panic, identified the danger and initiated steps to manage the situation. The engines were put in reverse, and the ship was placed on an even keel with the rudder amidships.
The crew also dropped the anchor to stop the vessel from moving further. As there was nothing more to be done by the crew, they watched it to see if what they had done would improve the situation. Sadly, not much enhancement was noted, and the crew had to take further action. They began by establishing communication with the port authorities by sending a distress call.
They responded by quickly sending a survey and tug boat that was to inspect the vessel. They discovered that the ship’s hull, bow and stern sustained the greatest destruction. The vessel was also found to have an ingress of water, causing the ship to list. Rescue teams secured everyone and the vessel was patched up.
Causative Factors of the Incident
The port commanders continued their analysis of the event by interviewing crew workers of the ship and any other person who might have witnessed the occurrence. They also examined the ship, its navigational systems, and the current weather conditions. Poor visibility was a significant factor in the incident, as the tanker could not identify the other vessel in the channel until it was too late. It was challenging for the crew to pinpoint hazards and items in their way, and thus, human error played a central part in the accident’s occurrence.
Moreover, the pilot on board the tanker also contributed to the accident. The pilot had boarded at the pilot station and had not conducted any proper voyage planning or risk assessment before his arrival. This lack of planning meant that the vessel was not adequately prepared for the voyage and could not identify potential hazards and risks in the area. This, combined with the poor visibility, led to the vessel running aground.
Additionally, the Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS) was found to be operating correctly and was providing the crew with the necessary information, but it was not being used effectively. The staff was found to be relying solely on the ECDIS system and not conducting any proper visual checks. No potential hazards or obstacles in the area were identified. The bridge team communication was also found to be inadequate. The bridge team was found to be not communicating effectively and not taking the necessary steps to detect possible dangers or obstructions nearby correctly.
Things That Went Wrong on the Board
On the ship, one of the things that went wrong was the reluctance of the crew members to take precautions to identify other vessels in the waters as they had noted the worsened weather. Another issue was the poor response to the situation due to below-par preparation for such an event. Moreover, due to a lack of situational awareness of the accident by the bridge team, the ships continued to collide, and the actions taken made it worse. The coordination of people on board was also mediocre, which resulted in a lot of confusion and panic as the accident occurred.
Relation of Incident to Other Similar Events
The incident that occurred onboard the tanker vessel is similar to several other marine accidents that have been investigated. Examining these incidents makes it possible to identify the types of causal factors that can lead to such accidents. The first incident that can be used to identify these causal factors is the grounding of the MV Wakashio, which occurred in July 2020.
The vessel was en route to Singapore when it encountered an area of shallow water off the coast of Mauritius (Mauritius: MV Wakashio Oil Spill – Aug 2020, 2020). The navigational systems on the vessel had not been updated with the latest navigational data, and the ship could not detect the shallow area before it had become grounded (Laurette et al., 2021). The investigation identified that the lack of updated navigational data significantly contributed to the incident.
Another occurrence entailed the grounding of the MSC Chitra back in 2010. The vessel had encountered heavy weather conditions, which caused it to lose power and drift off course. The ship then became grounded on a shoal off the coast of Mumbai, India (Meena, 2019). The investigation identified that the lack of an emergency response plan and inadequate navigational charts were the main contributing factors to the incident (MSC Chitra, 2013).
Another illustration is the MV Rena accident, which was due to a combination of factors. Firstly, the vessel’s captain had failed to heed warnings and advisories regarding the reef off the coast of New Zealand and had been unable to take necessary precautions to prevent the vessel from running aground (Sievwright et al., 2019). Furthermore, the navigation equipment and charts on board the vessel were outdated, which meant the captain was unaware of the reef and its exact location (Jo, 2020). Finally, the weather was also a contributing factor, as the vessel encountered heavy seas, which increased the risk of grounding on the reef.
The MOL Comfort incident exemplifies how a vessel can be pushed beyond its limits if overloaded and improperly maintained. The MOL Comfort was a large container ship owned and operated by Japan’s Mitsui O.S.K. Lines (Jo, 2020). On June 17, 2013, it was making its way from Singapore to Jeddah when it catastrophically split in two and sank near the coast of Yemen (MOL Comfort Casualty Report, 2023).
This resulted from a structural fault and excessive cargo loading, which put an enormous strain on the vessel’s structure. At the same time, the lack of maintenance meant that the ship was not inspected for stability or other necessary safety checks. As a result, the ship broke in two and sank, losing all cargo and four crew members.
Another incident that can be employed to understand the causes of ocean vessel accidents is the collision of the USS Fitzgerald and the MV ACX Crystal in June 2017. The primary cause of the crash between the USS Fitzgerald and the MV ACX Crystal was a failure of the crew of the Crystal to maintain a proper lookout (Tadlock et al., 2021). The Crystal was on autopilot, and its staff failed to detect the Fitzgerald’s presence, which led to the collision.
Additionally, the crew of the Crystal could not report the company of the Fitzgerald to the Tokyo Vessel Traffic Service, which could have prevented the accident (Chavez et al., 2021). The Crystal’s crew also failed to respond to the Fitzgerald’s bridge-to-bridge radio calls and could not take appropriate action to avoid the collision.
Furthermore, there was an excessive speed discrepancy between the two vessels. The Fitzgerald was traveling at 17 knots, while the Crystal was traveling at 30 knots (Miller et al., 2020). Additionally, Crystal’s crew failed to sound warning signals or take other evasive action, which could have prevented the accident (Sanjeev, 2019). Lastly, the MV Hebei Spirit is another notable accident that depicts the causes of collisions at sea.
The first factor that led to the crash of the MV Hebei Spirit was a lack of communication (Park et al., 2019). The tugboat, Samho Dream, failed to inform the Hebei Spirit of its intentions and could not take evasive action when the Spirit attempted to make a course change (Barron et al., 2020). The Samho Dream was not adequately equipped with a VHF radio, and the crew could not contact the Hebei Spirit directly (Handl, 2019). The lack of communication significantly contributed to the collision (Nicolas-Kopec, 2021). Furthermore, the captain ignored the surrounding vessels and failed to act appropriately when the Hebei Spirit signaled for a course change.
Recommendations
The first recommendation for the company is to ensure that all bridge personnel receive adequate Bridge Resource Management (BRM) training. This will ensure that all bridge personnel know the guidelines and procedures that should be followed during a voyage and can effectively communicate with each other and collaborate to make the best decisions (Cavaleiro et al., 2020; Röttger & Krey, 2021). The BRM training should also include emergency drills so that all bridge personnel are familiar with the protocols and can respond quickly and effectively in an emergency.
Secondly, management should ensure that the navigation equipment and charts on board the vessels are up to date. This will ensure that the ship can accurately identify any potential hazards or obstacles in the area and that the boats can remain on the safest and most efficient route (Fu et al., 2022). Additionally, the company should ensure that the vessels are adequately equipped with the latest navigational aids, such as radar and GPS (Awan & Al Ghamdi, 2019). Thus, the bridge personnel can accurately and effectively monitor the vessel’s track.
Finally, the business ought to ensure efficient interactions among the bridge team. This will ensure that the bridge personnel can proficiently converse with one another and spot likely dangers or challenges in the region. Besides, the organization ought to guarantee that the bridge staff are accurately educated on using the ECDIS and are acquainted with its capacities and features. This will guarantee that the bridge personnel can viably exploit the ECDIS and make the best choices in any given circumstance.
Conclusion
The tanker vessel incident serves as a clear reminder of the significance of appropriate bridge resource management, current navigational charts and equipment, and efficient bridge team interactions. By making sure that all bridge employees have sufficient BRM training, that the navigational aids and charts are current, and that the bridge team communicates effectively, the corporation can prevent repeat tragedies. The corporation should also ensure that the bridge staff is properly trained to use the ECDIS and that the ships are outfitted with the newest navigational aids, such as radar and GPS. By implementing these measures, the corporation can reduce the likelihood of accidents and guarantee the safe operation of its vessels.
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