Introduction
One of the characteristics of Aristotle’s philosophy is that he based it on real-life things as opposed to abstract ideas. It is this approach to philosophy that probably earned him the title of “father of science” (Socio, 2009). He became the first philosopher to realize that there is a connection between matter and form when he suggested that the two were in fact inseparable (Lloyd, 1981).
This was a result of his efforts in trying to unravel the mystery of the process of change. Traditionally, it was known that for X to become Y, then A must be the same as Y. The contradiction was that if X is the same as Y, then it would not be possible to turn into Y. For instance, we can’t say water is ice because it changes into ice. Aristotle’s philosophy on the process of change is what shed light on this (Socio, 2009).
Theory of Form
Aristotle’s main problem was in the theory of being and becoming as had been suggested by Plato (Savitt, 2006). He had a problem with the concept of subdividing the world into two. He observed that the idea of dualism left a big gap between the two sides. His view was that the world should be looked at as one entity (Woods, 1991). He further observed that separation of form from content usually happens only in the mind and not in practice. As an example, though mankind can tell the difference between color and shape, there aren’t any tangible colorless shapes or shapeless colors. By so doing, Aristotle sought to correct the discrepancy in Plato’s theory for he believed that “intellectual analysis” should never be mistaken for “ontological status” (Jiyuan, 2001).
According to Aristotle’s school of thought, everything had two traits. On one side, anything that can be considered had the same general property that is shared with something else. For instance, man shares the property of procreation with any other mammal. On the other hand, there is a basic trait that a thing shares with another thing. For instance, even though mankind shares the characteristic of procreation with other mammals, man only shares certain characteristics like humanness with fellow man. In the same way, a mammal-like elephant has some characteristics that are absent in man (Charles, 1993).
The choice of Aristotle to base his assertions on natural life and not theories and scientific ideas is what made his ideologies palatable to many scholars. It is easier to identify with a philosophy that borrows from real-life issues as opposed to one that is based on abstract ideas. Aristotle made a very relevant contribution to physics and other sciences when he came up with the theory of form.
Conclusion
The fact that matter and form were inseparable was very useful in understanding the concept of natural changes. It is now possible to understand that matter can in fact exist in different forms and that does not mean that it has changed to another substance. For instance, when water is frozen into ice, it is ideally just water in a different state. This is a concept that had previously been elusive among western thinkers as they debated on the theory of change.
What was confounding them was how a certain thing could change into something else without initially being similar to the end product. The paradox was that for a thing to become something else, it would have to be similar to the other thing but on the other hand, if it was in fact similar, then why to how could it change to be the other thing? Aristotle’s views helped to shed light on this and paved the way to a new approach in science.
References
Charles, D. (1993). Aristotle on Substance, Essence, and Biological Kinds. Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 7(1), 227-261.
Jiyuan, Y. (2001). The Identity of Form and Essence in Aristotle. Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (2), 299-312.
Lloyd, C. (1981). Form and Universal in Aristotle. Liverpool: F. Cairns.
Savitt, S. (2006). Being and Becoming in Modern Physics. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Socio, J. (2009). Archetypes of Wisdom: An Introduction to Philosophy. New York: Cengage Learning.
Woods, M. (1991). Particular Forms Revisited. Phronesis 26(1), 75-87.