Introduction
Ian Manners argues about Europe being a civilian power in contrast with military power and then eventually introduces the idea of normative power in the whole of Europe. Civilian power may be defined as centrally driven economic power for achieving common national goals, diplomatic cooperation for achieving national goals, and international progress via institutions that have international applicability or are beyond the national borders. (Ian, 2002)
Hedley Bull criticized civilian power as ineffective and deficient in military power. He wanted EC to exhibit military power through; nuclear deterrence, rebuilding conventional forces; more emphasis on Germany and France, and being careful with its continental neighbors the Soviet Union and the US. Military power Europe expectation may be partially met by European security and defense policy (ESDP) charter demanding that 60,000 rapid deployment force be available by end of 2003. These discussions of military power and civilian power may have common roots as both of these aspects of power are aimed at strengthening the international societal outlook and not just civil aspects of society. The basic required result might be considered as strengthening of Europe as an economic power, as Ian quotes Duchene, or as per Bull requirement for military power. The eventual convergence is around European interests whether by civilian dimension or the military one. Ian thus agrees on normative power as better reflective of the EU’s role in world politics, rather than discussion of civilian or military power. Normative power thus focuses attention on the inclusion of cognitive processes rather than institutions or policies only, into an understanding of the EU’s international identity. An apt succinct description and difference between these three powers are presented in the following table. (Ian, 2002)
Devolutions of power
Comparing the three devolutions of power that normative power is a more abstracted form of the other two, this does not decrease the importance of the other two powers, it just brings them into a different perspective. (Ian, 2002)
EU’s normative difference according to Ian stems from its historical roots and political-legal constitution. The current forms of governance may be a milieu of supranational and international forms. Constitutional norms that transcend borders may be thought of as representative of the EU’s normative identity. As Ian quotes Alston and Weiler, human rights focus is of paramount importance and one of the central characteristics that define the EU. Ian cites other sources as well all highlighting the dignity of human rights as necessary and of fundamental importance. EU has further codified its relations with external entities based on following strings of norms that parallel the European convention on human rights and fundamental freedoms (ECHR) and the universal declaration of human rights (UDHR). Ian rejects the notion that normative power requires appropriate support in conventional power and force availability – so that normative power basis can be asserted truly. Ian believes, that normative power does not require any supporting force applicability, and he launches into a discussion of normative basis to support his point. (Ian, 2002)
The normative basis
The normative basis is a combination of core factors of peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights, and fundamental freedom. These aspects form the cornerstone of EU criteria adopted in 1993. In addition, other important norms are social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development, and finally good governance. These norms have grown from the postwar period o the post-communism era. The necessity of peace and democratic principles foreshadowed the development of these norms. The EU’s normative basis from the founding principles mentioned above results in the expression of fundamental rights like dignity, freedom, equality, solidarity, citizenship, and justice as corresponding to each of the cornerstone norms. (Ian, 2002)
Becoming a normative power requires the actual application of the cornerstone norms. Ian believes EU’s norms are diffused via strategic communication of new policy initiatives, and announcements from EU head. Another aspect of incorporation of these norms may be in the procedural elements where engagement with the third part and EU help in the dissemination of norms. Transference of goods and services requires conditionality and possible deployment of such transferred goods and services conditional upon satisfying the preconditions. Overt diffusion occurs through the physical presence of EU members amongst external countries and states and finally cultural filter. How these factors come into play can be seen as the EU seeks to promulgate the “abolition of the death penalty”. (Ian, 2002)
Helene (2006) has mentioned that the EU is distinguished by being both civilian as well as a normative power. Helene analyses the ascription of the EU as normative power through series of questions, whether the EU’s normative power rating applies in general to international trade, global economic justice, etc. Helene also believes that the EU’s normative power has a connection with the EU’s international relations and foreign policy. Since the EU encompasses more than a nation-state EU’s normative power extends beyond the state’s sovereignty. Military power adds a more interesting twist. As mentioned above EU had provisioned for military force by 2003. It was in March 2003 that the first military mission of the EU was launched followed Operation Artemis at the request of the UN for peacekeeping in Congo. EU has developed its military powers and is further enhancing its battle forces to augment its military capabilities. As for governance increases and goes beyond borders questions about the protection of rights as human rights, universality, and sovereignty beyond borders become important issues. Helene says Ian Manners is wary of the EU’s ability to remain as normative power as militarization increases and EU’s policies become more jingoistic. Helene further states by applying these concepts to EU’s external policies would enable us to understand how normative power EU may be EU that pursues policies considered appropriate under the given attribution. Helene states that the EU may be confused as to which role, civilian or normative it is expected to play. (Helene, 2006)
Political thinkers Donhoff and Duchene, according to Ian, emphasized political peace by the metamorphosis of conflict into peace. This was suggested both through civil actions and other rallying actions that engender pacifist movements. If political culture can be qualified as a harbinger of pacifist movements then there is a strong need of transferring these percepts to EU external action and using these percepts for prevention of violent conflicts in Yugoslavia and Rwanda, areas where the EU sent its military interventions. Instead, Ian suggests the term sustainable peace was defined as a series of ideas about conflict prevention, and involving both short term problem resolution and long term problem structural solutions for conflict prevention (Ian, 2006).
Sustainable peace focuses on the rights of people involved in the conflict, rather than thrusting external sympathy and brief interventions that do not provide sustainable solutions. Sustainable interventions would involve short and long-term conflict management and preventions schemes along with building up of civil capacity to manage conflicts and enable reconciliatory forces. As EU Swedish and Finnish foreign ministers suggested the idea is to prevent the conflict from erupting and provide an enabling attitude and milieu that fosters the conditions for sustainable peace, by democratic, economic, socio-political means (Ian, 2006).
Ian Manners further explores how the events of 9/11 and 11 March 2004 and the US-led invasion of Iraq, forced inveterate militarization on to EU. This forced militarization forced the EU into adopting a more militaristic attitude than it had earlier envisioned for itself. Despite earlier misgivings about ESDP policy missions, and the supposed nonmilitary nature of them would be a mission, the militaristic element has become all too prominent (Ian 2006). There have been two EU missions whose experiences can shed some light on EU peacekeeping missions. The operation Artemis in Bunia had a very limited scope, it failed to achieve even demilitarization in Bunia. Operation EUFOR Althea in Bosnia went through selective phases of working out with local administration and even appointment of EU’s special representative. The focus was on military objectives without focus on local logistics and infrastructure build-up and this led to “dependency, helplessness and
Disillusionment” (Ian, 2006). Thus militarization of the EU may make it like super powers or better powers, however, it will not lead to an increase in its power in the state and intrastate politics. Another problem with increased militarization in the EU may coerce the EU to use short-term military interventions rather than traditional reliance on longer-term structural reforms and managing conflicts. There will also be danger of peacekeeping missions becoming peace-making ones and the increased presence of EU military personnel in situations where EU civilians worked will undermine the EU’s peaceful normative power (Ian, 2006).
Ian asserts that the EU portrays itself as constructed on a normative basis and this makes it act in a normative way in world politics. One case Ian cites is the abolition of the death penalty in which exercising normative power was aptly demonstrated. This required trespassing on state sovereignty, bypassing heads of state and writing to prison guards, intervening in case of prisoners who were under 18 at the time of committing the crime, and facing the wrath of other countries like the US, China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, etc. who have the death penalty in place.
EU’s after the cold war
Adrian (2006) suggests that after the cold war ended EU’s been conceptualized as a civilian or normative power and charged with the mandate of transformation of international society or providing a ‘civilizing’ influence. Adrian goes on to present a different view from what has been largely promulgated and describes the international role of the EU from an abstracted position. Such approaches have inherent failing possibility because of extrapolation of national or subnational elements to a wider international outcome. Adrian believes that Neorealism is one of the most sophisticated and influential theories in international politics yet this has not been applied to EU’s foreign and other policies.
According to Adrian (2006), core assumptions in neorealism are that International systems are anarchic, and everyone is fighting for its survival. This also indicates a high degree of instability and increased chances of a conflict. This also means that states would have to look inwards for their security and survival, build a self-help system; states are the primary international actors and international politics may have a very important rival the state itself. The state is competing with other actors in the international arena and states usually set the rules for other actors including the EU; States are functionally similar – in anarchic systems units are functionally similar exhibiting similar institutional features. Functional similarity dictates that the powerful states would have a balanced portfolio of power capability, i.e. military capability – the ability to destroy or hurt one another significantly; finally states are rational unitary actors – capable of acting on basis of cost and benefits of weighing alternative courses (Adrian, 2006).
These assumptions allow inference of the following propositions; Increased security competition as states are vying for their survival in a self-help system, adding a “sword of Damocles” fear undermining cooperation between incumbents; preservation and aggrandizing power is of paramount importance in the backdrop of paranoid fears; focus on relative gains vis-à-vis the neighboring or another state that may be a potential enemy; larger states have a higher stake in regional governance and correspondingly in shaping the external environment; other concerns include pursuance of national interests, which may range from environmental protection to human rights issue. Adrian believes that the EU is already espousing minor concerns of member states, as member states see the EU as an emblem of virtuous force. The further following ethical dictum has led the EU to advocate an end to capital punishment – which has not affected trade or balance of power (Adrian, 2006).
Conclusion
The currently unipolar world means post-breakup of USSR, USA was left as the only superpower, with a unique position in global politics. The US has military power, economic, scientific, technological, and cultural power. This US can afford to pay less attention to European Allies and use power to its advantage. As far as Europe is concerned it is characterized by multipolarity, where levels of suspicion and fear amongst incumbent players are higher. Europe has diversified into five big powers; the USA, Russia, Germany, France, and the UK. The strongest European contender is
Germany but its collective power is not that differentiated from UK and France to make a bid for regional hegemony (Adrian, 2006).
As Ian (2002) suggests the idea of EU representing a normative power is not contradictory, rather besides civilian and/or military powers Europe should be considered a normative power (Ian, 2002)
References
- Adrian Hyde-Price (2006). ‘Normative’ power Europe: a realist critique. Journal of European Public Policy. 13:2: 217–234
- Ian Manners (2002). Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? JCMS. Volume 40. Number 2. pp. 235–58
- Helene Sjursen (2006). What kind of power? Journal of European Public Policy. 13:2: 169–181
- Ian Manners (2006). Normative power Europe reconsidered: beyond the crossroads. Journal of European Public Policy. 13:2, 182–199