Why Do States Acquire Nuclear Weapons, and What Are the Implications for Counter-Proliferation Efforts?
The issue of nuclear weapons, their development, proliferation, and counter-proliferation have continually been discussed from the first launch of an a-bomb. The topic itself is controversial and sensitive at the same time because it touches upon themes that include national security, wars, foreign and domestic policy, etc. There are various reasons why states acquire nuclear weapons: these weapons are seen as a security tool, they serve national interests of a state and they can symbolize the state and its identity. Although such use of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) seems reasonable to some, it should be noted that deterrence and containment do not always work, and a state’s security can be easily compromised even if it possesses a large nuclear arsenal. One of the most prominent examples is the 9/11 terrorist attack. Since terrorists are not regarded as a military force belonging to any state and are not linked to particular states, nuclear weapons have little chance of providing security to states that are targets for terrorists. The expansion of a nuclear arsenal in any state leads to the same expansion by other states; therefore, the number of nuclear weapons may double or triple, but the state and its international security remain vulnerable. Thus, counter-proliferation strategies and policies need to be developed to avoid a war involving WMD or at least reduce the damage to the lowest level. In this paper, I will address the following questions: why do states create and purchase nuclear weapons, and what implications exist for counter-proliferation efforts?
WMD can be a useful tool of deterrence and containment, but their potential is so catastrophic that the only efficient strategy against a possible mass-destructive war would be the implementation of ambitious and well-supported counter-proliferation programs and policies. However, the number of nuclear weapons will grow as states create nuclear weapons not only for their defense but also because the weapons serve the national interests of the country.
Why Do States Acquire Nuclear Weapons?
As Sagan (1996, p.57) states in his article on nuclear weapons, states decide to acquire nuclear weapons for three main reasons. The first is the security model (Sagan 1996). Since nuclear weapons and WMD potentially have enormously destructive power, each state that wants to ensure its security from the intervention of a rival state also possessing nuclear weapons has to have a nuclear arsenal. As the author explains, two possible policies can emerge from this situation: powerful states can develop their own nuclear weapons, although it is costly; and those states that are not as powerful or simply weak will have to join an alliance with nuclear power. Although this option is the only one available to a more vulnerable state, it does not necessarily lead to the desired guarantee of deterrence. These guarantees can beak down if another state with nuclear power chooses to attack the weaker ally ā in this case, the more powerful state will have to consider retaliation as a possible future step of the attacker (Sagan 1996).
Because states may decide to acquire nuclear weapons to ensure national security, this decision-making results in a chain reaction when two possible rivals trigger other states to purchase and develop WMD. After the United States had developed the atomic bomb, the USSR launched a nuclear program as well. The United Kingdom and France then acquired nuclear weapons because they believed the arsenal of the USSR presented a danger. At the same time, China developed its nuclear arsenal as well. At last, India felt the need to acquire nuclear weapons due to its war with China in the 1960s. As can be seen, the chain reaction was set in motion, resulting in the development of several nuclear arsenals.
The next reason is the domestic politics model. The acquisition of nuclear powers can serve the interests of several parties, including the official nuclear energy establishment, actors in the military, and politicians from those states where the development of nuclear weapons is supported by individual parties or the public (Sagan 1996). In contrast to the first model, this model argues that the development of nuclear weapons is supported by the elite and the military because of their personal interest in this weaponry. However, to explain the state’s need for nuclear weapons, individual parties offer reasons involving security, while having a personal interest in them. This assumption is supported by another article on nuclear weapons; since it is impossible to determine what views have influenced the elite’s decision to support the development of WMD, it remains unknown whether nuclear weapons are developed to maintain national security or because they serve someone’s interests (Press, Sagan & Valentino 2013).
Another fact that can support this model is North Korea’s policy on nuclear weapons and proliferation. According to Nikitin (2013, p. 21), the state has several reasons to continue the development of nuclear weapons: “financial profit, joint exchange of data to develop its own systems, and as part of the general provocative trend”. As North Korea (i.e. the elite and the military) is interested in maintaining its regime and not in confronting the United States in a military conflict, it is reasonable to assume that it will not sell its weapons or technology related to the development of nuclear warheads to other, non-nuclear states.
Another example of how personal opinion can influence a decision on nuclear weapons is the trial of a nuclear bomb in India in 1974. According to Sagan (1996), the prime minister was informed of the final test decision by the pro-bomb scientists in the AEC, and the foreign minister received the notification 48 hours before the detonation.
The third model that Sagan (1996) discusses is the norms model. This model suggests that nuclear weapons serve as symbols; the mere existence of nuclear weaponry in a state can be regarded as a tool of enhancement of international prestige for the state. In this case, the nuclear arsenal is seen as symbolic, similar to Olympic teams or airlines.
What Are the Implications for Counter-Proliferation Efforts?
As the number of nuclear warheads grew, so did the concerns of the states, the public, scientists, activists, and other parties. First, nuclear weapons can lead to changes in foreign policy, including aggression and expansion (Bell 2015). Recent examples that support this assumption are the Ukrainian and Crimean crises. In January 1994, an agreement on the denuclearization of Ukraine was facilitated between Ukraine, Russia, and the United States (Baker 2013). The nuclear weapons that Ukraine owned were sent to Russia for dismantlement. In return, the United States and Russia provided security assurances: both states asserted that they would ensure Ukraine’s national security and respect its independence (Baker 2013). Nevertheless, in February 2014, Crimea was annexed by Russia after the former president of Ukraine fled the country (Marxsen 2014). As can be seen, denuclearization of one country was seen by Russia as an opportunity to aggressively expand its territories.
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the NPT) was signed in 1968. Today, some argue that the NPT is failing; therefore, counter-proliferation has the potential for a more significant influence on the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Counter-proliferation implies that states are to use military force to counter the use of nuclear warheads (De Volpi 2013). However, counter-proliferation can also include diplomatic actions. What are the implications for counter-proliferation efforts? First, it reduces the possibility that other states will produce weapons secretly (Ragheb 2016). Second, as technologies continue to develop, some of them can also present a danger. For example, 3-D printing can make the manufacture of weapons (including nuclear weapons) easier, whilst international security will have challenges in detecting it (Kroenig & Volpe 2015). Third, not every country will agree to sign a treaty supporting counter-proliferation. Although the United States tried using a diplomatic approach and pressure to influence Iran, it did not gain more control over Iran’s nuclear program (Zarate 2013). Fourth, counter-proliferation does not always target other states. For example, President Obama suggested that the United States should both prevent nuclear proliferation and reduce the role of these weapons in the national security of the country (Bentley & Holland 2013).
Nuclear weapons can be dangerous to any state because of nuclear terrorism that cannot be adequately deterred by states with nuclear power (Klein 2012). Nevertheless, since many of the terrorist groups prepare their actions logically, it is possible to prevent their actions with specific anti-proliferation policies.
Conclusion
States can acquire nuclear weapons for various reasons, including national security concerns, domestic policies that are lobbied for by the elite or military because of their interest in nuclear weapons, the symbolism of nuclear weapons, or their ability to expand the state’s opportunities. Counter-proliferation policies are needed because not all states that own nuclear weapons can be controlled, nuclear weapons can be exploited by terrorists and modern technologies are capable of increasing the danger.
Reference List
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Bell, MS 2015, ‘Beyond emboldenment: how acquiring nuclear weapons can change foreign policy’, International Security, vol. 40, no. 1, pp. 87-119.
Bentley, M & Holland, J 2013, Obama’s foreign policy: ending the war on terror, Routledge, London.
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