Introduction
Today, the US ocean and naval transportation represent one of the most important industries with millions of annual profits and strong commercial relations with all parts of the world. Today,.concepts of maritime strategy are about the ability and policies of a country to use the sea for its own economic, political, strategic, and military advantage. It is clear therefore that institutions, legal regimes, and arrangements for oceans governance should have vital input into maritime strategic thinking, although perhaps some of the intellectual links and processes here are not as well developed as they might be (Attard, 92(). The two concepts of oceans governance and maritime strategy are inked together representing and reflecting a national vision and understanding of the ocean and naval transportation sphere. The US ocean and naval transportation are based on century-old traditions and principles, values, and ethics which guide the industry and stipulate its main functions and legal principles. Today, the US ocean and naval transportation is a fast-growing industry regulated by international laws and national security principles. This is in response to the jurisdictional revolution in the law of the sea, the expansion of economic activities at sea, increased concern for the health of the world’s oceans, and awareness of the importance of ecologically sustainable development.
History of Ocean Transpiration
From Columbus to 1900
The history of ocean and navel transpiration foes back to the colonization period and is closely connected with the first colonists. The first businessmen in America were the agents of colonial promoters resident in England. The function of these agents was to import into the infant settlements the food supplies and the tools and building materials so desperately needed by the pioneers of the early seventeenth century and to dispatch to England the paltry amounts of furs, skins, and staple products collected in payment (Chapin 54). As the controls of the English promoters weakened because of heavy financial losses, interlopers made their way into the colonial trade. At the outset, these were ship captains, whole or part owners of their vessels and cargoes, but sometimes agents of English mercantile houses. Forefathers of the tramp traders of a later period, these peddlers of the sea visited the coastal towns of Massachusetts and the settlements ringing the Chesapeake Bay, exchanging supplies, manufactured goods, and in some cases slaves and servants, for whatever the local people had to offer (Adede 44).
After the Constitution was adopted and a stronger government was set in operation, the first legislative proposals included measures to aid and promote shipping. In 1789, Congress adopted a law, later to cause much controversy, to the effect that only ships built in the United States and belonging to citizens thereof could be privileged to register under the American flag (Ademuni, 12). During the 18th century, the growth and development of river transpiration had a great impact on ocean transpiration means. Work on steam engines had been in progress in England since the early eighteenth century, and experiments with steamboats were undertaken in the United States by Oliver Evans, James Rumsey, John Fitch, and John Stevens, among others. Fitch was the first to get a practical steamboat in operation. The development of ocean transpiration was influenced by economic growth and international trade: cotton, timber, and tobacco industry development. Work on steam engines had been in progress in England since the early eighteenth century, and experiments with steamboats were undertaken in the United States by Oliver Evans, James Rumsey, John Fitch, and John Stevens, among others (McDowell 72). Fitch was the first to get a practical steamboat in operation. An itinerant clock repairer with a suspicious, contentious nature but extraordinary mechanical ingenuity, After receiving the reports of the cruisers and if necessary buying land or stumpage (i.e., the timber on the land), mill owners arranged to send logging crews to the area selected for operations. Sometimes the crews were employees of the mill owners; more often they were independent outfits working under contract. But the building and operation of steamships required the resources and organization of big business, and–at the early stage of development–government assistance. In a few short years, therefore, both here and in Europe ocean steamship lines became the large government-sponsored enterprises, few in number and heavily freighted with the national interest, which they remain today (Soares et al 82),
The entire period from 1815 to the clipper ship era in the ‘Fifties was marked by a steady growth of the merchant marine both during the period when discriminating duties were in force and during the period when reciprocity had superseded the earlier policy. This growth, it should be noted, was at a considerably slower pace than that maintained during the Napoleonic wars, and shipping never again achieved the same relative importance that it had during that period. The Civil War led to the decay of the merchant marine. The South succeeded, with its armed cruisers, in striking terror into the hearts of the northern shipowners. The need for naval protection was demonstrated once again. Many owners sold their ships to foreigners at panic prices and others laid up the vessels in port and hesitated to operate them. A total of 750,000 tons of shipping, about one-third of the fleet engaged in the foreign trade, was sold (Mears 81).
1900-1950
The results of its deliberations were the Hanna-Payne, and, at a somewhat later date, the Frye bills. The former was in the form of a bounty, compensation being granted on the basis of gross tonnage, mileage, and speed. The Hanna-Payne bill did not come to a vote but in the expectation of the passage of this or a similar bill, a number of steamers were constructed (Radius 33). The bill provided to all American ships in the foreign trade a general bounty of both outward and inward voyages. This decline in the price of steel in the United States led to the formation of the steel trust and by 1902 American steel was again at a price substantially higher than British steel. The conclusion of the Democrats and other opponents of the subsidy was, that if steel were sold to the shipbuilders at a reasonable price, they would have so great an advantage over English builders that no subsidy would be necessary (Mance 101).
An emergency measure enacted in August 1914 was the ship registry law. This act was passed at the request of American capitalists who owned ships operating under British and other foreign flags. These ship-owners had refused to take advantage of the American registry provisions of the Panama Canal Act, but now that their ships were in danger of capture or destruction by the enemy they were eager to seek the protection of a neutral flag. The ship registry act extended this protection in a most liberal form. On April 14, 1917, Philip Manson, president of the Pacific and Eastern Steamship Company, submitted a plan for constructing the proposed Shipping Board fleet in small Government shipyards (Mance 82). The “scientific subsidy law” of 1936 marked the first acceptance of subsidy legislation by the Democratic party which previously had been a consistent opponent of this type of special privilege legislation (Soares 43).
The sponsorship of subsidy legislation by President Roosevelt contributed to the reversal of policy, but of somewhat greater importance was the universally recognized necessity of ending the evils of the mail contract system. Congress was unwilling to abandon completely the principle of private ownership in the foreign shipping business. Having convinced itself that the foreign trade merchant fleet was an important national interest, the commission proceeded to investigate the reasons for the failure of the American fleet to keep pace with the fleets of other nations. This failure was found to be the result of three causes: the higher cost of building American ships, the higher cost of operating the same ships, and the foreign subsidies which, it was claimed, gave foreign shipping an undue advantage (Marx 33).
Before World War I, foreign ships were allowed, however, to call at any American port as long as they did not take on cargo for discharge at another domestic harbor. At the time of the passage of the original coastal monopoly act, the United States had no seacoast on the Pacific and only a limited seacoast on the Gulf of Mexico. With the acquisition of additional territory, the law became increasingly significant; its provisions were extended to cover trade between the Atlantic and the Pacific coast and, later, commerce with Alaska (Dilger, 19). A second means of extending indirect aid to the merchant marine was the readoption of a policy of discriminating duties. These imposts had been in effect during the early years of the Republic which were also years of great prosperity in the shipping industry. Under these conditions of panic, American exporters sought desperately to secure shipping to carry their cargoes abroad (Soares 23). For a time this was almost impossible since the United States had practically no foreign trade fleet and since the ships of the belligerent powers were tied up in the ports because their owners feared they would be captured. To make the situation even more difficult, the marine insurance companies hesitated to write insurance for cargoes on ships sailing into European waters. Their rates soared to exorbitant heights. The prediction by shipping lobbyists of a shipping crisis in the event of a European war had materialized (Gravson 55).
1950-Present
The main changes in ocean and naval transportation took place between the 1950s 1990s influenced by international politics and a new world order system. During the Cold War, US seapower dominated the seas of the world while the Soviet Union also tried to develop a formidable navy to challenge American governance of the world’s oceans. However, the Soviet challenge was effectively met by US seapower, and the safety of sea lanes was guaranteed. Most of the countries belonging to the maritime global alliance led by the US were trading states whose national security and economic prosperity were heavily dependent upon the safety of the sea lanes. Without effective seapower of their own, these countries felt secure under the umbrella of US seapower (Rose 41; U.S. Bureau of the Census. 2001). The US provided security of the sea lanes as the common good for all its allies. The American alliance with the East Asian states also had maritime characteristics. The US established bilateral alliances with Korea and Japan in the early 1950s and also formed the ANZUS treaty in 1951. These alliances were made possible only through the connecting highways running across both the northern and southern Pacific Ocean (Soares 25).
During the Cold War, the US devised various tactics and strategies for winning the war. Among many American strategies, the entangling military alliance with countries in Western Europe and East Asia was most important (Rose 62). The US thus successfully contained the Soviet expansionist threat through its superior naval forces. Strong American naval power also guaranteed the safety of the sea lanes of communication (SLOG) of all five oceans of the world. Therefore, US allies, most of which are also capitalist maritime states, were provided with SLOG security without the need to build up their own naval forces. SLOG security was a common good provided by the US during the Cold War era. The United States Navy (USN) reached its peak during the early 1980s when President Reagan’s arms build-up plan was launched. The 600–ship navy was the motto of the Reagan years and the Reagan plan was the underlying factor of the collapse of the Soviet Union (Rose 65; US. Department of Transportation. 1990).
During the 1970s-1990s, the classical maritime strategists were able to view the ocean as a great international ‘common’, a highway of trade and commerce, and the vital means by which the imperial powers were able to exercise their strategic domination and extend their influence around the world. Through a proliferation of international treaties dealing with marine issues, particularly the preservation and protection of the marine environment, there has been a great codification recently of the rights and obligations of countries to use the oceans (Whitnah, 4). The result is n increasingly complex array of rules and guidelines dealing with what countries can do in ocean areas, where they can do it, how they exercise their rights and duties at sea, and what the ships and fishing vessels flying their national flags can and cannot do. First and foremost with these international treaties, we have the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (or LOSC or UNCLOS, as it is variously known). It codifies a universal and balanced set of rights and responsibilities for the users of the world’s oceans. It provides the foundation for subsequent international treaties and ‘soft law’ instruments dealing with the oceans and activities at sea (Whitnah, 15).
Modern Ocean Transpiration in the USA
There are profound changes that have occurred in recent decades in the operating environment of navies. The naval operating environment is now much more regulated by new regimes of oceans governance than it was previously. It is incumbent upon navies to identify the implications of these new regimes for naval operations, including the role that navies will have in the enforcement of the regimes. In the past, navies have tended to see these non-war-fighting missions as detracting from their ‘core business but it is not a ‘zero-sum’ game and navies may have to accept new roles, particularly in high seas enforcement, without any reduced emphasis on their primary war-fighting missions. These new roles could lead to new types of a naval vessels, such as long-range, high-endurance, capable, patrol vessels, possibly operated cooperatively by two or more countries or on a regional basis (U.S. General Accounting Office 2000).
At the beginning of the 21st century, the US has one of the best and innovative transportation means. Despite recent developments with oceans governance, including the introduction (but not necessarily implementation) of international conventions, fundamental tensions remain between different uses of the sea and the extent of the sovereignty or sovereign rights an individual country can exercise at sea. Recent incidents, including disputes over ownership of the Spratly and Senkaku Islands in Asia, arrests by Royal Australian Navy vessels of illegal fishing vessels off Heard Island, and the dispute between Australia and Japan over southern bluefin tuna all demonstrate how problems over marine sovereignty and resources can arise (Rose 76).
International Policies
Marine Protected Area (MPA) is the first global instrument to establish a framework procedure allowing non-flag states to board and inspect fishing vessels of another state on the oceans Parties to MPA agree to have their vessels subject to inspection by another party on the high seas even if they are not a party to regional measures. By becoming parties to MPA a state would be bound to respect the conservation measures for straddling stocks and highly migratory species which two or more states may adopt for any region of the world, as far as such measures are consistent with the rules of international law as reflected in the MPA. Another Important document is the UN Implementing Agreement (Rose 79). To date, it has received 18 ratifications and has been signed by 59 states. Japan and Korea have signed it and the US has ratified. Australia signed The UN Implementing Agreement on 4 December 1995 and is currently determining what the full legal implications of ratification are (Rose 80).
Local Situation
In spite of great changes in legislation and international policies, in the US direct shipment may have the disadvantages of poorer services and higher costs, but the use of air freight and the reduction in inventory costs may make direct shipments more economical (Rose 69). The feasibility of making direct shipments depends on such factors as unit value and perishability of the product, the size of the customer’s order, the geographic location of customers, the required speed of delivery, service, transportation alternatives, and above all, the impact on sales. For the lowest possible physical distribution costs can also have the adverse effect of causing a more than proportionate reduction on profits. Rather than ship direct to customers, it may be more economical to make shipments in bulk to regional warehouses and fill customer orders from these stocks (Rose 76). Manufacturers who use regional distribution centers have the option of owning warehouses or leasing warehouse space. Leasing is a more flexible option and requires lower capital outlays. Leasing costs are roughly proportionate to volume since warehousing space can be expanded or reduced to meet needs. In determining whether to have regional warehouses, companies must balance the benefits of better delivery and services and reduced freight costs against the costs of operating such centers. Large national and international companies often own their own warehouses. They have the volume and stability of demand to support them. Conditions in smaller companies usually favor leasing or a combination of owning and leasing. Large companies usually have several plants and several distribution centers. They must then decide what quantities to ship from each factory to each warehouse, or from each warehouse to each customer, so as to minimize distribution costs. Linear programming has been used to reach the optimal solutions for such questions. The more complex problem of future distribution-center locations to minimize distribution costs, or at least realize savings, has been approached successfully by simulation (Rose 84).
Future Perspectives
It is possible to assume that doing the next decades the US government will upgrade its ocean transpiration and invest heavily in new shipyards and innovative technologies. The new regimes of oceans governance at the global and regional levels, as well as oceans policy at a national level, are important inputs to maritime strategy. Oceans policy sets out a strategy for maximizing economic, social, and political benefits from the oceans and is the basis of both oceans governance and maritime strategy. If one eschews a purely military concept of maritime strategy then in many ways a comprehensive oceans policy, establishing a development and management regime for national maritime interests, constitutes a large element of maritime strategy. Two main implications for navies flow out of consideration of the challenge of oceans governance. The first is the role of navies in contributing to more effective oceans governance and promoting maritime cooperation, and the second is the greater priority now to be attached to the protection of offshore areas and resources both in national areas of maritime jurisdiction and possibly on the high seas. This protection is an integral component of national security. The international community and individual nations are paying increased attention to the needs of oceans governance. Historical facts suggest that ocean and navel transportation is influenced greatly by the historical development of the nation and its global political position. These issues determine the scope of authority and international laws, principles and procedures of marine control.
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