Thesis
War principles are complex and dynamic, influencing the operations and tactical considerations leveraged for mission success. Accordingly, some war dynamics require effective joint operations whose elements are best described by the discrepancies in Operation Anaconda. The operation was acknowledged as the most ambitious part of the war to that date (Narbutovskih, 2020). Therefore, the expedition gave insight into the revolution of battle tactics and operations before and during combat. Thus, the events of Operation Anaconda form the basis of this paper, whose primary objective is to assess the effectiveness of the operations and tactical framework of the battle. The chosen objectives for this paper include the following:
- Objective 1. The effectiveness of the operation’s command structures and communication paradigms for expeditionary explorations and tactical battles.
- Objective 2. Assessing the impact of intelligence accuracy on tactical and operational outcomes.
- Objective 3. The influence of mutual understanding and trust in battles.
Introduction
Over the years, war has been a recurring concept that has revolutionized its application of strategies, tactics, and the inherent application of technology. Accordingly, Operation Anaconda was among the notable missions in the Afghanistan war that it embarked on in January 2002 after the Tora Bora mission of December 2001 (Wright et al., 2010). The concerted efforts were developed against Al Qaeda, leading to a standoff in the Shah-I-Kot Valley against combined forces that constituted the International Security Assistance Forces and the US forces. The mission successfully achieved the central objective of overrunning the authority that the terrorist group had in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, despite victory and success in the battle, there have been criticisms of the effectiveness of the tactical and strategic achievements of the operation. Narbutovskih (2020) stated that the operations led to significant casualties, with 8 Americans dead and 82 wounded, with a higher frequency for the allied forces. As such, the operations were an essential benchmark of war efforts whose tactical and operational frameworks were not celebrated. Critics presented significant flaws in various aspects of the war, presenting the dynamic perception of preparations for battle and tactical preparedness and operations.
Command Structures and Future Joint Expeditions
As a joint expedition with the allied forces against the insurgence of Al Qaeda, Operation Anaconda had a significant issue in its command structure that presented substantial risks of failure. The predominant command structure was associated with integrating ground-air forces characterized as independent forces. Consequently, due to the autonomy of action, the main challenge was a breakdown in exercising coordinated action with ineffective lines of communication (Payne, 2019). The inconsistency of command led to failed air support action, a drawback in the subterranean mountain expeditions. The resultant effect led to the escape of some of the insurgent leaders, thus accentuating the fact that the victory was incomplete. Primarily, the ground team was led by Major General Hagenbeck of the 10th Mountain Division, who was assigned as the overall operations leader weeks into the operations (Payne, 2019). The command system lacked preparation before missions, creating an undefined communication chain.
Command structures stretched to indifferences between upper echelons that ignored conditions on the ground. In this light, Payne (2019) deciphered that the decision-makers made uncalculated decisions in the battle without factoring in the challenges and battlefield environment that soldiers faced. The decisions led to the occasional denial of CAS strikes by the CAOC, which had an inherent desire to be independent and control all air operations. Ultimately, the effect caused a lack of tactical communication between ground and air teams, with one line of communication to the upper echelons and no direct coordination. Effective activity would require real-time coordination between the CAS strike operators and soldiers on the ground for timely action.
The implications of Operation Anaconda presented a need for future joint expeditions to identify the power structure before combat. The conceptualization indicated the necessity of breaking down the barriers of independence of action to ensure coordination among forces. However, the chain of command does not only imply selecting central leaders with autonomy. The mismatch in coordination presents the need to establish command chains even among troops to ensure timely decision-making. An assumption made is that Al Qaeda would not have escaped through the caves and tunnels if the soldiers on the field and the CAS operators had a sense of authority to act on real-time intelligence.
The Challenge of Generating Accurate Intelligence Estimates of Enemy Forces, Intentions, and Capabilities for Tactical Battles
A determining factor of war is the quality of intelligence and communication. In this case, accuracy and timely access to intelligence play an integral in ensuring success in combat. Gilad et al. (2020) highlighted that it offers an indispensable tactical and strategic advantage over enemies, supplementing the capacity to improve forward-looking battle preparations of necessary troops, infrastructure, and weaponry. However, Operation Anaconda presented a failure in its intelligence systems to position the enemies accurately. Narbutovskih (2020) documented the events of the first two days, whereby on landing the MH-47 Chinook, the SOF troops fell under fire from an enemy whose presence at the hilltop was unprecedented. During the evacuation, Petty Officer 1st Class Neil Robert fell from the MH-7 open ramp and had to be left lest the entire troop be killed. This unfortunate event reinforced the issue of unnecessary risks from inaccurate data as a rescue mission had to follow in which an entire team was pinned down. The soldiers would then be subjected to unprecedented fire that disadvantaged them.
Furthermore, intelligence accuracy transcended enemy positioning to include elements of determining the enemy’s capabilities. Contrary to the intel offered, Al Qaeda possessed heavy artillery with a fixed heavy machine gun, multiple firing positions, and rocket-propelled grenades. In the wake of setting up the ground base, the SOF lost three helicopters and seven elite operators due to intelligence inconsistency (Narbutovlandingsskih, 2020). Accordingly, the implications of such a disaster forced helicopters to redirect and land in other locations. Through adaptive measures, the team could land on alternative landing ones that were not premeditated. The adaptive measures are presented in light as a prerequisite in combat training to allow the management of adversities or shifts of battle environments. Nonetheless, the lack of accurate positioning of enemies was a recurring challenge throughout the mission cycle.
Imperfect or incomplete imaging of the battlefield was an integral component of the tactical approach to battle. Milkovich (2018) indicated no meetings between Hagenbek’s ground staff and the CAOC created an incomplete perception of the area from air pictures. As such, the intelligence system did not anticipate the rugged terrain of Shah Ikot Valley, which affected the ground forces’ capacity to conduct their mission objective (Caruso, 2012). The challenges included establishing suitable helicopter landing zones as the top of the mountains had sharp peaks (Wright et al., 2010). Therefore, airmobile troops had difficulty accessing the battlefield for quick infiltration. Additionally, the terrain instigated a reduced helicopter load, which implied less equipment and soldiers that could be transported. Accordingly, the unprecedented intelligence factors derailed the tactical and strategic completion of the mission objective.
Moreover, the landscape affected battle preparations for the foot soldiers trained for a different altitude. Caruso (2012) pointed out that the teams were forced to battle at higher altitudes, which meant inconveniencies in less oxygenated atmospheric conditions. The SOF ran a significant risk of reduced physiological function due to increased heart rates and hyperventilation. These effects undermine the capacity of the soldiers to conduct the mission under such conditions. Cumulatively, the lessons from the operations presented the risks attached to war with changing intel, requiring proactive, adaptive planning for unprecedented challenges.
Mutual Understanding and Trust in Allied Forces
In combat, allied forces can establish mutual trust to retaliate against a mutual enemy. In the battle of Shah-I-Kot, the application of mutual trust was thus integral to supporting effective mission objectives. However, as established, some sections of the Anaconda had drawbacks, especially in air-ground integration. Wright (2010) presented the necessity of developing the bond between air forces and soldiers to establish pride in each other’s achievements. The lack of mutual understanding showed delays in coordinating tactical air support, influenced by language barriers, as some air support operators were French. A challenge was raised in the capability to create a cohesive unit with varying cultures and systems of operation. There were attempts to integrate a rotational framework of replacing members of both teams to develop a sense of both sides of the fight. Instead, a new challenge was expressed in the rotations as new members struggled to conform to the variations of cultural dynamics, which caused more harm than good in ensuring mutual understanding.
The element of mutual trust and understanding among allied forces was best expressed in the combination of the US and the local government supporting the operation’s access to local intel on enemy operations and location. The approach offered to resolve the challenge of remaining inconspicuous, limiting US soldiers from gaining the locals’ confidence. Therefore, applying mutual trust with local authorities facilitates local insurgence communication, enabling the locals to incorporate the forces among themselves locally.
Conclusion
The battle in Afghanistan was undoubtedly a testing expedition that presented significant flaws in intelligence application and mission coordination. Nonetheless, the mission ended in a victory for the US and allied forces, giving a sense of adaptability to the adversities of the battlefield. As presented, the adaptive application of changing landing zones in the heat of battle allowed pilots to choose alternative landing zones, offering alternatives to the changes in battle environments. The importance of accurate intelligence is given as a fundamental component impacting the preparedness of soldiers. Despite adaptation, the risks were increased and presented a disadvantage for the troops on the ground.
Furthermore, mutual trust is presented as a complex aspect to maintain without a systematic command structure. In some instances, the mutual understanding had implications of unified efforts to survive the mission among foreigners, increasing coordination and trust that each soldier was doing their best. However, on the command level, the limitations of the independence of forces were crucial, risking mission failure. Accordingly, the actions have since then impacted the revolutionizing and identification of air-ground coordinated battle tactics for identifying, positioning, and targeting enemy lines.
References
Caruso, D. (2012). Operation Anaconda: America’s First Major Battle in Afghanistan. Oral History Review, 39(2), 334–336. Web.
Gilad, A., Pecht, E., & Tishler, A. (2020). Intelligence, Cyberspace, and National Security. Defence and Peace Economics, 32(1), 18–45. Web.
Milkovich, N. (2018).AirLand Battle Redux: Evolutions of Air-Ground Integration from the Gulf War to Operation Iraqi Freedom. School of Advanced Military Studies US Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, KS. Web.
Narbutovskih, N. (2020). Minimum Force: Airborne Special Reconnaissance in War. Air and Space Power Journal, 34(3). Web.
Payne, A. (2019). Subterranean Operations and Operational Art. School of Advanced Military Studies US Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, KS. Web.
Wright, D. P., Bird, J. R., Clay, S. E., Connors, P. W., Farquhar, S. C., Garcia, L. C., & Wey, D. F. V. (2010). A Different Kind of War. Combat Studies Institute Press US Army Combined Arms Center Fort Leavenworth, KS. Web.