Introduction
Since the September 11 attack, the fight against terrorism has become an important area for the activities of the American army. Operation Anaconda is an important milestone in this struggle, during which many Al-Qaida and Taliban terrorists were destroyed. However, operations should be based on principles and regulations developed with experience. They include “Competence, Mutual trust, Shared understanding, Commander’s intent, Mission orders, Disciplined initiative, and Risk acceptance” (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2019, p. 1-7). Using an example of an Anaconda operation, the current paper examines the application and violation of these principles. Even though the operation did not initially go according to plan and several principles were violated, the army was still victorious.
Mistakes in Intelligence
One of the critical features of Anaconda’s operation is that it was much more complex and with more significant losses than expected due to intelligence errors, which are associated with the principles of mission orders and risk acceptance. The original plan of the operation was built on the data that the enemy had little force. Consequently, friendly Afghan troops and the American Army expected to finish the operation three days after it began (Kugler, 2007). At the same time, following the principle of mission orders, orders must be formulated using intelligence data, which was done.
However, the troops met unexpected resistance, which shocked them, required a new action plan, and extended the operation to 17 days. Later, the command announced that intelligence is not a precise science and that there will always be cases when the military does not know what it will face (Geibel, 2002). This statement reflects the risk acceptance principle, meaning that operations can often go unpredictable (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2019). As a result, the army sought to agree on an action plan to prepare for the operation, but it went unexpectedly, which is part of the risk.
Command Structure
The operational structure of Operation Anaconda reveals the disagreements between the two commands demonstrating that participants did not follow principles such as competition, mutual trust, and shared understanding. The issue was that they had to divide their forces between Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC) and Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), led by The United States Central Command (CENTCOM) (Kugler, 2007). In addition to these groups, control was also transferred to Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain and General Hagenbeck (Kugler, 2007). This situation threatened the operation’s success, although, at the planning stage, it was not considered a problem. In fact, after the start of the operation, it became clear that the bifurcated command was a mistake, as it interfered with the coordination of actions.
With Operational Control, superior officers can delegate tasks to their subordinates when doing so is crucial to the mission’s success. It is a helpful tool for quick command and control by commanders (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2019). During Operation Anaconda, CJTF Mountain commanded over forces, with some exceptions, as mentioned above (Kugler, 2007). Consequently, the mission’s support and resources could have been more organized due to the conflicting reporting structures that showed no unified operation command. Following the Competency principle, it is essential to establish conditions and trust for the “ability to execute mission orders in a decentralized fashion at acceptable levels of risk” (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2019, p. 1-7). This principle is intertwined with the principles of mutual trust and shared understanding. Since no high-level coordination was established during Operation Anaconda, the principles were violated, which led to problems.
Lack of Coordination between the American Army and Friendly Forces
The American army collaborated with friendly Afghan troops to improve the effectiveness of the operation. However, they had opposing priorities and authority to request and get support from a variety of the same assets (Geibel, 2002; Kugler, 2007). Moreover, due to the previously described problem of the command structure, there was not enough coordination between the units of these forces. The competition for resources puts much pressure on both commands because of the limited reconnaissance assets. For example, one commander might want to survey the Western part of the battlefield, the other might want to survey the Eastern part, and the theatre commander wants to survey the enemy’s position. With all these demands coming down the pipeline, the operation does not go as necessary (Kugler, 2007). The critical problem of such a situation is that the unity between forces is not present. Competing to get control of assets or for a battlefield survey is irrelevant, violating the principles of mutual trust and competence.
Conclusion
The battle of Operation Anaconda is just one example of the countless conflicts from which one can draw lessons about the infinite permutations and combinations of forces at play. Mission command is a well-structured philosophy developed from the previous iteration of command and control. All military operations can benefit from adhering to the seven tenets of mission leadership. Although Operation Anaconda had some flaws, it did not necessarily fail. The commanders still were ready to accept the risk and change the action plan, and the desired outcomes were achieved. However, leaders missed opportunities to recognize threats and put safeguards in place. Therefore, future commanders should thoroughly examine this case to formulate better-guiding principles that will, in turn, yield better results.
References
Geibel, A. (2002). Operation Anaconda, Shah-i-Khot Valley, Afghanistan, 2-10 March 2002. Military Review, 83(3), 72-77. Web.
Headquarters, Department of the Army. (2019). Mission command: Command and control of army forces. Army Doctrine Publication 6-0. Department of the Army. Web.
Kugler, R. L. (2007). Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan: A case study of adaptation in battle. National Defense University, Center for Technololgy and National Security Policy. Web.