Introduction
Patriarchy is a social construct that is based on the advantageous position of men in specific communities or countries, where they have a domineering place and possess power, unlike women, who take inferior roles. Arab countries are the ones where patriarchy has only slightly decreased with time. Nowadays, this phenomenon still has a strong presence due to societal standards and religious influences. One such country is Egypt, which is considered to be among the most patriarchal countries in the MENA (the Middle East and North Africa) region, where gender disparities are robust. Thus, while changes in the parliamentary system and Constitution have taken place, the Egyptian community is reluctant to embrace change in terms of gender equality, which manifests in stree-based harassment, intimate partner violence, female genital cutting, and unequal career opportunities.
The Patriarchal System in the Arab Countries
When it comes to discussing the prevalence of patriarchy in specific countries, it is essential to give a review of the extent to which the patriarchal system permeates and influences the lives of people in Arabic regions. According to Moghadam (2020, p.469), the phrases “patriarchal belt” and “the belt of classic patriarchy” are terms that have been used to discuss the given phenomenon. Moreover, since Arab women lack the ability to start or perhaps even support a mass reform movement, the dynamic between Arab women and men can be compared to a cold war. Therefore, due to MENA being among the most patriarchal countries in the world, women are less free to engage in work that generates income there.
There are many concepts that constitute a patriarchal system and control the lives of women. For example, the male equivalent of the breadwinner paradigm, which states that males are typically the family’s primary provider and that women’s primary duty is to stay at home and raise offspring, is a significant impediment to women’s accomplishment in the organized economy (Soekarba, 2019). In this case, state legislation in many nations promotes this concept, which is closely tied to Islamic doctrine on the gender distribution of work. After the Islamic Revolution in Iran, for example, many occupations were deemed undesirable for women, and the suitability of women’s role inside the home was emphasized in MENA nations like Iran and Egypt (Soekarba, 2019). According to official policy, males should be given preference over women when applying for jobs since they are the home leaders, not women (Soekarba, 2019). Therefore, there is a presence of constant discrimination based on gender.
According to a wide variety of social, economic, legal, and political indicators, women in the MENA regions have fewer opportunities and equal rights than their Western counterparts. Some blame the region’s problems and the predominant gender stereotypes and viewpoints (particularly discriminatory policies and ideologies) for this underachievement (Moghadam, 2020). This might include a propensity for authoritarian regimes, subpar economic expansion, conflicts, and mass migration, which frequently adversely affect women. In a number of quantifiable categories, women in the Middle East and North Africa do worse than both men and women in the majority of other nations. The MENA region ranks last worldwide for attaining gender equality, with the countries constituting 12 of the 25 worst-performing nations internationally, according to the World Economic Forum’s 2021 Report (Moghadam, 2020). Thus, women have an inferior position in terms of equitable rights to employment and stability.
There is little doubt that the issues plaguing the MENA area as a whole, as well as the prevailing gender norms and viewpoints, provide obstacles to extending privileges and improving the quality of life for MENA women. According to the 2019 WPS Index, the nations’ poor performance may be attributed in large part to the prevalence of systematic violence, exclusionary legislation that weakens women, and reduced levels of involvement, particularly in paid jobs (Danon and Collins, 2021). To delve deeper, women’s career prospects are improved by schooling, and as a result, they can have their own funds and move up the social ladder in the future. Nevertheless, it is practical for parents to invest in their child’s schooling. Families will encourage boys’ education more than girls’ education if the career chances for girls are substantially lower than those for boys (Soekarba, 2019). As a result, the patriarchal system leads to the favoring position of men.
Still, the objectives of Arab women differ considerably from those of the second and subsequent waves of feminism in the West. This implies the moments when women won changes to their legal status regarding sexual harassment, security from family violence, parenting rules, and the ability to choose their own partners (Yassine-Hamdan and Strate, 2020). Schooling, employment, political engagement, and parliamentary representation all improved for women in the West. Even if they share certain similarities, Arab women’s demands continue to be centered on obtaining fundamental human rights and ending increasingly oppressive and oppressive patriarchal behaviors.
When it comes to the roots of patriarchy in Arab countries, religious influences must be noted. Holy scriptures and ideologies continue to encourage patriarchal practices in the Arab world. Sharia law upholds different gender norms, or “the public man, private woman” duality, for Muslims, who make up a sizable majority in all Arab nations (Yassine-Hamdan and Strate, 2020, p.31). In patriarchy, females’ primary role is in the home, where they have children, raise them, and handle household responsibilities. In turn, men have a position in the public domain in which they are accountable for collecting the funds required for their families. Consequently, the family laws that have a religious foundation are construed to emphasize the division between the private domain of the family, which is associated with women, and the larger sphere of economics and administration, which are depicted as the domain of men.
Many studies are dedicated to such a matter to accentuate the division of roles in MENA countries. Research findings demonstrate the existence of some degree of patriarchal indoctrination via religious incorporation. Religious attendance is linked to a lower level of support for gender equality among MENA residents (Glas et al., 2019). Furthermore, those who are more religiously committed were less in favor of political gender equality than those who are less committed, but this is not true globally (Glas et al., 2019). Therefore, receiving (patriarchal) religious teachings and internalizing them have a negative impact on the demand for gender equality.
Manifestations of Patriarchy in Egypt
Yet, it is vital to analyze the system with the use of a specific example. Here, Egypt can be used since it has continuously rated 135th out of 149 nations in the World Economic Forum’s ranking of countries for gender equality (Samari, 2021). Much like most Arab nations, Egypt has a variety of patriarchal institutions. The organization of important spheres of life, such as sexuality, family, schooling, and the government, is based on uneven gender norms and opposing authority structures. For instance, males are less likely than women to have employment outside the home, have lower levels of education, and perform the preponderance of household chores at all income levels (Samari, 2021). Men have the option to relocate for employment and are required to work outside the house.
As a result, the way in which the country is exposed to patriarchy is due to emigration for employment. Since the 1970s, large waves of young men from Egypt have migrated to Arab nations that produce more oil and are worse off than Egypt in terms of gender equality (Samari, 2021). The societal change brought about by migration flows a reorganization of gender politics and standards. Migration patterns often have an impact on how gender is constructed and how gender relations work out. Consequently, there is a widespread problem that returning workforce migrants from other Arab countries will support the existing patriarchal culture and further deteriorate the status of women in Egypt. This might be due to embracing and reinstating concepts that are prevalent in host nations or sentimentally clinging to standards from sending countries.
Similarly to other Arab countries, married men in Egypt lead their homes and make judgments for their families. Traditional duties are assumed by women in the home, and few of them work outside the home (Samari, 2021). The majority of women marry before they are 18, and less than 2% of women who are 40 years old have never been married (Samari, 2021). Few choices in the home are made by women alone, and societal gender expectations influence how much control women have in the house. The prevalence of spousal abuse in Egypt is a sign of the continuance of patriarchal standards and the pervasiveness of domestic violence against women. The possibility of achieving gender equality, the willingness of men and women to confront the patriarchal society, and the willingness of men and women to oppose the current power structures are all still up for debate. In an attempt to alter gender expectations in the coming generation, Egyptian mothers have voiced the need to raise their children with more gender-equitable views (Samari, 2021). Despite the uncertain future, it is crucial to confront gender norms in Egypt.
When it comes to the permeation of the country by the patriarchal division of gender roles, it is necessary to see the perceptions of the youth. In Egypt, a country with separate roles for men and women, an unmarried teenage population is representative of the general population. Generally, adolescents perceive Egyptian men as domineering in their interactions with women, as enforcing the separation of gender stereotypes, as deciding whether to have children and keep an emotional distance from their children and spouses (Glas et al., 2019). Social standards limit women to duties inside the family and typically expect them to be obedient to males (Glas et al., 2019). In this case, they are thought to exhibit greater compassion and emotionality than males.
Still, many community members are opposed to such division and the overbearing power of patriarchy. The engagement of women in the Middle East’s political realm, particularly in Egypt, has made the 2011 Arab Spring a significant event (Jamilah and Machmudi, 2019). Women and men at the time felt the same way about the government in power. Egyptian protester Asmaa Mahfouz said: “All of us were there throwing stones, moving dead bodies there was no difference between men and women” (Jamilah and Machmudi, 2019, p.186). In addition, Egyptian columnist Eman Hashim noted the enormous contribution Egyptian women made to the Arab Spring movement. They said the following: “When it became so bloody that it was really hard for women to be in the front row, men knew that women were waiting meters away, with medicine, water, and words of support” (Jamilah and Machmudi, 2019, p.186). In this situation, one can see the deviance of the religious community and a desire for equal rights.
The uprising is an indication of public disagreement with the circumstances. After 30 years in power, Hosni Mubarak’s administration in Egypt was overthrown owing to the involvement of women in the Arab Spring uprising (Jamilah and Machmudi, 2019). However, Egyptian women’s involvement in the public realm during the Arab Spring was not adequately acknowledged since their commitment and effort did not produce equal outcomes. In contrast to the Mubarak era, women’s participation in the public realm fell dramatically in the weeks after the Arab Spring (Jamilah and Machmudi, 2019). Nine out of the 508 representatives of the Egyptian legislature are women, which is less than 2% of the total, down from 12% during Mubarak’s rule (Jamilah and Machmudi, 2019). This illustrates to what extent the government has yet to have intentions to change the system.
Implications of the System for Egyptian Women
Regarding the implications of the system for Egyptian women, they can be described as only negative. First, recent government statistics on intimate partner violence in Egypt have shown a significant trend: women are at greater risk of being exposed to persistently harmful and life-threatening violence, which frequently occurs in married relationships (Abouelenin, 2022). Approximately twenty-five percent of ever-married women in Egypt reported experiencing physical or emotional abuse (Abouelenin, 2022). Intimate partner violence is the formal term for aggressive behavior that occurs in close relationships and has the potential to hurt someone physically, psychologically, or sexually. In the case of Egyptian households, this can be seen as an immense issue.
Furthermore, street-based sexual harassment limits women’s ability to enter public areas and is a pervasive but little-understood type of gender-based abuse. In the research by Hassan and colleagues (2019), harassment was a common occurrence, and participants preferred to blame the conduct of people at the individual level, notably that of women. Yet variables at the communal and social levels also had a role in the occurrence of harassment. Due to victim-blaming fostered by patriarchal standards and the social stigma of harassed women, most young women might be reluctant to report abuse for fear of social rejection. In this situation, it is doubtful that educational or awareness-raising efforts will be successful in reducing harassment, an issue that is generally known.
As mentioned before, unequal career opportunities are additionally prevalent. In Egypt, women have significant difficulties participating in the economy. Women only comprise a quarter of the workforce, and their unemployment rate is over four times greater compared to men (Nazier and Ramadan, 2018). Nearly a quarter of financially productive women are jobless (Nazier and Ramadan, 2018). As a result, 75% of young women, making up the majority of the population, are not employed (Nazier and Ramadan, 2018). This is the situation that clearly illustrates the reliance of women on men in terms of finances in a patriarchal system.
Indeed, the institutional enforcement of socially prescribed gender norms is primarily to blame for the general exclusion of women from the employment field in Egypt. When authorities do not impose gender norms, the absence of women in the workforce is primarily a result of cultural beliefs and expectations of women, in addition to pressure from family and husbands (Sweeting, 2020). Women lack sustainable livelihoods when they are unable to work. Lack of financial independence prohibits women from having greater participation and activity in economic affairs, having control over their own lives and health, and having access to enough care and requirements. Thus, financial inclusion for women is significantly hampered by their isolation from the workforce, and attaining gender equality depends on this.
In Egypt, women face significant barriers to political engagement in addition to being excluded from employment. A general upward trend in the proportion of women in the legislature has been seen in Egypt. Women held less than 3% of parliament seats from 1997 to 2009 (Sweeting, 2020). In 2010, there was a sharp surge to 12.7%, but in 2011 and 2012, it declined back to 2% (Sweeting, 2020). Similarly to the discrimination women experience in the workplace, perceptions against women in leadership roles and culturally mandated gender stereotypes are the primary causes of their isolation from political engagement. For instance, an astounding 83 percent of Egyptians agreed with the assertion that “men make better political leaders than women” (Sweeting, 2020, p.111). Women’s participation in the political process is a prerequisite for their social and economic empowerment, both of which are important for achieving gender equality.
Finally, female genital cutting is a general health concern and a result of patriarchal implications for women. In Egypt, Eritrea, Mali, and Sudan, as well as other countries of MENA and Asia, female genital cutting (FGC) is a practically universal traditional practice among women who are perpetually wedded (Blaydes and Platas, 2020). The World Health Organization estimates that around 140 million women and girls have undergone FGC, and if prevailing patterns continue, 30 million additional girls will undergo the procedure in the upcoming ten years (Blaydes and Platas, 2020). A range of explanations for why FGC continues to be practiced can be provided. Common justifications include observance of a religious custom or obligation, hygiene, beauty, assuring virginity until marriage, avoiding infidelity, and enhancing a woman or girl’s chances of finding a spouse (Blaydes and Platas, 2020). Therefore, with the presence of patriarchy, women must undergo procedures that will fit gender expectations, which will additionally align with religious norms.
The Extent to Which the Patriarchal System has Changed
Lastly, after reviewing the extent of patriarchy in the MENA region, more specifically Egypt, it must be emphasized that more needs to be done to change the patriarchal system, although there were changes in legislature. For example, beginning in 2010, there were widespread demonstrations throughout the Arab countries that have been referred to as the Arab Spring (Abouelenin, 2022). These demonstrations moved to Egypt in 2011, and there have been substantial social and economic transformations as a result (Abouelenin, 2022). Women’s duties are historically limited to those in the home and family. Nevertheless, during the demonstrations, women all around the nation were given more access to the public realm, and some even started participating in politics (Abouelenin, 2022). Women are now participating in public life to a greater extent as a result of the adverse economic effects of the Arab Spring.
The level of education attained by women has significantly increased recently. In terms of enrollment in elementary and secondary schools, Egypt is progressing toward gender parity (Abouelenin, 2022). In comparison to their husbands, women’s educational levels have improved. Contrary to 17.7 and 10.9%, respectively, in 2007, the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics reports that 9.8% of wives and 6.9% of husbands were uneducated in 2016 (Abouelenin, 2022). However, women remain under-represented in the workforce compared to males despite rising female education. The disparities between men’s and women’s occupations can be partially due to cultural norms that prevent women from actively participating in the economy.
As for the legislature domain, women have faced several changes in parliamentary representation. For example, women are noted only once in the Constitutional Declaration of 2011, which was approved by SCAF: “The law will govern the right of candidacy for the People’s Assembly and Shura Council according to the determined electoral system, including at a minimum the participation of women in both assemblies” (Mansour, 2021, p.386). Nevertheless, Article 38 was removed from the statement’s June 2012 revision, and neither women nor their representation in government was mentioned (Mansour, 2021). In December 2012, a constitutional amendment was ultimately ratified, and a civilian president was chosen, but not before women had once again been severely sidelined (Mansour, 2021). In this case, there was a serious under-representation of women in terms of legislative decision-making.
The panel’s final result, the constitution, was a reflection of the relative influence of its various members. The State Legislature, for instance, declined to set aside a quota for women. Because of this, article 11 of the original 2014 Constitution stated that “the state shall seek to take necessary measures to guarantee adequate women representation in parliamentary bodies, along the lines identified by the law” (Mansour, 2021, p.386). Nevertheless, eighty-nine female members of the legislature now hold seats, constituting 14.9% of the total number of parliamentarians (Mansour, 2021, p.386). This can be heralded as momentous for the country, considering the lower figure only several years prior to the amendment. Still, many efforts are required for further improvement of women’s position in the conditions of patriarchy. Otherwise, the female part of the population will continue to be oppressed.
Conclusion
Hence, while the legislative system and the Constitution have undergone reforms, the Egyptian population has been slow to accept gender equality, which shows itself as harassment based on gender, violence, female genital mutilation, and uneven professional opportunities. The male version of the breadwinner paradigm, which holds that men are generally the family’s major providers and that women’s primary responsibilities are to stay at home and raise children, is prevalent in Arab nations. Egypt has consistently been ranked 135th out of 149 countries for gender equality. As a result, the female population of the country faces detrimental implications, varying from abuse and harassment to unequal opportunities. Nowadays, however, the situation has slightly changed in the context of legislature and employment, with women having an increased percentage of representation in Parliament.
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