The possibility of teletransporation is a topic that concerns not only science fiction but also raises important philosophical issues of personal identity. Supposing teletransport becomes possible, it is not clear enough whether a person who disappeared in one place and appeared in another will be the same. Thus, it should be determined what factors influence the fact that a person is still self during some time. Philosophers at different times raised questions about the relationship between soul, body, and identity.
According to the Body Theory (brute-physical view), personality is determined by a bodily criterion, and people are their bodies, which define identity. In turn, Descartes believed in the existence of an immaterial soul or mind, which causally interacts with a material body (“Personal Identity,” 2019). With this, for personal identity, nothing is needed except the personality itself. Locke also considered the question of souls that could live in a human body. Moreover, according to his views, one soul can live in several bodies in different lives, which resembles the concept of reincarnation, but at the same time, a person is not the same. Identity, in this case, depends on the consciousness’ continuity, and, for example, people who have lost their memory lose their personality. Parfit, who raised the teletrasportation paradox issue, believed that any factors for determining identity are not enough, and character features and memory come to the fore.
Thus, even though I find Locke’s opinion to be the most convincing, each of these views may speak in favor of using a teletransporter. However, with the brute-physical view, it depends on whether human cells are transferred or duplicates created. In the second case, following this approach’s views is likely to be not the same person. However, following Descartes, if transported people define their identity in the same way, they will remain the same. Following Locke and Parfit, the identical character qualities and memory will also testify to the same identity. I believe that experience and attitude to it determines personal identity and I would advocate the use of a transporter.
Reference
Personal identity. (2019). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Web.