Nietzsche, the self-proclaimed anti-Christ, proposes a world devoid of a superior being and solely governed by individuals who have become masters by virtue of possessing stronger minds. Under this proposed new philosophical thought, the masses that are weaker due to a lack of natural insight, are subjugated to the rule of the masters. Under their rule, the masses are obligated to do as the masters have demanded because there is no higher authority governing their actions and every act they see fit is permissible. This system as proposed by Nietzsche represents the markings of a society devoid of morality. It begins with an examination of the truth and its value and asks a very poignant question as to why humans seek the truth and can this truth be discovered by uncovering the lies that exist. In his discussion of the traditional philosophers he paints a picture of the traditional philosopher as individuals who operate from a purely selfish vantage point. He denounces the notion that philosophers attempt to arrive at the truth. Instead he paints a picture of the traditional philosopher as one who engages in a systematic self-fulfilling prophecy in that they proclaim that they attempt to live according to nature when they actually embody the tendency to be tyrannical in nature. Much of this tyranny can be attributed to the fact that the philosophers begin with their perception of the truth and this perception serves as an active force in enabling them to embrace that perceived truth and reject the many possibilities which can also prove to have merit. Essentially he embodies the belief that traditional philosophers operate utilizing the notion that a proven idea or a perceived truth is much easier to deal with and examine than a whole realm of possibilities.
One of the most poignant beliefs examined by Nietzsche in his quest to determine morality in the absence of any form of deity is one that relates to the notion of free will. He engages in a debate with regards to free will and discusses two diametrically opposing approaches at arriving at the truth with regards to free will. His first approach brings to task the question of entitlement. He examines this in the realm of which individuals should be rewarded and which individuals should be punished and brings to task the notion of the correlation of determinism and free will. He carefully explores the notion that determinism serves to circumvent free will and effectively and efficiently weaken entitlement. In his application of entitlement he indicates that if free will does exist and one operates based on the tenets of free will, one should not be punished by virtue of exercising that free will.
Nietzsche’s second approach to the discussion of free will is one which is inextricably linked to the privilege of choice. In essence, he examines the elemental components of an action rather that the mere act. He is examining the notion of autonomy and what truly constitutes an autonomous act and arrives at the understanding that what is important in the question of free will is the rationale behind the choice to act and not the choices of actions. He removes the alternatives an individual has in his course of action from the equation of free will and replaces it with the action taken and the rationale behind that action. In so doing, one is free to attach a reward system to his/her actions. When examining the notion of free will in terms of entitlement and in terms of the privilege of choice, Nietzsche makes a clear choice of dealing with free will in terms of the privilege of choice. He indicates that only a selected few are truly afforded the privilege of choice and as such throughout his writings it appears that he refutes the idea of free will and in others he wholeheartedly supports it. For example, he writes:
“…and in general, I have observed correctly, the “non-freedom of the will” is regarded as a problem from two entirely different standpoints, but always in a profoundly PERSONAL manner: some will not give up their “responsibility”, their belief in THEMSELVES, the personal right to their MERITS, at any price, the (vain races belong to this class); others on the contrary, do not wish to be answerable for anything, or blamed for anything, and owing to an inward self-contempt, seek to GET OUT OF THE BUSINESS no matter how. The latter, when they write books, are in the habit at present of taking the sides of criminals; a sort of socialistic sympathy is their favourite guise…” (Beyond Good and Evil, p. 44).
Clearly from Nietzsche’s writing one can see an inextricable link between the notions of responsibility and free will. This is a common thread in a great deal of philosophical writing. For example Kant attributes a great deal of moral responsibility to individuals as they act on the basis of free will. For Nietzsche, however, there is a gray area on the subject since he does not always do a good job at distinguishing between responsibility and the privilege of choice. That is, oftentimes he fails to draw the line between saying that someone is responsible for a certain act therefore he/she should be punished or rewarded and saying that the end result of a certain act was created by an individual. Essentially, he does not always delineate whether an act should be accompanied by a reward/punishment or whether the act should be independent of a reward/punishment. This poses a problem for me in that examining the act within the context of reward and punishment paints a different picture than examining the act when there is no reward or punishment attached to it. He feels that free will should merely be the freedom to act based on the truths of nature rather that to act based on a reward/punishment system.
At this juncture, it is prudent that we examine the notion of reward/punishment and blame/praise. In the onset it appears that they may be used interchangeably but Nietzsche’s take on the subject is much different. In the opening chapters of his book, “Beyond good and evil”, he blames philosophers such as Socrates and Wagner for the current state of philosophy and is seen praising individuals such as Napoleon and Goethe. In his blaming and praising he does not attribute any reward to punishment to the actions of these individuals. He repeatedly criticizes his contemporaries and yet does not offer any form of retribution (in cases where he engages in blame) and any form of reward (in cases where he praises these individuals). This is a clear indication that he supports free will in the absence of retribution or reward and feels that any form of punishment or reward serves to pervert true free will.
Nietzsche’s “New Morality” is inextricably liked to the notions of agency and free will, however, there are places in his work where he adamantly belittles the notion of free will but in those very same places he also belittles the notions of will that is not free (in other words, he belittles the notion of both free will and its opposite). He is quoted as arriving at the following conclusion:
Suppose someone were thus to see through the boorish simplicity of this celebrated concept of “free will” and put it out of his head altogether, I beg of him to carry his “enlightenment” a step further, and also put out of his head the contrary of this monstrous conception of “free will”: I mean “unfree will,” which amounts to a misuse of cause and effect. (Beyond Good and Evil, p. 21).
In examining this statement, it is prudent that we seek Nietzsche’s rationale behind this. From a reading of his works, one can discern that the primary reason for his rejection of the traditional belief with regards to free will is a self-serving one. On some level, it was his goal to instil guilt and foster a positive view of the world. He is aware of negative effects of portraying the majority of individuals as not possessing free will and speaks in great length of what he refers to as “a fatalism of the weak willed”. This in his opinion would hinder the engagement of individuals and thus serve to the detriment of the propagation of his “New Morality”. He goes on to state that “unfree will is mythology, it real life it is only a matter of strong and weak wills”. (Beyond Good and Evil, p. 21). He feels that true world order begins when those who possess strong wills dominates over those with lesser wills. On the individual level, he believes that the self only emerges when the strong wills of an individual takes an active role in organizing the lesser drives. One of his most prolific examples of this notion can be seen in his accounts of the development of Wagner as delineated one of his other works, Untimely Meditations. He can be quoted as saying:
The dramatic element in Wagner’s development is quite unmistakable from the moment when his ruling passion became aware of itself and took his nature in its charge: from that time on there was an end to fumbling, straying, to the proliferation of secondary shoots, and within the most convoluted courses and often daring trajectories assumed by his artistic plans there rules a single inner law, a will by which they can be explained. (Untimely Meditations,p. 2).
In telling the story of the achievement of Wagner, he delineates a tale of the emergence of a man of higher morals who can attribute his character to the fact that he is guided by a high level of free will and an inclination to dominate. This is the end result of his “new morality”. This notion is fully embodied when be speaks of how an individual acquires his/her character. He states:
“To become what one is, one must not have the slightest notion of what one is… The whole surface of consciousness – consciousness is a surface – must be kept clear of all great imperatives…Meanwhile the organizing “idea” that is destined to rule keeps growing deep down – it begins to command; slowly it leads us back from side roads and wrong roads; it prepares single qualities and fitnesses that will one day prove to be indispensable as a means towards the whole – one by one, it trains all subservient capacities before giving any hint of the dominant task, “goal”, “aim”, or “meaning”. (On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo, p. 9).
A closer examination of this brings one to the conclusion that for Nietzsche, most humans are simply followers and members of a pack. They are submissive and very rarely exercise free will. They are simply conduits utilized by the forces of nature to guide the natural order of things. Some individuals however are distinct from the pact in that they possess the ability to take an active role in nature’s design. That is, perhaps by circumstances, they are afforded the ability to exercise a strong free will and take full advantage of privilege of choice. These individuals, in his opinion, embody all the elements of the “new morality”.
One point I found interesting with regards to the generation of his day is the fact that he characterizes them is the fact that he feels that inculcated within them are the
“diverse standards and values, everything is unrest, disturbance, doubt, attempt, the very virtues do not allow each other to grow and become strong; balance, a centre of gravity, and perpendicular poise are lacking in body and soul. But what becomes sickest and degenerates most in such hybrids is the will: they no longer know independence of decisions and the intrepid sense of pleasure in willing – they doubt the “freedom of the will” even in their dreams” (Beyond Good and Evil, p. 208).
The implication of this is that individuals who are extremely strong in will accept the fact that they have free will as a given. He is seen as very positive and progressive in his thought. This is not evident in the beginning of “Beyond Good and Evil”, however, after reading through the entire book and reading parts of Ecce Homo, namely the section on “Why I am So Cleaver”, one can clearly see where he is heading. He speaks in great deal of his “new morality” and makes somewhat of an ambitious prediction for the future when he indicates that he feels “responsibility for all millennia after me” His very ambitious pronouncements can be seen somewhat in its tempered form in “Beyond Good and Evil” where he deals with responsibility of philosophers on a smaller scale. He essentially makes the claim that philosophers are ultimately responsible for making the common man act in a moral and just manner. This to Nietzsche the embodiment of the “new morality” and it is the responsibility of every philosopher to propagate this new modality of thinking to the generations that follow. This is definitely a strong burden to bear.
References
- Nietzsche, F., Beyond Good and Evil, translated by W. Kaufmannn, Vintage, New York, 1966.
- Nietzsche, F., On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo, translated by W. Kaufmannn and R.J. Hollingdale, Vintage, New York, 1969.
- Nietzsche, F., Untimely Meditations, trans. R. J. Hollingdale, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983.