What is it to explain and define something? Does the explanation require universal law? Does it depend on context?
In the broadest sense, defining something means listing its key properties and explaining how these properties influence the interaction of the object with the environment. A good example of such an approach is the definition of time offered by Newton. Time is defined as absolute, true, and mathematical (in contrast to a relative, apparent, and common) and is expected to exhibit these properties regardless of any external influences (Bridgman, 1927). However, the definition in question is based on several assumptions that essentially render it unsuitable for universal use. The primary reason for this is the speculative nature of these assumptions which, when applied to an existing phenomenon, describe the behavior that does not occur in nature. For instance, it is trivial to disprove the definition in question experimentally by demonstrating that natural phenomena with such properties are non-existent. This issue leads us to the necessity of defining something within the scope of the experiment while leaving out the areas not covered by it.
At this point, I find it necessary to mention the role of universal laws in the formulation of an explanation. On the one hand, these laws are necessary for deducing the definitions that cannot be tested experimentally. From this perspective, these laws can be viewed as the backbone of the definition process. On the other hand, once it becomes apparent that such universal laws have zero probability, it becomes possible to exclude them from the process (Popper, 1959).
Finally, I would like to emphasize the importance of context for the explanation concept. For instance, the length of a physical object can be altered by such environmental conditions as temperature, gravitational distortion, and application of electrical and magnetic forces (Hull, 1968). Thus, an accurate report of measurements should account for all of these parameters in order to ensure its relevance.
Question 2: Visit the “What Works Clearinghouse” database maintained by the US Department of Education Institute for Education Sciences. What are the principles of positivism that you see present on the What Works Clearinghouse? What are the values these principles bring to the field of education? What controversies may arise from adherence to these principles? What would Bridgman, Hull, or Popper have to say about “What Works?”
All of the principles of positivism are identifiable in the statements on the Find What Works website. For instance, the opening paragraph of the “About Us’ section states that the organization is non-partisan and independent, which aligns with the principle of neutrality of science postulated in the fifth principle. Next, the description of the peer review standards utilized by the organization (e.g. physical location of peer review staff) is consistent with the peer review procedures applied across all scientific disciplines, assuring the uniformity of inquiry logic demanded by the first principle. Finally, the existence of the Statistical Standards Program ensures that the influence of bias on the findings is minimized, as is required by the fourth principle (IES, n.d.).
These principles maintain the values of logical consistency, predictability, and testability of results provided by the researchers. At the same time, they enable the development of analytical thinking and critical approach. Finally, the principles ensure the validity of conclusions and their applicability to the contexts outside the studied area.
The most apparent controversy that may arise from the adherence to these principles is the possible misalignment between the obtained results and the culturally and socially acceptable values and norms. In addition, it is possible to imagine a scenario where testing a specific assumption is impossible due to the lack of means that are considered ethical. Thus, I find the principles to be consistent with Karl Popper’s view on the scientific method. The commitment to rigorous statistical analysis and responsible peer review process provide necessary means for falsifiability. Therefore, I believe that What Works’ approach would likely be approved by Popper.
References
Bridgman, P. W. (1927). The logic of modern physics. New York, NY: Macmillan.
Hull, D. L. (1968). The operational imperative: Sense and nonsense in operationism. Systematic Biology, 17(4), 438-457.
IES. (n.d.). About IES: Connecting research, policy and practice. Web.
Popper, K. (1959). The logic of scientific discovery. New York, NY: Hutchinson & Co.