Introduction
Accidents and mishaps at sea have the potential to do enormous damage not only to persons but also to the environment and the economy. Investigating the causes of these mishaps and occurrences and implementing preventive measures is crucial for ensuring marine traffic safety (“Interim report on the investigation of the collision […],” 2021). The report is divided into several components, including an analysis of the incident’s underlying circumstances and recommendations for improvement.
The incident description section thoroughly explains what happened before the incident, including how the ship approached the berth and how the pilot and the bridge team communicated. The analysis part examines the variables that contributed to the incident, including insufficient track monitoring, inefficient communication, and ineffective BRM approaches (“Interim report on the investigation of the collision […],” 2021). In the recommendations section, steps are suggested to avoid future occurrences of the same situations. They include strengthening track monitoring, adding more equipment, and examining maintenance processes.
Five Relevant MAIB Reports
The five identified MAIB reports at Plymouth Port, UK, include two catastrophic engine failures, one of which resulted in a fire on board the Ro-Ro passenger ferry Wight Sky, which occurred in August 2018. While the ferry Wight Sky was getting ready to make its usual journey from Yarmouth, Island of Wight, to Lymington, its main engine experienced a catastrophic failure. It had been less than a year since the last catastrophic failure of the ferry’s main engine, which had led to a fire. It left an engineer officer with serious injuries (“Marine accident investigation branch reports,” 2015). The engine that failed this time was the replacement for the engine that had caused the prior failure.
The collision between the rigid inflatable boat Rib Tickler and a personal watercraft, which resulted in the loss of 1 life, occurred in August 2020 in the Menai Strait, Wales. As the rigid inflatable boat changed its direction, it jumped across Rib Tickler’s wake when the personal watercraft crossed the route of the rigid inflatable boat (“Marine accident investigation branch reports,” 2015). The collision between the prawn trawler Achieve and the general cargo vessel Talis and its subsequent sinking occurred on November 8, 2020. The fog caused the fishing vessel Achieve (HL257) from the United Kingdom to collide with the general cargo ship Talis, which was registered in Panama.
A cargo tank explosion and fire on the chemical tanker Stolt Groenland occurred on September 28, 2019. A cargo tank on the Cayman Islands-registered chemical tanker Stolt Groenland, carrying styrene monomer, burst due to uncontrolled polymerization (“Marine accident investigation branch reports,” 2015). The monomer was contained within the tank. The catastrophic break caused a significant amount of vapor to be spilled into the sky, which then caught fire shortly after.
Aims and Objectives
This study examines the factors that led to a commercial tanker striking a quay at Plymouth port, and offers suggestions for enhancing safety on board. The particular goals of this study are:
- To describe the circumstances leading up to the incident, such as the ship’s approach to the berth, the pilot’s interaction with the bridge team, and the visibility levels at the time of the occurrence.
- To examine the incident’s contributing factors, such as poor visibility, inadequate track monitoring, ineffective communication, and insufficient bridge resource management (BRM) procedures.
- To offer suggestions for improvement based on the investigation’s results, such as strengthening track monitoring, upgrading communication training, adding more equipment, and examining equipment maintenance methods.
Incident Description
A commercial tanker was on a regular trip when, in low visibility, it slammed into a quay hard as it approached its berth at Plymouth port, UK. The incident occurred on a foggy morning, with mediocre visibility at the pilot stage and low visibility throughout the pilotage. The pilot boarded the ship at the pilot station and sailed towards the berth (Saliba et al., 2022). The ship struck the quay due to insufficient track monitoring and poor communication amongst the bridge staff.
The currently available information indicates that the vessel approached the dock at a modest speed. Yet, due to the limited visibility, it was difficult for the pilot to determine how far away the ship was from the wharf (Buttifant, 2021). The pilot and the bridge staff were using the VHF radio to communicate, but it wasn’t working well, making the bridge situation unclear. The vessel impacted the quay hard because the bridge team was unable to properly monitor the vessel’s location.
Throughout the examination, it was discovered that there had been no prior reports of faulty bridge equipment. The bridge staff was not effectively utilizing the available technology and equipment to monitor the vessel’s position, and the track monitoring was deemed insufficient. The bridge personnel were not properly trained to use the radar, and the ship’s radar was not utilized to its maximum potential (Saliba et al., 2022). Inadequate track monitoring and ineffective use of the vessel’s ECDIS system were further issues.
The bridge team’s inability to communicate effectively with the pilot resulted in a lack of situational awareness. They neglected to properly monitor the vessel’s position about the quay (Kapalidis et al., 2022). The event was a result of ineffective leadership on the bridge and a lack of active participation by the vessel’s Master in the decision-making process. Fortunately, no one was hurt or killed, although the catastrophe damaged the harbor and the ship.
Causes
The analysis of the incident at Plymouth Port in the UK highlights several key factors that contributed to the incident. The incident was partly caused by poor visibility conditions, poor communication, ineffective track monitoring, and poor BRM techniques. The investigation showed that the bridge crew was inefficiently utilizing the equipment and technology and that the vessel’s Master was not actively participating in decision-making (Sultana et al., 2019, p. 246).
The incident had financial repercussions and interfered with the port’s operations. It is essential to enhance communication training, implement effective tracking systems, install additional equipment, and review equipment maintenance procedures to prevent similar incidents from occurring again (Buttifant, 2021). The incident serves as a reminder of the importance of good communication, situational awareness, and BRM techniques in maintaining maritime transportation safety.
Poor Visibility
The incident occurred primarily due to fog, with visibility being mediocre at the pilot stage and low throughout the pilotage. Poor visibility may have impacted the pilot’s ability to determine the precise distance between the ship and the dock, as well as the ship’s position in relation to other ships and navigational hazards. Due to poor visibility, the bridge staff may struggle to keep track of the vessel’s location and adjust its route (Xue et al., 2021, p. 180). Utilizing onboard tools and technology, such as radar and ECDIS, can enhance situational awareness and track monitoring (Kaptan et al., 2021). The vessel’s crew should also receive adequate training to successfully navigate the vessel in low-visibility conditions.
Inadequate Track Monitoring
A significant aspect of the event at Plymouth port in the UK was determined to be insufficient track monitoring. The vessel struck the quay due to the bridge team’s ineffective monitoring of the vessel’s track and location with respect to it (Awan & Ghamdi, 2019, p. 350). The examination established that the bridge crew lacked adequate training to operate the vessel’s radar and the ECDIS equipment and that these systems were not being used efficiently.Enhancing track monitoring and ensuring the bridge personnel are prepared to use the tools and technology available are vital to preventing such tragedies from happening again.
Ineffective Communication
The incident in Plymouth port was found to have been exacerbated by poor communication. The inquiry results showed ineffective communication between the pilot and the bridge crew, and that the vessel’s Master was not actively participating in making decisions. The vessel’s crew was not effectively informed of the vessel’s position and the vicinity of the quay, making it impossible for the bridge team to adapt to changing situations (Tommarchi, 2022).
Communication between the pilot and the bridge staff must be improved if such events are to be avoided in the future (Tam & Jones, 2019, pp. 1-4). Confirming that the ship’s crew knows the value of excellent communication and is comfortable using the communication tools on board is crucial. Making decisions with the vessel’s Master present can also ensure that the crew is properly informed and ready to react to changing circumstances (Lott, 2022). Effective communication is essential to maintain the safety of ships sailing in congested ports.
Inadequate BRM Techniques
The disaster at Plymouth port, UK, was discovered to have been caused in part by insufficient Bridge Resource Management, which is a collection of procedures for enhancing cooperation, communication, and situational awareness on bridges (Awan & Ghamdi, 2019, p. 350). Using BRM approaches encourages efficient decision-making and communication, which lowers the likelihood of mishaps (Jeevan et al., 2020, p. 81).
The vessel’s crew must have sufficient BRM training to prevent future situations like this one.This may be accomplished by employing standardized BRM procedures, routine training, and drills. Additionally, it is critical to foster an environment on board where everyone feels empowered to voice their opinions and express concerns (Loughney et al., 2022). BRM tactics can assist in lowering the risk of accidents in congested ports.
Recommendations
According to our study, we advise taking the following steps to stop similar instances from happening again:
- Improved Communication Training. The ship should evaluate its BRM procedures and enhance communication training for the bridge crew members. Training should include instruction in situational awareness, efficient communication, and emergency response techniques.
- Enhance Track Monitoring. The ship should assess its track monitoring system and ensure it is sufficient for the operating environment. The navigational equipment must be inspected and serviced frequently to ensure proper operation.
- Install More Equipment.The ship should take further precautions to increase visibility, such as adding more illumination or using radar equipment. As a result, the pilot and bridge crew would be better able to determine the vessel’s precise location.
Conclusion
Several problems, including poor visibility, lack of track monitoring, communication issues, and inadequate BRM methods, contributed to the Plymouth port, UK event. It is crucial to address these contributing variables via frequent training, drills, and the adoption of best practices to prevent instances like this from happening again. The danger of mishaps may be decreased, and safe navigation promoted at congested ports by improving track monitoring, communication, and BRM procedures. To ensure proper operation, it is also crucial to periodically repair and upgrade the equipment on board ships.
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