The War on Drugs, over the course of its forty-year history, has gained widespread notoriety and sparked fierce criticism, with many going as far as to claim that this policy was a complete failure. Given the complex nature of the illicit drug trade phenomenon, this simplification and reduction of a project of such scale to a definite verdict is quite surprising. The present section argues that the War on Drugs yielded some significant results in the United States, mainly thanks to the country’s advantageous geographic position, in terms of reducing both production and consumption of drugs through price increases and public perception changes.
War on Drugs, in essence, is a public policy that extended beyond the United States borders as to eradicate production in the drugs’ countries of origin. Just like any other public policy, it has been often viewed in comparison with other countries with successful or failing drug policies, for instance, Portugal and the Netherlands. However, this approach is fundamentally flawed as it fails to take into account the unique geographic position of the United States which borders only on two countries: Canada and Mexico. The ever strict Transportation Security Administration’s regulations, especially in the aftermath of 9/11, make import of drugs by air nearly impossible.
Therefore, ground transportation through Mexico is the main import channel, with as much as 90% of cocaine coming from Mexico alone (“US Claims Success” par. 6). When enforcement efforts concern only two countries, the task becomes unprecedentedly manageable, especially since the Mexican authorities have been highly supportively of the US drug eradication program (“US Claims Success” par. 10-11). The United States government is also able to concentrate all of its efforts on the southern border, bringing the necessary “personnel, infrastructure and technology” to it and doubling the size of the US Border Patrol since 2009 (Kerlikowske par. 1). This strategy allows the US to curb drug trafficking in the country.
The second important achievement of the War on Drugs is that it forces drug cartels to reduce or even stop their production or, at the very least, it disintegrates them into smaller groups. Up until the 1980s, the southern Andean countries Peru and Bolivia were the major producers of cocaine, responsible for 65% and 25% of the total supply, respectively. Thanks to the US-funded crop eradication project in these two countries, supported by the local governments, cocaine production largely shifted to Colombia in the second half of the 1990s (Bagley 3).
While many have argued that this victory was insignificant as it merely chased drug cultivators to a different region, battling the problem of cocaine in Colombia presented an easier task. According to David Murray, the former chief scientist of the Office of National Drug Policy Control (NDPC), supply reduction programs combined with the efforts of local citizens yielded a 75% decrease in Colombia’s “productive capacity” (“Has the War on Drugs Been Lost?” par. 24). The program also dismantled two of Colombia’s largest drug cartels, and 300 smaller “cartelitos” appeared to take advantage of this drug trafficking opportunity (Bagley 4). This is significant because smaller organizations lack the resources and networks to engage successfully in the international drug trade.
The changing dynamics of cocaine cultivation and production resulting in supply shortages had an impact on the use of the drug in the United States. Cocaine became far less affordable – and consequently, far less attractive – to American citizens, with the nationwide average price going up by 24%, and almost doubling in some places (“US Claims Success” par. 9). According to John Walters, the head of the Office of NDPC, this change affected at least 37 major American cities (“US Claims Success” par. 2).
Thus, even though the War on Drugs primarily uses the supply-side approach, meaning that it targets production rather than consumption, its successful implementation also results in decreasing use of drugs, as buyers are highly sensitive to their price. As costs incurred by drug suppliers increase, they have no other choice but to drive the street price up, as well, thus reducing the prevalence of cocaine in the society (Kindle 66).
With supply going down and prices going up, the War on Drugs yielded some favorable consequences as far as drug consumption is concerned. Even though the overall illicit drug use has been slowly rising, this upward trend is explained by the increased consumption of such substances as marijuana and pain relievers – both obviously undesirable but nevertheless not as detrimental to human health. Far more important is that the policy succeeded to reduce the use of such dangerous drugs as methamphetamine and cocaine, including crack cocaine (Kerlikowske par. 2).
This decline in consumption brought about some visible social benefits, as fewer Americans had positive drug test results and the number of “cocaine-related hospital admissions” also went down (“US Claims Success” par. 14). David Murray estimates the decline in the cocaine consumption rate to be as high as 45% – meaning that the drug’s prevalence was cut nearly in half (“Has the War on Drugs Been Lost?” par. 25). A more relevant question is thus not whether the policy brings about positive results but rather how to successfully sustain these results over a longer term, which is the main challenge that the government is facing (“US Claims Success” par. 4, 15).
Finally, a less material and thus a more difficult to quantify result of the War on Drugs was the change in public opinion and attitudes, including the changing perception about the US drug trade by the drug dealers themselves. According to David Murray, drug cartels favor “ungoverned safe havens where they would like to be to carry out their business with maximum efficiency” (“Has the War on Drugs Been Lost?” par. 26). Obviously, this is a highly reasonable strategy, and the key to fighting it is letting the offenders know that the US soil is not one of those safe havens. This is precisely what the zero-tolerance policy aimed to achieve.
As Peter Reuter, professor of public policy at the University of Maryland, put it: “the war on drugs was partly defined by its rhetoric” where the government sent a clear “signal to the population that [being tough on drugs] was a priority” (“US Claims Success” par. 34-35).
Thus, the prohibitionist strategy yields the most effective results in limiting “prevalence and harmfulness” of illicit drugs (Kindle 69). Like any other policy, it has its drawbacks and shortfalls, which merely means that the policy needs to be revisited and reevaluated occasionally, so it can be expanded and supplemented with new or improved strategies. The next section will now provide an overview of the arguments that are frequently cited against the War on Drugs and its consequences.
Works Cited
Bagley, Bruce. Drug Trafficking and Organized Crimes in the Americas: Major Trends in the Twenty-First Century. 2012. Web.
“Has the War on Drugs Been Lost?” BBC News. 2015: n. pag. Web.
Kerlikowske, Gil. “Successfully Fighting the War on Drugs.” The Washington Post. 2012: n. pag. Web.
Kindle, Peter A. “Is the War on Drugs Effective? Yes.” Controversial Issues in Social Policy. Ed. Howard Jacob Karger. Boston: Pearson, 2007. 64-69. Print.
“US Claims Success in War on Drugs.” BBC News. 2007: n. pag. Web.