The issue in the case of Dang v. Commonwealth is whether the court erred in failing to order a second competency evaluation after the new facts about Dang’s life, particularly the physical trauma he received as a child, had been discovered.
Dang was charged with murder and violation of the protective order. The in-house psychologist appointed on January 12, 2011, provided the evaluation of Dang’s competency according to which the suspect was found competent to stand the trial. The assessment report was prepared regarding the analysis of Dang’s ability to understand the process, to communicate with his counsel, and to perform adequate decision-making operations. Even though Dr. Hudacek noticed some incoherence of the suspect’s speech, her general conclusion would state that Dang’s communicative difficulties were normally consistent with defendants and were not provoked by any mental disorders.
Eleven months after the first competence evaluation took place, some new details regarding Dang’s background came to light. The suspect’s counsel received extensive data on his childhood and the numerous traumas he used to receive as a schoolboy. Considering the possibility that the mentioned injuries could have caused a disorder of cognitive functioning, the council decided to appeal for a second evaluation of Dang’s competence.
The motion was denied based on the validity of the preceding evaluative report, which admitted Dang’s capacity to understand the process and to participate in the communication. On the trial day, a plea colloquy with Dang was conducted. During the colloquy, the suspect insured the circuit court of his awareness of the current state of things, and his will to be tried by a jury. Dang’s answers in the course of the colloquy were disconnected; the suspect would sometimes seem to misunderstand the question.
The court decided to accept the suspect’s plea of not guilty. Moreover, Dang insisted on possessing some extra data he desired to share with the council; therefore the circuit court had to take a recess to enable the suspect to meet with his counsel. After the counsel had renewed, Dang started claiming that he did not feel conscious enough to understand the process. He complained of recent difficulties in critical thinking and current memory blackouts. After his questioning the court concluded that Dang’s mental state was volatile; however, it did not show any signs of mental disorder. As far as the evidence managed to prove Dang’s murdering of Nguyet Lu, the court delivered a judgment committing Dang to a life sentence based on first-degree murder and five years’ imprisonment based on the protective order violation.
According to the provided data, one can point out a possible violation of Code § 19.2-169.1(A), according to which the information concerning the defendant’s competence is to be thoroughly considered regardless of the fact when it was provided. However, the primary difficulty in identifying the violation lies in the fact that, according to this Code, the circuit court is not obliged to provide a second competence evaluation record unless there is considerable circumstances change.
The case under discussion got to the Court of Appeals due to the suspect’s argument that the circuit court did not provide sufficient consideration of his claim that he was incompetent to stand trial. After a detailed study of the case details the Court of Appeals claimed that the circuit court did not perform any violations, as it carried out the series of proper actions to estimate the suspect’s capacity to understand the reality and to communicate with the counsel.
The court ruled in reliance on the relevant psychologist’s competence evaluation report that claimed the suspect did not possess any mental disorders that could prevent him from standing the trial. The court did not consider the extensive information received from the suspect’s mother and sister basing on the fact that even if the provided facts could have been significant for Dang’s past, they could not have had any impact on his current actions. The Court of Appeals did not find any evidence of the circuit court’s abusing its discretion while refusing to provide a second competency evaluation. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was affirmed by dissenting Justice Mims.
The case consideration implied the participation of several individuals. Dang’s competence was evaluated by the appointed psychologist Dr. Hudacek. During the evaluation process, the suspect used the assistance of the interpreter. Dang was also provided with a Commonwealth’s Attorney that represented his interests.
The most controversial part of the case is Dang’s performance on the trial day when he complained of understanding difficulties and provided the court with a disconnected response. His performance along with the earlier provided information presuming his mental incompetence could call into doubt the decision of the circuit court to decline a second competence evaluation procedure. Therefore, the court could have violated the suspect’s constitutional right to safeguard his interests providing all the information he supposed to be relevant, no matter when and in what manner.