Political Control of Bureaucracy
Three decades ago, political theories of political control of bureaucracy underwent complete transformation; shifting from the paradigm that emphasizes the extreme difficulty with which electoral institutions have in controlling the massive powers of the federal bureaucracies to one which insists that the elected officials have powers to control and shape bureaucratic behaviors systematically. Historically, this was demonstrated by the Reagan Administration, which changed a number of programs (Dye, 2003). These developments triggered a number of scholars in the field of social sciences to develop tools to measure and evaluate the extent of this control. What followed was a series of empirical studies that were meant to establish the extent to which the electoral institutions would control the then overbearing bureaucratic institutions. To date, the political theory of bureaucratic control holds the view that political office has a massive power to control bureaucracies. However, what is the extent of control?
Several empirical studies have been done in the past to explore the dynamics of political control, scope or how manipulation can occur, and to some extent, what variables are there for manipulation to occur. Wood & Waterman (1991), cited in Dye (2003), examined the dynamism in this political control of the bureaucracy to explicitly determine the scope and mechanisms of this influence. In this study, the two researchers investigated seven bureaucracies in relation to their responsiveness to political tools applied by Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan administrations (Dye, 2003). Their findings revealed that all the seven public bureaucracies were responsive. Furthermore, the results also indicated that political appointments (a shared power between the president and the congress ) are the most important instrument of political control, while changing budget, legislation, congressional signals, and administrative reorganizations were considered less significant (Dye, 2003).
Meier, O’TooleO’Toole & Hawes, cited in Holland (1999), tested multiple theoretical determinants of political control over bureaucracies and justified the concept that political office has a huge influence on the nature and effectiveness of these bureaucracies. These findings illustrate the importance of the scholars’ insistence that a method of policy control monitoring is necessary for the better democratic future of America. In other words, the future of America’sAmerica’s democracy is hinged on current policies that will shape the extent of political control of the bureaucratic office to avoid misuse.
Representative Bureaucracy
Representative bureaucracy theory is based on the belief that an organization would work effectively and efficiently if the constituents were well represented in the workforce. That is to say, the organization’s elected persons have the discretion to choose members from their constituency to occupy the non-elective positions within the organization, taking into consideration the constituent’s population characteristics. Many believe that this kind of organizational arrangement is based on the strategy of the organization. In this theoretical perspective, it is possible to agree to the fact the public sector governance explicitly needs some kind of validation, ostensibly to gain the support of policies. At times this kind of demand overrides all other factors in the appointments just to secure the support of society. As Dolan (2003) puts it, “no matter how brilliantly conceived, no matter how artfully contrived, government action usually also requires societal support. And one of the oldest methods of securing such support is to draw a wide segment of the society into the government to convey and to merchandise a policy….” (p.25)
Basically, the belief that bureaucracy is in fact representative is put forward in two separate ways: (i) it is seen as such in composition and in a manner of its selection; (ii) it is judged in terms of substantive product, and the quality of its decisions is evaluated in the light of their accord with what is normally considered pubic opinion. Many critics have argued that the two kinds of arguments are principally intertwined and that the results of such arrangements would not justify the validity of the first belief unless some assumptions are made. [Roger] Davidson cited in Dolan (2003) wonders, “analytically, the test of representation is whether, in public policymaking, the demands or interests of every relevant definable public have been effectively articulated” (37)
However, against the backdrop of the criticisms, many empirical studies have attempted to establish and justify this theory. Meier & Polinard (1999) examined the long-standing notion that representative bureaucracy favors the minority at the expense of the non-minority using a pooled time-series analysis of 350 school districts over a period of six years. Against the belief, the researchers reveal that the two, minority and non-minority, all have measurable gains, and the output is better than the non-representative arrangements. In his attempt to establish whether representative democrats truly represent the interest of their subjects or represents their personal interests and/or that of the principal, Konisky (2007) presents an optimistic observation that the representation is positive except for where knowledge about the details of representation varies. He emphasizes that the fundamental reason behind the representative bureaucratic arrangement is that bureaucrats have the informational expertise obtained through their continual privilege of staying in such a position (p.24). However, he warns that it should be practiced with caution, especially where the specific policies are to be validated through a referendum. This is because such a direct democracy has a possibility of denying the bureaucrats their powers to make critically important decisions, which may lead to “democratically legitimate but inferior policy” (p.25). Principally, this may stem from the fact the bureaucrat, due to their long-term exposure to informational knowledge, would understand the policy implication better than their subjects.
Bureaucratic Politics
Bureaucratic politics theory allure to the fact that non-elected government officials get access to the political office through political appointments and subsequently attempt to use their positions to influence the policy changes or manipulate the process of policymaking. In most cases, they are charged with the responsibility of implementing government policies. This position also gives them opportunities to shape and influence the policymaking process or change. One of the earlier supporters of bureaucratic political powers is Max Weber, cited in Dye (2003), who described bureaucracy as a “rational” way in which society organizes itself; they are not just limited to the government but are present throughout society. According to Weber, bureaucracies shared three basic features, i.e.: (1) chain of command symbolized by the hierarchical structure of authority; (2) division of labor characterized by work divided among the specialists in the government in an attempt to increase and improve productivity; and (3) impersonality, where the individuals occupying such positions are selected and treated on the basis of their ”merit”, the ”clients” they serve to get same treatments according to the laid down rules, and maintenance of the records is to ensure the rules are followed to the latter (p.131).
However, many observers and critics state that this kind of political arrangement may lead to disagreements and conflicts between multiple players who would want their positions to carry the day in the process. This theory has for a long time implicated the bureaucrats as those who only strive for policy change or policymaking to push forward their personal interests and those of their employing agencies (Konisky, 2007).
Holland (1999) justified the bureaucratic theory in his study of the U.S decision to launch operation desert storm. He states that such critical decisions can never be made by the elective office but by the appointed office. This is largely because the elective office is likely to be faced with the long process of indecisiveness caused by the dilemma of pleasing the electorate and protecting them at the same time, at a time when an ”enemy” is ready to strike. Again, critical issues that need immediate decision without external consultation will receive low urgency they don’t deserve due to vested interest where bureaucracies lack.
The relationship between interests groups and administration in the context of Low’sLow’s The End of Liberalism
According to Lowi, cited in Connolly (1981), the liberal state established through the new deal of constitutional arrangements in America signified an end to liberation (p.141). This is because the complete democratization of the constitution overwhelmed the actors that its impact could not be controlled. He intimates that its specific way of using the government as the platform for implementation has created a sense of distrust in relation to the public objects.
In this perspective, interest groups’ relationship with the government is seen to benefit the former more and subsequently creates a conflict of interest. Lowi calls it ”interest-group liberation” (p.141). This is because the persons making the interest groups have got the chance to make their sentiments heard, with a strong belief that what is good for the government is good for the public, too; the public, in this case, implies the interest group. This is because they are in a position to merge their claims together to push for a particular policy issue with ease.
However, Lowi believes that these interest groups principally lack pluralistic ideas, as many may claim. In essence, the groups have easily definable ideas that largely seem homogenous. What does Lowi mean? In an actual sense, a particular group will put their faith in the elected representative to the government, whose judgments are taken as absolutely accurate. In some cases, such judgments are never accurate. The other perspective is that these interests groups may present their interests, subsequently leading to conflicts. This is because they will be checking on each other in an attempt to validate their specific claims of representing a society, which in essence is going against the same society, as they all belong to the same society fragmented into numerous interest groups. It is the ideologies of various interest groups that define the ideologies of the Democrats and the Republicans. The whole rank of the public administration ranging from Congressmen to president to bureaucratic administrators, is guided and controlled by the ideologies of interest groups.
Administrative Reforms in the recent American history
The Federal Civil Service Reforms: this reform started when the Pendleton Act of 1883 was passed, followed by the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) of 1978 (Lasswell, 1996). This has steadily transformed the American federal personnel system from the perspective of constitutional, political, and historical limitations (Lasswell, 1996). The proponents of these reforms based their belief in the success of the British civil service model and the practices of the private sector and the theories fronted by the academicians. However, many scholars believe that reforms have not lived up to the expectations of the people, not even the proponents.
The military reforms in the military: The events that followed World War II reinforced the need to reform the military. The main concern was the administration of military justice which was seen to be draconian and punitive (Long, 1962). The media’s exposure to the events of the military justice and punishment led to the reforms. Congress debated several proposals to reform the military (Long, 1962). The rationale was that the military court rulings were outdated and inconsistent, always headed by unprofessional judges. After a decade, the whole system was transformed into a more professional system with professional judges and prosecutors (Long, 1962). The reforms were seen as a way of making the US military stronger and to avoid the then inherent rebellions from the soldiers and the public as well.
The war on terror policy: The Bush Administration spearheaded its war on terror policy after the September 11 bombing. This triggered a new form of relationship with its international partners. The implication of war in Iraq and Afghanistan has invoked questions among scholars of the intentions of America in its war on terror and international relations. While proponents of the war on terror see insist that it was imminent, the anti-war policy insists that the decision to go to war was a big blander as it was not necessary.
However, political theorists can advance theories to advance the arguments that the war in Iraq, for example, was necessary as long as America felt its security was threatened and its position as a superpower was being challenged (Konisky, 2007). Others look at it in the cost-benefit value and claim that just as Paul Peterson’sPeterson’s arguments concerning the federal system of government, the war on terror is futile and carries some of the costs that may not be visible but will only be seen at the end, for those willing to reason out. Peterson, for instance, highlighted the weakness of federalism when he tended to support the anti-federalism stand that a strong Central government would place too much power in the hand of one person hence prone to misuse.
Paul Peterson and the inherent cost of a federal system of government
It must be noted that a new wave of developments has occurred in America in the last four decades. America has shifted from the development initiatives controlled by the central government in Washington to that which is controlled by the states and local governments. According to Paul Peterson and other researchers, this phenomenon has come with its inherent costs in all aspects of political, economic, and social.
Economic costs: according to Lasswell (1996), expenditure on development initiatives in America shorted up significantly, putting a lot of pressure on the domestic tax. He highlights that 1962 scenario where the expenditure at the state and local government levels more than doubled the national one, with the former taking 9.4% and the latter 4.2% of the gross national products (Lasswell, 1996). The same continued through to 1990 when the states spent 10.8% and Washington spent only 4.9% (Lasswell, 1996). Peterson also highlights several occasions when federalism is seen to have cost a lot to the public money. One such significant moment is when the budgetary shortfall doubled from an estimated $7 billion in the January of 1991 to more than $14 billion by May 1992, thus leading to an almost irreversible economic downtown (Lasswell, 1996).
Social Cost: From 1962, Washington’sWashington’s expenditure on the social welfare of the elderly, the poor, and the needy has been on the rise steadily, while that of the state governments has taken the opposite trend. In fact, in 1962, the national government spent 10.3% of Growth National Product from 4.9% the previous year. On the other hand, the state spent only 3.5% from 2.2% the previous year (Lasswell, 1996). This is despite the fact that the state takes the majority of the share of the national budget for its initiatives.
Political cost: according to Peterson (1995), federalism has perpetuated political divisions. He states that the whole bickering and squabbles that arise in the federal system of government are a result of many centers of power which encourage an inevitable conflict. This is because each state tries to expand its powers at the expense of others (Peterson, 1995).
The conflict between pro-federalism and anti-federalism was clear evidence that Americans had tried to pursue functional federalism before the constitutional intervention in the 18th century. Considering the fact that those who drafted the constitution were primarily federalists, they first tried in vain to convince the rest of Americans to accept federalism as the main guiding principle of governance, arguing that the power concentrated in one location will lead to the opposition being suppressed (Peterson, 1995).
It is apparent that the United States has adopted both functional and legislative federalism. First, functional federalism states that by applying the theory, the states are used as the centers for distributing resources. These resources are used to build the infrastructure and other social services to spur the nation’s economic growth. The other is to share the economic benefit by all through redistributing the wealth from the ”haves” to ”have nots”. In this aspect, the federal government will work efficiently only if they respect each other’s role at the government level. Hence in this arrangement, the responsibility of the national government is to redistribute while the state governments execute the development initiatives.
Legislative theory, on the other, fosters the belief that political incentives drive the decisions that are made by the policymakers, legislators. The proponents of this theoretical perspective believe that the president has and the governors have less role and impact on the policy issues affecting states. Legislative theorists believe that the governors and the presidents are always preoccupied with the desire to be re-elected rather than the welfare of their subjects; hence they will concentrate on the need to appease the voters rather than influence any meaningful development agenda. In Petersons view, this kind of dilemma is the climax of disaster as critical issues like the disaster that needs quick action will not receive the needed urgency. This is because the federalists will view it in the political dimension, expecting the national office to act faster than the regional and federal governments, an expectation that may not be practical considering its central nature.
Reference List
Connolly, W. (1981). Appearance and Reality in Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dolan, J. (2003). Representative Bureaucracy: Classic Readings and Continuing Controversies: New York: M.E. Shape.
Dye, T. (2003). Politics in America. Washington DC: Pearson.
Holland, L. (1999). The U.S decision to launch operation desert storm: A bureaucratic politics analysis. Armed Forces & Society, vol 25, No. 2, 219-242.
Konisky, D. (2007). Representative bureaucrats: Attitudinal Congrunce and Agency Expertise. Bureaucrats, politics and the environment. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Lasswell, H. (1996). Politics: Who Gets What, When, How? New York: McGraw Hill.
Long, N. (1962). Bureaucracy and Constitutionalism. American Political Science Review 46, 808-818.
Meier, J. & Polinard L. (1999). Representative bureaucracy and distribution equity: Addressing the hard question. Journal of Politics. Vol.1, (4). 11-17.
Peterson, p. (1995). The Price of Federalism. Stanford: Brookings Institute Press.