Risk Perception and Analysis Report (Assessment)

Risk is perceived differently by different people. Risk assessment is important as it enables people to control and manage risks. There exist both traditional and modern methods of risk assessment. To discuss these issues, this study shall: summarize the main points made by Slovic and Clark and illustrate the difference between a cause and a mechanism by use of examples.

A Summary of the Main Points made by Slovic

The persons’ extra ability to modify and to react to the environment constructs and lessens risk. Risk assessment as an area of study has developed as a result of the indefinable and hard to control nature of present hazards, particularly the modern advancement of chemical and nuclear expertise (Slovic 280). Risk assessment as a subject of study is intended to aid in categorizing, quantifying and typifying risk.

While scientifically refined analysts make use of risk assessment to assess hazards, the best part of populace depends on instinctive risk judgment, normally known as risk perceptions. For most citizens, understanding of hazards is usually developed from the news in the media, which scrupulously manuscripts threats and fears happening all over the planet.

For instance, media have made a majority of Americans, and other developed states to believe that they are prone to experiencing more risks in prospect. This has majorly impacted the economic and political development of these nations (Nelkin 38).

Anthropological and sociological works reveal that the perception and receipt of risks is usually grounded on cultural and social and aspects (Douglas and Albert 236). The reaction to hazards is influenced by social controls, which are conveyed by relatives, friends, colleague staff, and esteemed government officials.

Psychological study on risk perception has resulted to an invention of a cluster of psychological strategies or heuristics, which persons make use of so as to make good judgment out of an uncertain existence (Kahneman et al. 46). Even though these strategies are applicable in some situations, they can end in great and importunate prejudices, with severe repercussions for risk assessment.

In addition, research points out that those early views possessed by individuals are hard to change as they control the manner in which ensuing information is construed. Thus, novel evidence seems to be reliable and edifying if it is in line with an individual’s first beliefs. Presenting similar ideas regarding risk in dissimilar ways changes perspectives and measures.

Psychometric Paradigm

Research on the psychometric paradigm is centered on the functions of emotion, affect and stigma in controlling risk perception (Slovic 284). Slovic in 1987 disputed Starr’s article by exploring expressed preferences, the amount of risk persons say they are ready to accept (281). He discovered that, different from Starr’s fundamental assumption, persons regarded the majority of risks in the humanity as being incongruously high. He also discovered that the space amid involuntary and voluntary risks was not that big, as alleged by Starr.

Slovic discovered that it was possible to foretell and measure perceived risk. A person is apt to view present risk levels as inappropriately high for the majority of activities. All conditions held constant, the larger the perception of a gain by persons, the larger the forbearance of the risk (Slovic 284).

If an individual acquired satisfaction by using a commodity, persons judged its profits as lofty and its risks as small. If the action was not liked, the verdicts would be the reverse. Exploration in psychometrics has established that risk perception is greatly dependent on instinct, empirical thinking, and sensation.

Psychometric research acknowledged a wide sphere of characteristics that can be reduced to three major factors including the extent to which a risk is comprehended; the extent to which the risk induces a sentiment of dread; and the quantity of persons likely to be impacted by the risk (Slovic 285).

A dread risk educes intuitive feelings of fear of disaster and disparity. An indefinite risk is novel and strange to science. The more an individual dreads an action, the more elevated the perceived risk is, and the more that individual desires the risk abridged (Slovic 285).

Risk perception study reveals that people’s profound anxieties are connected to the authenticity of widespread adverse media coverage and to a sturdy relationship amid nuclear power and the propagation and employment of nuclear arms (Burton et al. 264).

Psychometric study can predict the reaction to technological tools that have the potential to cause strong and importunate public antagonism. However, differences in the span of an individual’s definition of risk can significantly alter the assessment of risk from a range of technological advancements (Slovic et al. 464).

A Summary of the Main Points Made by Clark

Risk is typified by diverse types of fears. The way that persons perceive those types of fears, influences their character. To understand contemporary issues in risk assessment, the historical perspective of social risk assessment is discussed in three segments: the European witch craze in the 16^th and 17^th centuries; resource management in the field of uncertainty; and drug safety and limits of regulation. I shall discuss each of this separately.

The European Witch Craze in the 16^th and 17^th Centuries

Witchcraft and witches have existed since time immemorial. For a long time, people regarded their fears of uncertainty as witches (Trevor—Roper 1). The term witches served as a sufficient explanation for the uncontrollable disasters which happened to people’s crops and wellbeing.

During that time, the church assumed a cynical and a chiefly academic loom to these beliefs, teaching the distinction between truth and fantasy, and classifying witches directly in the latter group (Schwing and Walter 287). At some point, the lawmakers intervened on the illusions about witches by illegalizing them.

Contemporary risk assessors do not harm their colleague residents. Instead, they attempt to insure against witch hunting by use of a systematic approaches to collect and assess proof on risk issues. However, the account of witch hunting puts forward that whatever we may be doing or intending to do in modern risk assessment is likely to be far from what occurs in reality.

Thus, the only way that we can identify these inconsistencies is through modifying the historical perspective, while offering clear grounds for adjustments. Several risk assessments employed today are usually identical with those that were employed by the inquisition.

The advantage of the past perspective is that, with retrospection, we are able to realize the disparity and attempt to gain knowledge from it. Currently, there is an aspect of opportunistic vocation in the modern risk assessment society (Schwing and Walter 289). Similar to the past, the present science society is willing to practice its risk assessment actions into regions that are near home. In many aspects, contemporary risk assessment activities are parallel to the European witch craze.

Resource Management on the Function of Uncertainty

Nothing imaginary or of witch-like nature subsists in the risks experienced through people’s daily associations with water, plants and the entire environment (Clark 1). However, inadequate adjustment can lead to uncertainties in the future as well as the explicit and direct consequences of drowning, hunger and burning up. Anthropological research indicates that pre-industrial folk communities adjust to such ecological risks mainly through adaptation in human conduct (Clark 3).

Many a time we adjust to the environment, but still disaster strikes us. For instance, even with a great deal of efforts by the U.S. to manage floods, an insupportable rainfall hit resulting to vast floods (Burton et al. 264). Again, communal health and vaccination crusades have done much good, as they have assisted in the prevention of diseases, especially among children.

However, the abridged frequency of ailments brought by vaccination is always accompanied by augmentations of other types of risks. This is so since the efforts to manage ailments introduces alien substances in the composite biological structure.

Drug Safety: The Limits of Regulation

Medicines, even though they planned to enhance lives, create risks of recognized types. Therefore, the assessment of risks posed by clinical drugs is simpler than other risk conditions. The fundamental actions for risk-benefit judgments of drugs are also soundly recognized. Preliminary testing makes use of broad knowledge and skill on identical products. However, different nations have diverse policies pertaining drugs.

In order to make efficient policies of risk management, it is vital to have cautiously planned studies that demonstrate the types of risks that the current testing measures can catch, and the type of risks that they allow to trip. Suitable combinations of risk assessment strategies are not likely to surface from even the most refined thoughts; hence there is the need to carry out adaptive risk management.

In the final section of the paper, Clark demonstrates that all traditions place themselves in the antagonism of the unknown and endeavor to conquer or manipulate it, hoping to set up a more unsurprising and less scary world. He stresses the need to take risks in the medical field as well as in other similar fields.

The Difference between a Cause and a Mechanism

The conventional approach to perceiving actions has been to consider it as a cluster of effects created by preceding causes (Reinout 20). Causes and effects are commonly acknowledged in the shape of events. After a lightning stroke appears, one expects a roll of thunder. In this case, the occurrence of one event results to the occurrence of the other. Causation is characterized by a series of actions (Ashraf 38).

Causation depicts the sequence in which actions consistently happen, although it does not engross a depiction of the mechanism that relates cause and effect. Characterizing action in terms of causes and effects is extremely hasty since each novel cause has to be independently allied to its effects (Ashraf 38). The following is an example of a case that can be used to explain a mechanism.

As a result of air entering the room from an open window, a thermostat will start the furnace. In case, it was switched off, the current of air makes the thermostat to start the furnace. On further observation, one sees another cause-effect association. In case, it was on, increase in temperature can evoke the thermostat to switch off the furnace. This is parallel to the former cause-effect incident, although the cause and effect are in the reverse routes.

More observations confirm several other comprehensive forms of causes and effects, depending on the duration of time that the furnace remains on or off.

Chilly climate remote to the house makes the thermostat maintain the furnace activated for longer periods than it maintains the furnace switched off, while mild heat makes the furnace switch off soon after it is switched on, and warm heat makes the thermostat to maintain the furnace switched off all along.

The number of causes and effects can be lengthened for an indefinite period, without indication of why any experienced cause has particular effects and without creating any capacity to envisage what a novel sort of cause will occur. For instance, holding a large party in the house or placing a fire in the house will both generate identical effects via the thermostat.

Different from a cause, a mechanism never work merely for definite causes and definite effects; it connects a big number of diverse causes, which are capable of influencing a structure, to the entire end effects that the structure can generate. The example discussed above, of a thermostat’s mechanism, shows the connection between heat from the atmosphere and the on and off condition of a furnace.

The connection between these two remains just similar, despite the causes that influence the exterior temperature. From the above association, it is possible to envisage the entire effects that will occur on the furnace. If an individual places fire in the house, it is likely that the furnace will be switched off by the thermostat, as a result of high temperatures.

A mechanism involves causes that one may not be able to perform experimentally as they could be harmful (Brooks 39). However, the effects are always obvious. The fact that a house could be on fire would be of no interest to the thermostat. Its interest would be that there is a rise in temperatures, and thus should turn the furnace off.

In conclusion, for most citizens, understanding of hazards is usually developed from the news in the media, which scrupulously manuscripts threats and fears happening all over the planet. Risk assessment is important as it enables people to control and manage risks. In some cases, it is important for one to assess the benefits and the risk factors, for instance in the use of vaccines.

Finally, the major difference between a cause and a mechanism is that a mechanism connects a big number of diverse causes, which are capable of influencing a structure, to the entire end effects that the structure can generate.

Ideas adopted from “Subject notes and study guide for risk perception and analysis” (12 – 16, 18)

1. In this case, the threat is leakage of gas under pressure from the cover drill hole. This is energy. The energy involved is chemical energy since it involves oxidation of the gas which leads to the explosion. Another threat is the presence of intrinsically unsafe electrical equipment. This is also energy. In this case, the energy involved is electrical potential energy (“Subject notes and study guide for risk perception and analysis” 16).
2. The event is gas leakage from the cover drill hole. An event is described as the moment in time when management is lost against a threat. As a result, assets become vulnerable to the outcomes of the events. In this case, the gas leaking from the cover drill hole proves that control had been lost over the threat, thus making assets (people, the mine, and equipment) vulnerable to the events’ outcomes (“Subject notes and study guide for risk perception and analysis” 17).
3. Mechanisms are described as the reasons for the occurrence of an event. For this case, the first mechanism was cover drilling. Cover drilling has the potential of exposing the pressurized gas if the gas leaks from the cover drill hole. The other mechanism involved the leaked gas coming in contact with the intrinsically unsafe electrical equipment (“Subject notes and study guide for risk perception and analysis” 17).
4. The most devastating outcome was the explosion that subsequently occurred after the gas had escaped from the cover drill hole. The gas leakage could also lead to respiratory problems to those directly inhaling the escaped gases (“Subject notes and study guide for risk perception and analysis” 17 – 19).
5. The consequence of the outcomes could be death to the miners. In this case study, we are informed that 19 people died as a result of the explosion. Another consequence of the outcome could be damage to the mine and the equipment found in the vicinity of the explosion. In the case study, we are informed that there was widespread damage that covered up to 500 m from the core of the explosion (“Subject notes and study guide for risk perception and analysis” 19).
6. The assets in this case study included people (the miners), the mine itself and the equipment used in the mine (“Subject notes and study guide for risk perception and analysis” 11, 17).

Assignment 2

Adapted from “Subject notes and study guide for risk perception and analysis” 20.

1. Comparing different risks

Risk estimation “matrix” (Adapted from “Subject notes and study guide for risk perception and analysis” 48)

Smoking is one of the factors that are almost certain to occur and its consequence is catastrophic. The case study notes that, although it is not allowed to smoke in the mines, the miners are not prevented from smoking by this rule. This makes the factor almost certain to occur. The presence of highly flammable gases in the mines makes the consequence of this activity very catastrophic if the cigarette, or matchstick, or lighter’s flame would come in contact with a flammable gas. The result would be an explosion.

It is likely that a gas would escape from the cover drill hole. The consequence of such an action is minor. As noted in the case study, the gas will be intercepted and escapes through the hole in half the number of times cover drilling is done. Although the hole cannot be plugged to deny the gas the chance of escaping, it is not likely that this would lead to an explosion. As noted in the case study, explosions have only occurred 12 times in 6 years in the mine.

2. The chosen risks are Effectiveness of existing control measures and the Cost of proposed control changes. Using a scale of 1 to 5 and taking 1 to be ‘good’ and 5 to be ‘as bad as can be’, by addition, the Risk Rank Number of the Effectiveness of existing control measures factor was found to be 21, while that of the Cost of proposed control changes was found to be 5. By ranking all the factors it is possible to find the maximum a risk could be ranked.

3. The combination of all factors by either addition or multiplication proved to be a challenging and confusing task as one had to be very careful when selecting the rank for each factor or when combining the numbers from various scales. It was easy to give each rank its own scale.

I. Comparing the same type of risk – “risk factors”

Most of the articles shown are related to health conditions, with a few relating to business or financial matters. Most of those articles relating to health conditions are either discussing risk factors associated with cancer or those factors associated with heart conditions. In both cases, risk factors have been described as things that are have a tendency to increase the likelihood of a certain event taking place.

II. As a sports person, the type of risk that that is of interest to me is the risk of losing a match. The risk factors associated with this type of risk include poor preparation before the match; misunderstanding between team members; lack of winning mentality and taking things for granted or being casual. If a does not prepare adequately before a match, it is most likely that that team will lose the game. This leads to misunderstandings between teammates, since there would be inadequate or lack of proper co-ordination. If a team lacks a winning mentality, then they would only be playing the match to avoid punishments or just for the sake of it. This is likely to lead to a loss.

III. Preparation before a match – absent to excellent

Misunderstanding between team members – worst to not present

Lack of winning mentality – worst to absent

Being casual – worst to not there

I. For the explosion to occur; gas should escape from the cover drill hole and come in contact with flames from smoking or intrinsically unsafe electrical equipment.

(pA * pBi) + (pA * pBii) = p

Where pA is the probability that the gas escapes from the cover drill hole (0.5)

pBi is the probability that smoking takes place (0.9)

pBii is the probability that intrinsically unsafe electrical equipment will come in contact with the leaked gas (0.9)

Therefore p = (0.5 * 0.9) + (0.5 * 0.9) = 0.45 + 0.45 = 0.9

II.

III.

This is a highly economic alternative in case all the risk costs were covered with the airport operator. On the other hand, most of this accident’s costs, e.g. deaths, hull loss and associated costs were experienced by the air operators. It is also possible that the airport operator could experience the costs.

This could happen in case the air operators decided to file a suit against the airport operator since he had failed in providing a secure airport operating structure. In addition, one could inquire whether it was affordable to provide ground radar in principle. A court would have seen this as a minor cost. This is proved by the fact that ground radar was installed after the accident. Therefore, it was affordable and thriftily acceptable to provide ground radar.

Works Cited

Ashraf, Mozayan. The Forensic Laboratory Handbook Procedures and Practice. New York: Springer, 2010.Print.

Brooks, Jamyn. Gravitation, Discovery of its Cause and Mechanism. London: J. W. Arrow Smith, 1977. Print.

Burton, Ian, Rachel Kates, and Gerald White. The Environment as a Hazard. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978. Print.

Clark, Williams. “Lessons for Ecological Policy Design: a Case Study of ecosystem management.” Ecological Modelling 7 (1972): 1-5

Douglas, Mark and Albert Widavsky. Risk and Culture. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982. Print.

Kahneman, Dupe, Paul Slovic, and Andrew Tversky. Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982. Print.

Nelkin, Duke. “The Political Impact of Technical Expertise.” Social Studies of Science 5 (1975): 35-54

Reinout, Willem. The Cause and Mechanism of Igneous Intrusion: With Some Scottish Examples. London: Sage, 1937. Print.

Schwing, Richard and Walter Albers. Societal Risk Assessment. New York: Planum Press, 1980. Print.

Slovic, Paul, Sarah Lichtensten, and Baruch Fischhoff. “Risk and Environment.” Management Science (1984) 30: 464

Slovic, Paul. “Perception of Risk.” Science 241(1987): 280-285.

“Subject notes and study guide for risk perception and analysis.” Swinburne University of Technology Faculty of Engineering and Industrial Science 3/08/ 2011. Print (Lecture notes).

Trevor—Roper, Reagan. The European Witch Craze of the 16^th and 17^th Centuries and other Essays. New York: Harper and Row, 1968. Print.