Introduction
The plaintiffs contended that Section 2339B of the US Code, which bars giving substantial assistance or resources to recognized foreign terrorist groups, was unconstitutionally ambiguous. The plaintiffs intended to aid two groups listed by the United Nations as international terrorist organizations in their case. They claimed to be assisting the organizations in achieving their legitimate and peaceful goals. Plaintiffs contended that because of the vagueness of 2339B, it breached free speech and associations provisions of the 1st and 5th amendments. According to the plaintiffs ‘ plan, the organization’s members would be trained to utilize the legislation to peacefully settle conflicts and petition representative authorities for restraining order relief. Plaintiffs were given partial summary judgment on the district court’s remand, supported by the Ninth Circuit US Court of Appeal, which granted certiorari after the petition.
Procedural History
The court concluded that persons who offered material assistance to foreign terrorist groups violated the Patriot Act (18 USC 2339B). The United States Supreme Court’s verdict on the case of Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project in June 2010 addressed the Patriot Act’s limitation on doing so. Two instances under the First Amendment deal with this topic, filed by US Attorney General Eric Holder. Following significant consideration, it was found that the Constitution allows for the regulation of political expression. The other case is Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, which was determined only last year. It was found that the Humanitarian Law Project had broken international law when it counseled Turkey’s Kurdish Workers’ Party and Sri Lanka’s Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam on how to settle their issues amicably via conversation.
Consequently, it concluded that the US Congress prohibited assistance to such organizations, even if the grant was intended to facilitate peace talks or UN processes, because it fell within the legal definition of material aid, which included training, expert advice, federal government service, and the provision of federal government employees. Any aid might help legitimate the terrorist group and free up resources for terrorist actions, motivating them to help. Even though the Humanitarian Law Project’s proposed acts were broad and wholly hypothetical, the court said in its conclusion that a legal challenge to the implementation of the material assistance provisions was not prohibited once they became operative.
Issue
18 USCS 2339B prohibits aiding known foreign terrorist organizations, but does it deny helping them in any other way?
Rule
Providers of material assistance or resources to foreign terrorist organizations for supposedly approved, peaceful purposes, as prohibited under 18 USCS 2339B, are not in violation of the Constitution because the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on vagueness and the First Amendment’s right to free expression and association prevent them from doing so.
Application/Analysis
After reviewing the evidence, the majority found that applying the Act to these particular plaintiffs violates the Constitution. It did, however, bypass the knottier question of the statute’s validity under different circumstances. The plaintiffs claimed three constitutional violations in their lawsuit: (1) that the Act’s applicability to them was unconstitutionally ambiguous; (2) that the statute infringed their freedoms of speech and association; and (3) that the statute violated their right to free association. To begin, the court concluded that the legislation was clear since the sections of the Act that pertained to the plaintiffs’ anticipated behavior were specified explicitly. Second, the plaintiffs claimed that the Act forbids them from participating in any political activity.
While plaintiffs are free to express their thoughts on the group in any way they see fit, the court ruled that the Act does not ban any speech since plaintiffs can express their opinions on the organization they see appropriate – they cannot support it. According to the court, a content-neutral rule is constitutional if it “significantly promotes governmental objectives unrelated to the repression of free expression and does not impose much higher burdens on speech than are required to achieve those interests.” The court decided that invoking the government’s national security concerns fulfilled this criterion. The plaintiffs claimed that the Act infringed their freedom to the association by making mere membership with terrorist groups a criminal, which they said was an unconstitutional categorization. The court flatly rejected this argument, stating that the legislation does not forbid association but rather encourages or supports it in its operations. Consequently, the majority of the court concluded that the Act applies to defendants.
The supply of services, training, and professional assistance to international terrorist organizations The United States Supreme Court affirmed a federal statute that restricted the supply of service, training, and support advice to entities classified by the government as foreign terrorist organizations in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 US 1 (2010). The Supreme Court upheld the Act despite arguments based on vagueness, free speech, and freedom of association. Assisting terrorist organizations is now forbidden under the law. The Act made it illegal to have knowledge and intention. As part of the USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001, Congress expanded the definition of support and materials to include providing “professional advice or assistance” to terrorist groups and other comparable organizations. Therefore, the implication is that future cases with the same issue will agree on judgment since the law is vague.
Conclusion
The verdict of the court of appeals was overturned because 2339B was applied ambiguously. Situations have been remanded to detention in several cases. When the Act was used to speak, the court decided that the evidence of purpose criterion was not reached. The anticipated actions of the plaintiffs did not infringe Section 2339B since they were principally covered by the clauses of “training” and “expert advice or assistance,” both of which were not violated. No laws were broken by 2339B. Consequently, Congress and the President concluded that even the slightest assistance for a foreign terrorist group was harmful.
Reference
O’Scannlain, D. F. (2010). A Decade of Reversal: The Ninth Circuit’s Record in the Supreme Court Since October Term 2000. Lewis & Clark L. Rev., 14, 1557.