Olympic Games is one of the most important events in sport for athletes from all over the world. The idea to boycott the Olympic Games in China is based on political reasons and human rights doctrines aimed to protect Chinese citizens from violation of freedom of press and speech, and political repressions. This major spotting event is used as a political battle between democratic and non-democratic states aimed to protect their rights and insist their political will (Hopkins 155). The Olympic Games in China 2008 should not be boycotted because it will be the main violation of human rights, freedoms and democratic principles preached by the boycotted side.
The Olympic Games in China 2008 should not be boycotted because it will not bring a desired a outcome. The states made attempted to boycott the Olympic Games in Moscow and Afghanistan but failed to meet desired goals. The first Olympic games boycotted were Games in Melbourne in 1956. Other attempts were made in 1974 and 1976, 1980 and 1984. The problem is that neither of these boycotts reached their ultimate goal but deprived many sportsmen a chance to proceed in their career. The Olympic Games cannot be used as an arena for political battle because it will be the main violation of human rights and freedoms (Repression continues in China 2008). The boycott of the Olympic Games will not punish the state but it will punish athletes from all over the world who have spent much time and efforts on training and preparation for this important event in their life (Hopkins 155).
The decision to boycott The Olympic game is non-democratic because it violates rights and freedoms of the majority of Chinese citizen. The international organization is constituted by states but once the constitution of the organization is legally in force over time the state-organization relationship takes on varying patterns as we have observed. The state may retain high authority in preference to significant organization participation or may seek a dominant role to bend the organization toward its goals (Repression continues in China 2008). The partnership role may be the state’s preference or high organization authority may take place, especially in proportion to the state’s inability to meet its needs by its own sovereign authority. Finally, the state may choose to accept supra-organization authority in certain areas of national policy now, international policy. The sovereign state may always choose to depart from the organization or international treaty obligation (Guttman 92).
The example of boycott was Jimmy Carter’s decision to boycott the 1980 Summer Olympics motivated by two main considerations. First, the Soviet Union was to be punished for its actions in Afghanistan. The White House sought to increase the political costs to be borne by Moscow, and determined that as Olympic host the Kremlin’s investment in prestige, propaganda, and other resources was of such magnitude as to make a boycott especially effective (Guttman 92). Second, Carter desired to show the rest of the world that the United States still had the will to resist Soviet aggression. The helpless position in which the United States found itself as a consequence of the Iranian hostage crisis only reinforced such perceptions. It was in an effort to counter this negative assessment of U.S. foreign policy that Carter moved to support the idea of a boycott. Similar to modem China events, of the options the White House had at its disposal to punish Moscow, it determined that a boycott of the Olympics would have the most far-reaching consequences. It was this belief that Moscow was going to achieve a propaganda coup of global proportions that would confer legitimacy not only upon the regime and its political system but also upon its actions in Afghanistan that made the boycott idea so alluring (Guttman 99).
The first factor that must be considered prior to any political utilization of international sport is the compatibility of a projected plan of action with the political and structural characteristics of sport itself. The boycotts demonstrated that the politically peripheral nature of international sport enabled it to be utilized in a relatively low cost fashion. If the Olympic Games are boycotted, only the athletes and certain businesses are forced to sacrifice directly, a fact that minimized internal political repercussions (Guttman 42). Internationally, failure to win the support of a particular nation is damaging to the perceived capacity of the international community demand, and be accorded, solidarity on an issue of global concern, but did not damage intergovernmental relations per se (Sport and Moral Ethics 24). Sport can be imbued with great symbolic importance, yet intrinsically it has no political content, whereas disagreements among allies over nuclear strategy or trade barriers may imply wide-ranging philosophical discord, while creating serious substantive difficulties. Conflicts over sport are normally confined to the realm of the symbolic. The capacity of sport to perform political functions without the risks attendant upon other modes of action makes it attractive to state leaders. Employed appropriately, international sport can produce significant results with minimum cost. International sport is not as appealing to government leaders (Xiaowei 130). The fierce independence of the IOC, as well as that of many national Olympic committees, creates serious difficulties for states seeking to capitalize politically through the manipulation of sport. The various administrative organs comprising the international sports establishment are fraught with internecine quarrels, but have demonstrated an ability and willingness to band together in defense of their freedom from government encroachment. The steadfast persistence of those national Olympic committees which had a degree of real independence in asserting their exclusive right to decide all Olympic-related questions was displayed by the U.S. Olympic Committee (Hopkins 155).
While the suitability of any government action regarding international sport must be evaluated with great care and expertise, efforts focused upon the Olympic Games must be scrutinized far more thoroughly (Sport and Moral Ethics 24). Since the symbolic importance of the Olympics is universally acknowledged, and the mass media has succeeded to such an extent in instantaneously transmitting events to a global audience, the temptation to intervene politically in the Games has increased dramatically. Yet, while statesmen may feel the allure of utilizing the Olympics as a “quick-fix” to a myriad of political problems, they must realize that the same symbolic significance that has made the Games attractive for political purposes has fostered a strong reservoir of world sentiment that the Olympics should be excluded from the “petty,” “transient” concerns of international politics. Although statesmen may be inclined to dismiss, those who revere the Olympics regardless of its shortcomings, and who seek to minimize the political intrusions foisted upon the Games, as mere “idealists” who have lost touch with “reality,” they are at peril to do so. The symbolic significance of the Olympic Games attracts the attention of national leaders in search of alternative solutions to political problems (Hopkins 157). The globalization of the Games affords a worldwide forum in which to act, and offers the cunning, and successful, statesman a unique opportunity to develop international sympathy and support for his cause. Yet, the refusal of considerable segments of the global community to forfeit their intuitive commitment to the “Olympic ideal” creates serious difficulties for those attempting to tamper politically with the Olympic Games. Western statesmen in particular must neutralize the idealist “faction” before an Olympic-related boycott policy may be broached with any hope of success. The fate of attempts to manipulate the Olympics politically is predicated to a great extent upon the degree to which the symbolic meaning attached to the Games can be channeled in support of, rather than in opposition to, a state’s efforts (Sport and Moral Ethics 24). Not only does an endeavor of the magnitude of an Olympic boycott present enormous challenges for the most consummate of politicians, but, once such an action is initiated, it is imperative that it be perceived as successful. Any lesser result jeopardizes the credibility and esteem of the sponsor government and impairs its ability to act effectively in the future (Xiaowei 130). Since a boycott requires a total commitment by its primary advocate in order to have any hope of success, and failure portends such adverse consequences, it should be only with the utmost of caution that government leaders identify themselves too closely with this type of action (Hopkins 155).
In sum, it is the main violation of human rights to use of international sport as an instrument of power politics. The decision to utilize the Olympics as a vehicle to inflict political damage revealed the particular allure such a tactic held for government leaders. The Olympic Games was the quintessence of sporting competition among nations and embodied to a heightened extent the political potentialities inherent in sport. Of a politically peripheral nature and capable of being utilized with little risk, international sport appeared as an ideal tool of national policy. So, the international community and other states have no moral, ethical and legal rights to boycott this sporting event and make it a political arena for interest groups.
Works Cited
Guttman Allen. The Games Must Go On: Avery Brundage and the Olympic Movement. New York: Columbia University Press, 1984.
Hopkins, M. M. Olympic Ideal Demolished: How Forced Evictions in China Related to the 2008 Olympic Games Are Violating International Law. Houston Journal of International Law, 29 (2007): 155-158.
Repression continues in China, six months before Olympic Games. Reporters Without Borders. 2008. Web.
Sport and Moral Ethics Bring Dilemma of Olympic Proportions. Western Mail (Cardiff, Wales), 2008, p. 24.
Xiaowei, Z. Does China Matter? A Reassessment. Journal of Contemporary Asia, 37 (2007): 130.