Introduction
It is sometimes difficult to make a choice on whether to be realistic or non-realistic towards religious claims. Often, people choose to apply both.
Realist views in religion claim to be referring to God’s existence and God’s characteristics as a real being with real features. Therefore, if there is no God, and if these characteristics of God did not exist, people would be making false claims (Peterson et al., 2007, p.5).
Of course, realism exists in many forms. An important form for discussion is ethical realism. The realist philosophers hence believe that their perceptions and normative claims concern definite realties in the moral realm. However, as the paper unveils, we should be realistic about religious claims.
Without getting into much discussion about the prospects and challenges of non-realism on general philosophy, I can say that there is a central problem with non-realists’ perception of truth (Trigg, 1997, p.217).
They fail to acknowledge the commonsensical idea, in religion and beyond, where truth relies on the way things are. Truth surpasses what is determinable in boundaries on certain discourse (Trigg, 1997, p.219).
Religion is essential in a community and both realist and non-realist at some point aggress of this given the advantages that religion has had. The society has been using religion to ensure that people comply with its rules (Peterson et al., 2007, p.7).
Non-realists point out the structure of religion as a social discipline with nothing supernatural about it. The basic sense of religion seriously changes from these thoughts.
My viewpoint is that, human agency works to determine whether there is something or nothing. It is blatantly false that the human beings created the universe (Peterson et al., 2007, p.7). People find themselves part of the universe hence the non-realist stance cannot explain creation.
Don Cupitt view of religion relies on radical relativism, linguistic constructivism, and culture’s impact on humanity. Cupitt’s perception is that religion is a cultural situation in modern time (Cupitt, 1995, p.81).
There has come the end of an era. The old realistic concept of God as omnipotent, spiritual and independent of human is long overdue according to Cupitt (Cupitt, 1995, p.81). People need to make their own truths and value developing a reality that encompasses everyone.
In the past, Christian morals were entirely realist. For instance, the God’s commandments in the Bible tell people what to and what not to do. This has caused people to view moral truths as independent of the commandments.
This implies obeying the commandments without question (Cupitt, 1995, p.82). However, as people now challenge or even reject moral truths and religion by rationalizing issues to believe in, this has resulted in a perception of any absolute form of such issues gradually rejected.
The main challenge to religion’s certainty and centrality beliefs came about in Europe following the emerging philosophy in 1700s. People refer this period to as the Enlightenment or Age of Reason.
This rationalization of belief has reduced the objective view of God. Moral ethics stands out as attempts to obey God-given moral code. However, this has led to the perception that there are no absolute standards of what is right or wrong. According to Cupitt, the bottom-line is that there is a new starting point for Christian ethics.
Cupitt’s rejects God’s objective existence based on epistemological concerns on how much knowledge human have of God, or more significantly lack.
He rejects God’s existence as lawgiver arguing that, if he were to exist, then human would not truly free to live the way they wanted…they would follow certain ways designed by God (Cupitt, 1995, p.82).
Such heteronymous faith cannot be a means of becoming autonomous of fully liberated spirit, as it seems decisive against God’s purpose of existence.
An objective God cannot offer salvation. Believing in divine lawgiver is repressive from this viewpoint. If God set out the right ways to live, human beings would have to fallow that ‘path’. Cupitt argues that this view cannot save, as salvation means freedom, while this viewpoint means submission (Cupitt, 1990, p.106).
Roger Trigg argues from different angles that it is badly unsound understanding of religion that makes people think it is optional and eccentric: secretive individual conviction.
Religious belief is not typically private. However, it takes a public communal shape. Rarely is it an issue of personal concern: it finds expression in the way followers of the religion live out their communal life (Trigg, 2007, p.191).
For many people, leave alone the religious ones, religion is not optional but a crucial factor of fundamental identity as persons. Religion has also over the years proven not to be an idiosyncratic thing.
For years, cognitive scholars argue that human beings are naturally religious beings. It is indispensable to add to the argument that no one merely has religion rather religion comes are types of religions (Trigg, 2007, p.191).
If these arguments are true, it hence constitutes a powerful case for believing that humans have a prima facie inalienable right to practice their religion.
Trigg notes that, in European declarations, it is common to see region referred to as clashing with rights. In such cases, it has to give way to rights (Trigg, 2007, p.193). Religion has it own rights.
Realists like Trigg and Penelhum also argue that God’s existence has to be independent of believers. Trigg’s argument points out the possibility of defining God’s transcendence without reference to any mind enclosing boundaries (Trigg, 2007, p.195).
Therefore, for realists, existence of God is real. Furthermore, this existence is independent of the world and, therefore, not the same as the world or anything in it. God exists independent of our minds – what we think (Trigg, 2007, p.196).
The central tenet of realistic perception of religion is, therefore, the claim that God exists, otherwise referred to as the Objectivity of God’s reality.
In essence, if this argument is true, God existence is not sensibly reliant on human’s subjectivity or certain ways of thinking and practice where cognitive actions and assertions pertaining God occur (Trigg, 1997, p.213).
Realism simply declares that God derives God’s own existence and reality from God’s self and not from the world, notions and or language that people use when referring to God (Trigg, 1997, p.216).
Theological realism is hence metaphysical realism that comprises of divine reality, affirming that God is objectively real with his existence independent of what people believe in or say about him (Trigg, 1997, p.217).
Doing justice to this rational perception, people need to tie truth with reality in a manner that the truth of religious propositions such as Omnipotent God or Loving God rely on whether reality is in agreement with them or not.
Realists like Trigg try to save this notion by placing arguments that religious propositions are true only if they correspond to the way human-independent reality is (Trigg, 1997, p.215).
Therefore, it is understandable with contention that an essential fact to realism is the concept of truth as constituted appropriate between beliefs or statements and the characteristics of independent, determinate reality.
There are religious realists claiming that God exists beyond practice and perception while there are also non-realists who claim this is not true. Independent existence seems to be the main concept of their claims.
I support the realist arguments that there is the existence of God beyond language, practice, and compromise. To deny this claim mixes up issues of how something is determined to be true and what it means to be true.
I think that it does not entirely require the concept of independent existence to prove real existence but the theory of objectivity of existence (Trigg, 1997, p.217).
Don Cupitt defines truth as something that comes up because of language hence it is a cultural thing (Cupitt, 1990, p.107). If realists agree to this then, consensus is paramount in deciding on what in the truth.
However, consensus cannot create the truth. It is not the people make truths by failing to accept certain true claims. Replacing them with our own notion is no better.
In conclusion, I support the realist claim on the subject of knowledge, as well as its object regarding our search for truth. Realists claim that we can have knowledge of something.
However, sceptics have a problem with how one achieves this knowledge. That is why Trigg proposes a non-fundamentalist way, which uncritically builds on own culture: a metaphysical thesis on the nature of reality (Trigg, 1997, p.220).
Trigg puts it that the solution to contention between realism and non-realism entails answering epistemological concerns, which refer to one’s ability to know.
The metaphysical concern is the nature of objective reality. Something real is independent of how we criticize it. Unreliability cannot be consequential without logic of objective reality.
Reference List
Cupitt, D. (1990). Creation Out of Nothing. London: SCM Press.
Cupitt, D. (1995). The Last Philosophy. London: SCM Press
Peterson, M., Hasker, W., Reichenbach, B., & Basinger, D. (2007). Philosophy of Religion. New York: Oxford University Press. Pp. 5-7.
Trigg, R. (1997). Theological Realism and Antirealism: A Companion to Philosophy of Religion. Oxford: Blackwell.
Trigg, R. (2007). Religion in Public Life: Must Faith Be Privatized? New York: Oxford University Press.