Religious Pluralism and Theology of Religions Research Paper

Introduction

The issue of religious variety has sparked major debate in recent decades. Religious diversity refers to the existence of major variances in faith and practice. However, since the early modern era, increased knowledge through travel, writing, and influx of refugees has compelled intellectual people to think more thoroughly about religious differences. Pluralism responses to religious heterogeneity essentially state that, given limits, one denomination is as valuable as any other. Religious Pluralism is a kind of theological doublethink, or, in less dystopian words, the conviction that two or more religious truth claims are equally legitimate notwithstanding significant conflicts¹. The emergence of pluralist theologies is a reaction to the understanding that, in a plural society, Christian affirmations are just propositions rather than absolute facts. However, since pluralists end discourse by regarding all major faiths as fundamentally the same, it is necessary to spectacle that there is no universal paradigm for evaluating religious truth claims.

Core Pluralism

Core pluralism recognizes diversity in all areas of religious practice, but distinguishes between marginal and core variations. A core pluralist maintains that all faiths of some form have a shared identity, and that this common foundation is what actually counts about religious beliefs; their equivalent worth is found in this shared core. To some extent, if the foundation has real principles, they will all be accurate. All religions will provide methods to view whatever the elements of religiosity are if the center is verifiable perceptions. Because any core pluralism eventually minimizes the other non-essential parts of religions, this viewpoint has also been dubbed “reductive pluralism.” As a result, if the core is salvifically successful practice, then all will be equal and should be treated that each is an incredibly viable way of attaining the cure through salvation.

Huston Smith

Huston Smith is by far the most significant modern supporter of a variant of core pluralism. The standard assumption of faiths, in his opinion, is a multi-tiered philosophy. This includes the notion that physical reality, the planetary plane, is included inside and governed by a more substantial transitional level, which in turn is enclosed and regulated by the cosmic plane. This heavenly realm is inhabited by a divine Creator, and beyond this lies a boundless, limitless “Being,” also known as “True Reality.”² Smith believes that such a mindset was almost widespread in ancient times and is still prevalent among indigenous cultures today. Only contemporary people, who are deluded by the misconception that science discloses everything, have neglected this. In some ways, the greatest level is the human “Spirit,” the inner self that lies underneath the self of everyday consciousness. Smith, using Hinduism, Buddhism, and Christian terminology, claims that this “spirit” is the Atman³. Atman, also referred to as Brahman, is a Hinduism deity who appears when one’s mortal self – departs from its own body and flesh.

The idea of the “soul,” like ancient faiths, provides a diagnostic of the human situation as well as a treatment. Furthermore, it depicts a descent from primal mysticism into contemporary spiritual impoverishment, which may be reversed by embracing the above-mentioned viewpoint. Most significantly, it allows one to know their true self as “Being.” While Smith’s position is based on faith in an indifferent Ultimate, other forms of core pluralism are based on monotheistic perspectives.

Mikael Stenmark

Mikael Stenmark, a Scandinavian theologian, is another fundamental pluralist who believes in the necessity of religious plurality. Stenmark described a variant of the “some-are-equally-right view”⁴ in which Jews, Christian, and Islamic are regarded to have similar proportions of religiously essential facts. He does not argue for religious plurality, but has analyzed it as a contrast to orthodox theology and inclusivism. From a philosophical approach, Stenmark’s idea may also be understood as a kind of core religious stratification, with the core consisting basic facts regarding the one Deity and the requirement of relationship with that God.

Critiques of Core Pluralism

There are various critics of Smith’s case for core plurality. Dissenting voices, for example, may be recognized among scholars of theology, who dispute that there is and has always been a unifying foundation in all of the world largest faiths. Others disagree because they embrace the conflicting assessment and treatment offered by another faith, such as Islam or Christianity. Those who think that the “ultimate reality”⁵ is a distinctive deity, for example, disagree to Smith’s idea that the “ultimate reality” is indescribable hence not a deity in and of itself. Regarding Stenmark’s “some-are-equally-right” perspective, “all” faiths, that is, all variants of monotheistic, are correct to same extent⁶. As a result, Stenmark’s explanation is narrower than pluralistic view and is often considered to be, but it is undoubtedly a variant of it.

Identist Pluralism

According to identist pluralism, individuals from all major faiths communicate with the relatively similar transcendent reason, variably referred to as “Deity,” “the Real,” and “the Ultimate Reality.” As a result, the many religious uncertainties of the one Ultimate are to be understood as distinct but entirely acceptable human reactions to the Real. The Real as it is exists independently of the full matrix of “in-sistence” conceptions⁷. This implies that individuals are only allowed to have tangible memories of the Real in as much as they comprehend it in biological terms. As a consequence, religious practices lie between the Real and “us,” forming various “lenses” via which it is seen.

Hick’s Unitary Approach

The main conceptual foundation for Hick’s philosophy of pluralism is Kant’s assertion in epistemology that awareness is constantly an activity of choosing, organizing, synthesizing, and providing significance to impulses in line with an individualized collection of ideas. Hick argues that cognitivist and information sociologist support Kant’s philosophy. He used Jastrow’s perception theory to demonstrate how people in various topographical situations are correct in what they proclaim and incorrect only in their conviction that everyone is misguided⁸. The spiritual truth that individuals meet in Religion may be perceived in a variety of ways. Hick, for example, thought religious doctrine was logically justifiable and that one might be reasonable in accepting the veridicality from one’s spiritual beliefs. However, he considered it illogical and unreasonable to believe that just one’s inner self or the memories of an individual’s own group are reliable, while those of persons of other faiths are not. Descriptively, those other individuals believe on comparable reasons.

These views, together with the reality that religious dogma is closely tied to origin, persuaded Hick that the realities of theological variety presented irreconcilable challenges for either exclusivist or inclusivist viewpoint, presenting only some kind of heterogeneity as a feasible choice. Hick argues that mankind is in the process of transitioning from a perspective of Christianity as the one and only genuine faith to a novel comprehending of Christianity as part of many global religions, all of which are inevitable⁹. To be accomplished, this change will involve a rethinking of Christian theology, notably in the areas of Orthodox theology and related damage. In his discussion of Christology, Hick emphasizes the incomplete and confusing character of the material known to mankind regarding Jesus¹⁰. As a consequence, a variety of distinct creatures, some of whom are portrayed in very basic situations, have been venerated under the lordship of Jesus or under the designation of Christ.

Hick contends that the concept of God incarnate, which is recognized as unchanging dogma in mainstream Christian tradition, is merely one of multiple viable interpretations of Jesus’ supremacy. Despite being strong and vital to Christian identity, the imagery of God embodied has never been depicted to have a legitimate factual interpretation. Instead, New Testament study has demonstrated that the real Jesus did not profess to be God incarnate and that the ideas of the Trinitarian, creation, and redemption are all understandable. Hick compares what occurred in the context of Jesus to what transpired in Mahayana Buddhism, where the Buddha began to be respected as considerably more than an extraordinary man who existed and died hundreds of years ago¹¹. In each instance, the evolving legacy was prompted to talk about the person in words that he did not employ and to comprehend him via complicated systems of ideas that were progressively constructed by subsequent generations.

The growth of the myth about Jesus is reasonable since it is clear that people had a definitive contact with God in his life, as well as in the scriptural evidence about him. However, since a religious response to Jesus may be communicated in a variety of ways, it is not essential to enable the concept of the embodiment to speak on behalf of the lordship of Christ. Despite the constraints with the conventional concept of embodiment, and the impossibility of reaching an agreement on what precisely it means in the current context, Hick feels that a Theology of revelation may have more credibility. A factor of consideration is that Christology does not necessitate or accept the concept of three separate people, but rather recognizes three distinct modes in which the ultimate Deity may be encountered as maker, savior, and exemplar¹². According to this view, the concept of three people refers to important facets of the one supreme deity rather than centers of awareness¹³. Responsiveness to humankind’s larger spiritual practice, with its diversity of approaches, may liberate consciousness from the infallibility of Christian essentialism.

Hick’s assumption is that Christian precepts, such as the Triune god, the embodiment, and soteriology, is not divine revelation of truths, but rather hypothetical structures developed to fix unique challenges, always in terms of the preconceptions and metaphysical and phonetic resources of a given age. As a result, he regards religious teachings as being vulnerable to modification and redefinition in each cultural phenomenon rather than being flawless or immutable. The motifs do not imply the exclusive supremacy of Christian enlightenment, but rather keep the door open to real religious plurality.

Peter Byrne

Peter Byrne has offered an intriguing concept of religious plurality by both his arguments and objections to the concept of religious pluralism. Byrne’s idea is a nuanced and comprehensive effort to reconcile a stance that supports the inherent veracity of all major faiths with the belief that theological truths consists in correlation to a consciousness hallowed, a mystical reality¹⁴. Byrne offers a pragmatic conception of religious reality while also claiming that all faiths have similar conceptual and sanctifying success.

Byrne’s pluralist argument is unmistakably influenced by John Hick’s theological plurality. For instance, Byrne’s suggestion is separated into three theses and asserts that all faiths are approximately equivalent in that they (1) refer to and enable perceptual interaction with a solitary, transcendent reality, (2) each provides a correspondingly moral- and everlasting “cure,” and (3) each contains revisable and inadequate profiles of this transcendent reality¹⁵. The center of Byrne’s religious tolerance is the concept that all significant religious customs prosper equitably well in pointing to a prevalent solemn, ultimate reality¹⁶. However, since there are no unbiased ways to rectify discrepancies in the specific allegations that faiths create about that actuality or the existence of and ways of achieving a salvific connection to that reality¹⁷. As such, no religious doctrine is vindicated in asserting perceptual or salvific supremacy over the others.

Byrne opposes religious orthodoxy, which holds that religion has an intrinsic essence that all faiths embrace. His pluralism does not believe that all faiths concur on a shared set of basic ideas, but it does assume that the major faiths all have some sense of a holy, universal truth and some understanding that the ultimate objective of human activity entails attaining an adequate connection to that reality. This last element of religions is described variously by several faiths, but Byrne employs the word “salvation” to encompass a broad variety of notions of the relationship between sentient creatures and the holy, ultimate reality and how that relationship is accomplished.

Critique of Identist Pluralisms

The enormous complaints levied against Hick’s pluralist perspective suggest that it is at best problematic as a framework for the pluralistic setting. One area of conundrum is that Hick’s plan undermines the individuality that humans naturally associate with their beliefs. The disadvantage of Hick’s ‘essentialism’ is that it draws discourse to a close. According to D’Costa, the philosophy of faiths described in Hick pluralism wound up as a neo-pagan Unitarianism. Mark Heim, a Catholic philosopher, similarly rejects Hick’s soterio-centric pluralistic thought, stating that in its ultimate expression, postmodernism rejects any assertions to understand a common religious value, which Heim considers to be an impossible stance¹⁸. This heterogeneity continues to become a powerful type of exclusivism by attempting to eradicate distinctions and separateness.

Hick’s viewpoint has also been called into doubt by Muslim scholars. As per Seyyed Hossein Nasr, the sentimentalist paradigm espoused by Hick, while predicated on fostering greater empathy across faiths, places less emphasis on the whole purity of the past than on common knowledge. For example, the demand that Christians abandon their belief in the embodiment in order to connect to Muslims begs the question of why they should stay Christians rather than accept Islam. Nasr feels that a more reasonable method is to examine at different faiths through the lens of another’s institution.

Byrne believes that his skepticism is not so strong that it precludes the prospect of religious mistake remediation. Religious groups are alive, self-critical, and involved in debate with their adversaries. Byrne accepts both the falsity of religious conviction and its potential of analysis and change. Religious conversation and discussion may lead to development toward more suitable religious interpretations throughout time. Although religions are restricted in the sense that they are essentially socio-cultural constructs and creations of history, pluralism acknowledges their existence. Despite this rather hopeful view of the prospects for Christian theology, Byrne’s skepticism does not identify adequate reasons for concluding that any one religious opinion is more valid to all the others.

Post-liberal Pluralism

Post-liberal pluralism is pluralistic in the sense that it seeks to verify the many statements made by each religious book in the framework of the post-liberal tradition. However, it is post-liberal in the way it blames their inconsistencies and proceeds to dismiss them by limiting them to a fabricated whole, based on their ideological frameworks being incompatible. This is apart from John Hick’s religious pluralism, which seeks union across religions, as Hick defines the ultimate Real. A pragmatic understanding of truth is rejected, and the incompatibility of religions is emphasized, since they are separated by their distinct communication activities and ideas.

The Cultural–Linguistic Approach of Lindbeck

George Lindbeck’s perspective to plurality is interpreted within the context of his interfaith conversation engagement. He became conscious of the absence of appropriate frameworks for comprehending the challenges linked with ideologies and religious doctrine. Inter-Church dialogue, for instance, aimed at understanding why some ecumenical council preserved exclusivity toward others despite no viable doctrinal foundations for doing so. There was an obvious necessity at the time to correctly understand the basis and purpose of theology, as well as to discover a means to combat and eliminate the abnormalities in inter-Church ties. Lindbeck saw the interplay between Christian ordinations as akin to the interaction between Christianity and other faiths. As a result, he considered that the suggestions he devised to address challenges in inter-Church relationships had ecumenical relevance.

He recommends a radically divergent stance than Hick because, with exception of Hick, he does not consider faiths as being directed toward the same ultimate aim. This leads him to dismiss the notion of a common basic encounter at the heart of all religious doctrines. The experience–expressive method is described by Lindbeck as the paradigm that recognizes a shared fundamental experience in religious faiths. This framework highlights particular religious perceptual components and the ways ideologies act as instructive assertions of factual claims about observable reality. According to this viewpoint, “if a doctrine is once true, it is always true, and if it is once false, it is always false.”¹⁹ Modifications in theological stances and the demotion of old mindsets cannot be compensated for in this method, and hence it cannot operate well in a pluralistic situation where theological revisions must be allowed. In essence, Lindbeck regards the Trinitarian idea as an intra-systemic reality which can only be comprehended within the framework of Christendom.

Critique of Lindbeck’s Cultural–Linguistic Approach

Notwithstanding its eloquence, the cultural paradigm is open to at minimum two serious objections. First one, it seems to demand religious beliefs to be regarded as segmented, as entities apart from one another. Lindbeck seems to view religious practice as a ‘pure’ linguistic or ‘pure’ heritage where there is no pooling of fundamental shares of conceptions. The assumption that a collection of ideas is exclusive to a certain religious ideology, on the other hand, is more fictitious than actual. What the cultural–linguistic model overlooks is that the setting in which religious people thrive is pluralistic, rather than an ethnic isolation.

This implies that theological claims are expressed and must be interpreted in the framework of multiplicity. It is naive to believe that a conservative religious ideology can segregate itself to the extent where the laws controlling its actions and conceptions are believed to be distinct from any other religion and can only be judged from the viewpoint of its adherents. This restricted grasp of setting and ideas does not prove to be possible in a condition of pluralism, with denominational borders crossing and intersecting.

Christ’s Uniqueness and the Exclusiveness of the Gospel Message

Almost every other question is today doctrinally as intensely debated as Jesus Christ’s intrinsic peculiarity, not just among philosophers but also among common Religious people. As a result, there is a desire to construct a Christian apologetic response to rebut the claims of religious tolerance and comprehend the notion of Christ’s Distinctiveness and the Authenticity of the Gospel message. Using an apologetic communication assessment, the act of messaging in contemporary Christian faith is achievable by revisiting the apologetics issues²⁰. Apologetics, in this sense, is just as important in a religiously pluralistic community as it is in a monotheistic culture. While many individuals prioritize their emotions and experiences, this does not imply that they are unaffected by introspection. Alternatively, most of the theological pluralist position is advocated by reasoning and hence requires argument to be addressed. To properly and effectively explain Jesus’ lordship to a religious pluralist, Christianity through believers must feel that the church as an institution must recover its apologetic mission.

Christians must constantly be ready to protect the promise of redemption. Apologetics is derived from the Ancient Greek term apologia, which meaning “defense.”²¹ Consequently, Christians must be ready and capable of successfully communicating the gospel to their peers, in this instance, the religious variety generated by theological tolerance. Furthermore, it is critical for the Christian faith to embrace Jesus intensely in his critique, distinctiveness, and gospel message. Christianity is a fervently, profoundly, and forcefully exclusive Religious Faith. Therefore, his concept, which relativizes Christ as one of many salvation figures, can only leave one to be completely disappointed. To show other faiths that Christian agreement on Christ’s peculiarity and exclusivity is beyond dispute, one’s zeal for limited truth must unabashedly display a sense of openness.

As such, religious pluralism is a religious belief of knowledge of other faiths – a consciousness that neglects and, in reality, disproves Christianity’s superiority and finality and demands little worse for “other religions.” In this scenario, pluralists contend that even the egalitarian faith, which all faiths must be fulfilled in God’s divine message in Christ, must be subject to modification. In other words, pluralists would not grant Christ even a relative status among “religious faiths,” let alone an exclusive place. One feature of Religious Pluralism is a total disregard for the Biblical message.

Pluralists seldom, if at all, utilize Biblical texts, and when it is (seldom) mentioned, it is by orthodox thinkers. Since there is no Religious text having impact on affairs, the Bible is regarded as if it were without any significance. It is not only few or more verses that compel Christ’s peculiarity and sovereignty. It is the rule and style of all Religious texts, particularly the Biblical New Testament. The Bible is diametrically opposed to the ideas of religious plurality; the two are incompatible. As a result, proponents of religious diversity despise and reject the supremacy and credibility of the Holy Bible.

Similarities

Religious pluralism in the notion of “various religions” implies that the other faiths strive and attain genuine and different spiritual “atonement,” which is the ultimate objective and gospel mission of Christ²². Example, as an inclusivist Christian, staunch pluralist believes that Buddhism genuinely achieves Nirvana²³. Similarly, Christian doctrine requires that everyone ultimately reaches either communion or oneness with God. As a result, pluralist proposes that individuals who achieve Nirvana are, from a Christian viewpoint, either a subset of the redeemed or a subdivision of the doomed, based on what is occurring on transcendence with such persons. This is compatible with the Religious theology that the final goal desired by Christ is superior to all others; hence, heaven is superior to Nirvana. However, God has designated Nirvana as a goal that some non-Christians may both seek and achieve. As a result, the theology of the Trinity implies a multiplicity of ordered religious aims.

Differences

A typical point regarding religious pluralism is that it accepts that the Lordship Christ is not transcendent – God of God, as Christians adherents have traditionally claimed. Again, one might have predicted that the proclivity to connect Christ’s glory with idol would be seen in Roman Catholic Christianity — a Religion that does not consider worshiping Mary, pictures, or saints to constitute idolatry. Another couple of “gods” that may be included are Muhammad’s Allah and Buddhist’s Buddha. As a result, it is not unexpected that “conventional” Christian Claims, particularly Calvinist Confessions, are treated with contempt amid religious diversity. The teachings of choice and gratuitous grace are the penultimate to be maintained in theological plurality because they suggest the exclusive preaching of Lord Jesus – to be discovered in Him or be destroyed.

According to religious pluralist highlighted above, there are indeed different faiths, each with their own “final” solutions. What pluralist implies is that Christian has its own “ultimate solutions,” which for little or no cause may claim sovereignty or incomparability to the “ultimate answers” of other faiths. The “ultimate answers” of all faiths are the same²⁴. The numerous is all the identical when one confronts the other. It no longer takes tremendous intellect or care to see the ramifications of pluralist ideas. But it takes trust in Lord Jesus to not confuse Him for the “numerous” or the “multitude” for Him, and that belief is required because no human has ever progressed by oneself, no despite how successfully he has grown.

Today, the interconnected world has made mankind more keenly conscious of religious plurality and the many various ultimate solutions than ever before. ” One is meant to trust that now the “ultimate solutions” provided by “the numerous” that comprise “religious tolerance” will finally all concur, because are they not just one and the same²⁵. However, pluralist is excruciatingly conscious of the reality that they are all “diverse” in this context²⁶. However, since they are all unique, they all need to be “ultimate.”²⁷ As long as all of the responses vary, the “ultimate” can simply be one, leaving the potential that just one “answer” might be the absolute pinnacle.

So long as all of the responses disagree, the potential that “at the very most one solution” may be the “ultimate” persists. The only other plausible conclusion is that none of them are “ultimate.” Despite the unpleasant truth that all faiths, each with their own “final solutions,” are distinct, there is no excuse to take anything completely, to trust any, save for its conflicting qualities, that is, for its lack of credibility. The Christian belief cannot be indicated by the sole rational option that the “ultimate” can only be Christ²⁸. The Christian Religion defies categorization and lies outside of all classifications. Since it cannot be presented in connection to other religious faiths, the concept of god cannot be the “final” in respect to other religious beliefs.

Conclusion

To summarize, there are three major orientations to plurality in the current era. The first kind, dedication to another, which regards faiths as almost equal with respect to their salvific capacity. Religious traditions are distinct but ultimately viable pathways to salvation or lenses whereby the Truth is viewed. The second form, dedication to one’s institution and heritage, strives to assess other faiths using the criteria of one’s own religious culture. Here, one’s own tradition is seen as having ultimate salvific potential, even if traces of it may be found anonymously in others. The third method, the cultural–linguistic paradigm, falls in between the first two. Truth assertions must be evaluated and examined within the context of each religion under this method. Because there is no standard context for analyzing Biblical infallibility, competing views of truth must coexist.

A key flaw in these methods is that the first and third approaches effectively try to put conversation to a close by seeing all major faiths as inevitably similar or slightly as supreme in their own definitions. These two techniques contradict the apparent need for discussion in a pluralistic society. The second option, adherence to one’s own history, seems to be the most beneficial, but not in the form expressed by D’Costa. He fails to demonstrate how a Roman Catholic Triune philosophy of religious plurality benefits the plural setting. His methodology has yet to react effectively to other faiths’ pretension to be the center of transcendent intervention and refuses to address the problem of Christology sufficiently, both of which are critical in the interaction between Christians and the other faiths.

According to the above explanation, Christians should never sacrifice their devotion for Christ’s peculiarity, since they recognize that it is this unique selling proposition that brings life. However, Christians might forfeit the same admiration and affection for individuals when it comes to the notion of the gospel message’s uniqueness and exclusivity. Christian believers are urged to uphold both Christ’s Sovereignty and dignity for all of mankind, even if it involves anguish in the process. The salvation, as well as the resurrection of Christ, is both examples of how to achieve this. As a result, honoring one’s own acquaintances entails Christians allowing them to renounce the gospel. Perhaps it is only the gospel itself that displeases people’s prejudices. Christians, therefore, ought to do everything they can to assure that it is the gospel and its entire message as the only way to redemption, not religious practices, that are generating the controversies.

References

Bartolucci, Chiara, Giovanni Pietro Lombardo, and Giorgia Morgese. “Sante De Sanctis’ Contribution to the Study of Dreams between the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: The Originality of the Integrated Method.” Histories of Dreams and Dreaming (2019): 91-120. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-16530-7_5

Cheetham, David. “Pluralism and Ineffability.” Religious Studies 56, no. 1 (2020): 95-110. doi:10.1017/S0034412519000556.

Dag, Esra A. Christian and Islamic Theology of Religions: A Critical Appraisal. New York: Routledge, 2017.

D’Costa, Gavin, and Ross Thompson. Buddhist-Christian Dual Belonging: Affirmations, Objections, Explorations. New York: Taylor & Francis Group, 2017.

Faber, Roland. The Ocean of God: On the Transreligious Future of Religions, 1st ed. New York: Anthem Press, 2019.

Goble, Geoffrey C. The History of Buddhism: Facts and Fictions. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2019.

Jack D. Kilcrease. The Doctrine of Atonement: From Luther to Forde. Oregon: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2018.

Jim, Kanaris. Reconfigurations of Philosophy of Religion: A Possible Future. Albany: SUNY Press, 2018.

Konadu, Adam. An Overview of the Concept of Religious Pluralism. Case Study of the Ghanaian Milieu. Munich: GRIN Verlag, 2018.

Salamon, Janusz. “In Defence of Agatheism: Clarifying a Good-Centred Interpretation of Religious Pluralism.” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9, no. 3 (2017), 115-138. doi:10.24204/ejpr.v9i3.2014.

Sikka, Sonia. “Descriptive vs. Theological Pluralism.” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 89, no. 2 (2021): 705-712. doi:org/10.1093/jaarel/lfab052.

Ward, Keith. Religion in the Modern World: Celebrating Pluralism and Diversity. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019.

Yip, Man-Hei. Interrogating the Language of “Self” and “Other” in the History of Modern Christian Mission: Contestation, Subversion, and Re-imagination. Oregon: Pickwick Publishers, 2020.

Footnotes

1. Kanaris, Jim. Reconfigurations of Philosophy of Religion: A Possible Future (Albany: SUNY Press, 2018), 112.
2. Keith, Ward. Religion in the Modern World: Celebrating Pluralism and Diversity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 56.
3. Geoffrey C, Goble. The History of Buddhism: Facts and Fictions (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2019), 26
4. Janusz, Salamon, “In Defence of Agatheism: Clarifying a Good-Centred Interpretation of Religious Pluralism,” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9, no. 3 (2017), 115. doi:10.24204/ejpr.v9i3.2014.
5. Roland, Faber. The Ocean of God: On the Transreligious Future of Religions, 1st ed. (New York: Anthem Press, 2019), 62.
6. Janusz, 116.
7. Roland, 63.
8. Chiara Bartolucci et al., “Sante De Sanctis’ Contribution to the Study of Dreams between the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: The Originality of the Integrated Method.” Histories of Dreams and Dreaming (2019): 91. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-16530-7_5
9. Gavin, D,Costa, Thompson, Ross. Buddhist-Christian Dual Belonging: Affirmations, Objections, Explorations (New York: Taylor & Francis Group, 2017), 17.
10. See note 9 above.
11. Sonia, Sikka. “Descriptive vs. Theological Pluralism.” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 89, no. 2 (2021): 705. doi:org/10.1093/jaarel/lfab052.
12. Esra A. Dag. Christian and Islamic Theology of Religions: A Critical Appraisal (New York: Routledge, 2017), 22.
13. See note 12 above.
14. Kanaris, 113.
15. See note 12 above.
16. Kanaris, 76.
17. Kanaris, 78.
18. David, Cheetham. “Pluralism and Ineffability.” Religious Studies 56, no. 1 (2020): 95. doi:10.1017/S0034412519000556.
19. Kilcrease Jack D, The Doctrine of Atonement: From Luther to Forde (Oregon: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2018), 3.
20. Samuel A, Oluwafemi “The Interplay of Christian Apologetics and Christian Philosophy.” Asian Journal of Interdisciplinary Research (2019), 37.
21. See note 20 above.
22. Gavin and Thompson, 19.
23. Gavin and Thompson, 20.
24. Man-Hei, Yip. Interrogating the Language of “Self” and “Other” in the History of Modern Christian Mission: Contestation, Subversion, and Re-imagination (Oregon: Pickwick Publishers, 2020), 13
25. Adam, Konadu. An Overview of the Concept of Religious Pluralism. Case Study of the Ghanaian Milieu (Munich: GRIN Verlag, 2018), 6.
26. Man-Hei, 14.
27. See note 24 above.
28. Adam, 8.