Introduction
Emerging knowledge of the cognitive significance of emotions sparks new debates in ethics, law, and politics. Huppes-Cluysenaer (2018) states that Aristotle is frequently mentioned as a pioneer because of his idea of emotions in Rhetoric. Additionally, the philosopher distinguishes two moralities, each with its interpretation of the cognitive role of emotions: a civic morality of judicial process in the Nicomachean Ethics and a contemplative ethics of theoretical study in Politics (Huppes-Cluysenaer, 2018). For instance, consideration for the cognitive function of emotions in civic morality involves realizing that competence in judges and other decision-makers is founded on self-education via self-reflection. The investigation of contemplative morality in politics focuses on the possibility of educating citizens’ emotions through legislation. Rhetoric is concerned with persuading decision-makers in Law Courts and the Assembly. Therefore, when it comes to emotions, it is more about persuading than it is about teaching (Huppes-Cluysenaer, 2018). The paper claims that the role of emotions via the prism of Aristotelian philosophy is crucial in ethics, rhetoric, criminal law, and politics.
Aristotle
Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) was a Greek philosopher who made significant and enduring contributions to every facet of human knowledge. According to Shamey and Kuehni (2020), he was born in Stagira, northern Greece, to a father who was the local king’s physician. When the philosopher was eighteen, he enrolled in the philosopher Plato’s Academy in Athens, where he remained until Plato’s death in 347 BCE (Shamey & Kuehni, 2020). Moreover, the ruler of Greece at the time, Philip II of Macedon, asked Aristotle to teach his son Alexander the Great, which he did for thirty-three years. Tutoring Alexander offered Aristotle several possibilities, one of which was establishing the Lyceum and its library at Athens in 335 BCE, the foremost educational establishment of the period, where he lectured until 323 BCE (Shamey & Kuehni, 2020). It is often thought that just around one-third of his written works have survived to this day. They consist of forty-seven pieces, some of which may have been authored by followers to reflect his beliefs (Shamey & Kuehni, 2020). The variety of topics demonstrates the broadness of Aristotle’s ideas and interests, one of which was the study of emotion.
Rationality and Emotion
No part of human mental life is more fundamental to the quality and purpose of one’s existence than emotions. Based on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, they make life worthwhile to live and, at times, to end (Emotion, 2018). Hence, it is not unexpected that most great classical philosophers, such as Aristotle, had distinctive theories of emotions (Emotion, 2018). Thus, it is vital to comprehend how Aristotle explained emotion and its relation to reason.
In everyday parlance, people frequently consider emotion as the polar opposite of reason. For instance, passion may confuse one’s judgment, causing one to make a poor decision (Neblo, 2020). Pathos is a crucial concept commonly translated as emotion nowadays (Bombelli, 2018). Passion or affection is the polar opposite of reason (logos) in the modern-Cartesian model and is understood in a mechanical or functionalist manner (Bombelli, 2018). The Aristotelian emotion (pathos) is inextricably linked to the rational world. Bombelli (2018) acknowledges that the philosophy of Aristotle reveals the complex connection between reason and emotion. His perspective provides a “pre-Cartesian and organicist anthropological model” based on the ontological notion of continuity, in which realms of nature are interconnected: they are distinctive but not segregated (Bombelli, 2018, p. 53). Consequently, logic and instinct are not opposed but rather entwined. Emotion is intellectually significant and implies many types of knowledge.
Reason and emotion are interlinked as parts of the same theoretical continuity. Bombelli (2018) asserts that based on Aristotle’s theory of knowledge, the knowledge processes, from the most rudimentary to the most advanced, indicate a strong relationship between emotion and reason. Pathos performs a cognitive role, implying, although problematically, the pair consciousness-awareness. Bombeli (2018) adds that emotion is essential for understanding reality on many levels, including knowledge, moral behavior, language, and politics. Furthermore, a comprehensive reasoning model (logos) arises, including legal and political reasoning. Unlike the contemporary, Cartesian viewpoint, Aristotle regarded reason as a blend of evaluative and affective dimensions.
The Phenomenological Explanation of Emotion in the “Rhetoric”
Emotion (pathos) plays an essential role in persuasion because it is incorporated into rhetoric categorizations. Stucki and Sager (2018) suggest that, according to Aristotle’s theory, rhetoric is based on the interaction of three elements: ethos, pathos, and logos. Hence, persuasion occurs when the speech is given in such a way that the orator is worthy of trust (ethos), when the speech evokes emotions in the audience (pathos), and when the speech establishes truth (logos). According to Aristotle, studying emotions is crucial in rhetoric (Brito, 2018). For instance, rhetoric is the art of persuading someone of a particular opinion; nevertheless, creating an opinion can be influenced by emotions and reasons.
The orator should, therefore, analyze emotions to get the judgments they desire from their audience, whether in deliberative assemblies or lawsuits. Thus, Aristotle presents a generic definition of emotion that does not attempt to be scientific and thus get to the core of emotion but rather be beneficial to the orator (Brito, 2018). Aristotle studies thirteen emotions in detail: “anger (orge), calm (praotes), friendship, friendly feeling (philia, to philein), hate (misos), fear (phobos), confidence (tharsos), shame (aischune), kindness (charis), pity (eleos), indignation (nemesan), envy (phthonos), emulation (zelos), and contempt (kata phronesis)” (Brito, 2018, p. 204). The philosopher follows an essentially consistent approach in examining each specific emotion, describing anger as the first emotion he investigates. Aristotle begins with a dialectic definition that he thinks is appropriate in light of the word’s usage, such as anger being described as a desire associated with pain (Brito, 2018). This idea is followed by an explanation of, first, what the emotional state of angry individuals is, second, who makes them angry, and third, why they get angry with the individuals.
The philosopher devised a sophisticated model for understanding the structure of common emotions. It contains four main components, most thoroughly treated in the section on emotions in the second book of Rhetoric (Medieval theories of the emotions, 2022). Firstly, the cognitive aspect is an unplanned appraisal, for instance, the belief that something favorable or terrible occurs or may occur to the subject or to someone else in a way that affects the subject. Furthermore, the emotional component is related to a subjectively perceived pleasurable or negative sensation regarding the evaluation’s content. Thirdly, the dynamical component is a behavioral drive to act generally associated with an emotional appraisal. Finally, there are usual physiological effects such as heartbeat alterations.
The Scientific Explanation of Emotion in “De Anima”
Aristotle clearly states in De Anima that the definitions of emotions and the concepts and interactions that comprise their study in Rhetoric are unsuitable for psychology. The philosopher considers psychology a branch of natural science, such as physics, because science does not provide the substance of emotions (Brito, 2018). Emotions are merely dialectic definitions, not only because they presume to be sufficient but because they conform to the orator’s and the audience’s use of language; they also stay in the intellectual realm (Brito, 2018). Even though they adequately explain the linguistic games that apply to each emotion at this level, they leave out an essential attribute: its existence in the body. Brito (2018) notes that concerning the latter, anger might be characterized as the blood boiling or the heated material around the heart. Nevertheless, such a physical description of anger would be inadequate, not only because the same physiological reaction might occur without experiencing anger but also because it ignores how anger is perceived by those who experience it.
Thus, both components, namely dialectic definition and the existence in the body, should be included in a scientific description. Brito (2018) admits that Aristotle conceived emotion as a thought that occurs in the matter (en hule) whenever it exists, inseparable from the body, unavoidably corporal and necessary mentally. The debate over how to define emotion is part of an argument that aims to establish that the soul cannot be detached from the body and encompasses Aristotle’s whole psychology (Brito, 2018). Nevertheless, it may be detached from such an argument, and the entire depth of any emotion reveals that it is most significant to ethics and criminal justice.
Emotion in Ethics: Identifications of Moral Character
Aristotle’s idea on the impact of emotions on ethics and moral responsibility is based on this sophisticated theory of phenomenological and scientific explanations of emotion. Brito (2018) emphasizes that when moving forward from psychology to ethics, desire is the point at which emotions or passions intersect with moral behavior. Aristotle classifies desire (orexis) into three types: appetite (epithumia), temper (thumos), and volition (boulesis) (Brito, 2018). Emotions are responsible for appetite and temper, and anger usually leads to a desire for retribution (Brito, 2018). Consequently, the logical component of the soul, the intellect (nous), proposes volition as intellectual desire. Nevertheless, every goal implies completing an action that may conflict with others or be impossible to achieve (Brito, 2018). Deliberation is the process through which the aims are balanced against the available methods, accompanied by the selection or decision of a specific action or omission.
Emotions are inextricably linked to ethics and morality and can signify moral character. In Rhetoric, for example, Aristotle characterized anger as generated by a prominent and unjustified disrespect of one’s person or associates, thus encouraging a troubled desire for conspicuous retribution (Parrott, 2019). By characterizing its evoking conditions and action inclination in moral terms, this definition connects anger to morality. Parrott (2019) states that a noticeable slight or insult may appear more as a world event than a part of emotion. Nevertheless, further examination reveals that it is not the event that is crucial but rather how a person interprets the incident. Following the definition of anger, Aristotle’s analysis demonstrates that interpreting an act as expressing unjustified hatred necessitates a nuanced examination of ethically essential problems such as justice, purpose, and social obligation (Parrott, 2019). When an emotion stimulates conduct toward a morally explicable end, it can be related to morality. Returning to Aristotle’s definition of anger, the desire for conspicuous retribution is unmistakably what componential theories currently classify as an action tendency (Parrott, 2019). Thus, vengeance connects anger to morality since vengeance is a morally justified act.
Emotions in Criminal Law
Based on Aristotle’s philosophy, emotions can be connected to judicial practice. When addressing the concept of a voluntary act in Book III of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle demonstrates the apparent relationship between moral behavior and the practical power to resolve criminal cases (Viano, 2018). According to the philosopher, differentiating between voluntary and involuntary is vital for those examining excellence and valuable for lawmakers in giving rewards and penalties. Because it directly concerns human acts and sentiments, criminal law is one of the most philosophical realms of the law (Viano, 2018). Moreover, emotions play a causal function in instigating criminal behavior while also playing an instrumental role during the trial as a persuasive method of influencing the judges in court.
In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle frequently emphasizes that anger as a desire for retribution is natural and healthy. For instance, the appropriate attitude toward anger, that is, the one that is according to the rules, against the appropriate person, and for the right reasons, is not criticized (Viano, 2018). On the contrary, it is regarded as noble and desirable, but indifference to a provocation is a flaw and indicative of an enslaved person’s mindset.
Aristotle demonstrates a good attitude about anger and vengeance because the unjust act might be considered voluntary. Viano (2018) acknowledges that an act is classified as right or unjust based on whether or not it is voluntary. Within that framework, someone who commits an injustice when enraged is not unjust. Aristotle emphasizes this characteristic of rage further with the following explanation (Viano, 2018). Acts committed in rage are rightfully deemed not premeditated (oukek pronoias). It is not the person who acts in wrath, but the man who has irritated him, who begins the trouble.
Hence, the issue is not whether the crime occurred but rather its unfairness. From an ethical perspective, this relocation of the operating principle in an unjust act forced on the actor by anger might be understood metaphorically (Viano, 2018). Focusing simply on the reasoning, one may argue that the act’s principle lies in the person who has generated the fury in themselves and has reacted to this by executing an unfair act willingly but without intentional intent. Nevertheless, one might understand this line in a legal sense, supposing that Aristotle is referring to the setting of criminal law, to the judgment regarding the character of an act of aggression, such as murder, committed in anger in response to a purposeful injustice.
Aristotle believed that anger, as an emotion, is one of the origins of criminal behavior. Viano (2018) asserts that anger is not a disease that must be treated but rather a soul capacity, an intrinsic need for retribution, and self-esteem recovery that responds to injustice and needs to be regulated and disciplined to be morally helpful. It is feasible to talk about virtue in the context of rage, but the objective measure of this virtue tends to the excess rather than the default (Viano, 2018). The philosopher claimed there is a place for both the justification of anger and the psychological gratification gained by retribution.
Aristotle employs legal reasoning in an ethical argument because he perceives a tight connection between these two areas. For instance, legislation is a function of politics, and politics incorporates ethics and is, in some ways, comparable to it (Viano, 2018). Thus, if ethics is the cornerstone of legislator science and emotions are the primary subject of Aristotelian ethics, it is evident that moral appraisal of the various emotions must play a primary role in the protracted legislative process. The acknowledgment of revenge as a motivator for crime and the transformation of personal feeling into a civic emotion allows for the beneficial integration of anger into law (Viano, 2018). Furthermore, the fundamental relevance of the appeal to the judges’ anger in court can only be attributed to the fact that this emotion expresses a high moral value that is already an integral component of the conceptions of law and justice.
Emotions in Politics
Politics has an emotional foundation in Aristotle’s thought since emotions are required for political stability. Nevertheless, emotions might be viewed as a cause of instability (Coelho, 2018). Aristotle’s description of the crowd as the most outstanding judge in real-world situations demonstrates how passions assist in establishing and maintaining the best regime (Coelho, 2018). Thus, emotions were viewed as crucial for initiating, protecting, and expanding politics in ancient Greece—and how they might also be the principal hurdles.
The Politics by Aristotle is an excellent source for analyzing the role of emotions. Coelho (2018) argues that the book is not only a theoretical treatise; hence, its goal is not only to know about the good but also to assist people in making it a reality. For instance, most passages on emotion (pathos) presume a clear, practical sense and must be taken as advice to be applied in historical settings in real-world circumstances. Emotions have lately resurfaced as a prominent issue in political philosophy after being largely ignored in positivist and behaviorist approaches in the previous century (Coelho, 2018). The revived current interest in emotions in politics is based on Aristotle and other classical philosophers.
Moreover, Aristotle stresses the rational foundations of politics and law. Coelho (2018) states that two well-known political assertions are noteworthy in this regard: the assertion of the political animal as the only one with a reason (logos) and the endorsement of the supremacy of laws above the authority of man. Thus, Aristotle’s characterization of humans as rational animals motivates rationalistic methods. Significantly, the same passages might illustrate why emotions are crucial and unavoidable in political life. Coelho (2018) suggests that Aristotle’s viewpoint emphasizes the importance of emotion (pathos) as a basis of politics and democracy. When discussing emotions and the circumstances of political life, the citizen in Politics should be addressed. It entails possessing reason (logos) and having a healthy emotional state of the soul, naturally allowing one to exist as a free and equal person (Coelho, 2018). According to Aristotle, the crowd is emotionally more competent in excellent reasoning than a few individuals, making democracy the best government for “real people and real cities” (Coelho, 2018, p. 363). Pathos might be seen as a beneficial condition of communal life and effective governance.
Aristotle’s argument in Politics is mainly based on human nature. For instance, the philosopher claims that a familiar society (household) arises from the natural inclination to want to leave another being of the same kind behind (Coelho, 2018). Aristotle uses the naturalistic approach to deconstruct politics (polis) into smaller pieces, such as tribes, families, free men, women, children, and enslaved people. His purpose was to reach the human soul and the set of capacities and requirements that enable and necessitate polis for people (Coelho, 2018). Consequently, pathos is also a principle accountable for the political nature of humans. The reason why some people fail at this, such as individuals Aristotle refers to as “war lovers,” for instance, assists in understanding why reason and emotions operate as conditions in the potential of living well.
The relationship between nature and emotions is that feelings and sentiments are required for political life. Coelho (2018) adds that the term “war lover” (polemou epithumetes) refers to an emotional state that makes it unable to live together or participate in communities. As a result, ‘war lovers’ fail to be able to live in communities because their emotions and personalities prevent them from doing so. This concept implies that all humans, by nature, require polis to be happy, but it is not feasible for all of them to be happy by nature (Coelho, 2018). It is also a starting point toward understanding how pathos enables polis. Participating in any relationship necessitates emotional sociability, without which one is guaranteed to fall short of achieving one’s human nature.
Aristotle also considered that ancient Greeks were superior to Barbarians. According to Coelho (2018), Aristotle stated that Non-Greeks are, by definition, unable to live as citizens. For instance, Asians are incapable because, despite their intelligence, they lack spirit. Others, such as Europeans, are unable because of their elevated spirits. Greeks are more suited to political life, not because they are cleverer than Barbarians, but because they appropriately integrate emotions and reason (Coelho, 2018). It is not enough to be intelligent; one must also be spirited. Furthermore, the inherent potential to be a citizen includes not only the capacity to think correctly but also the capacity to adequately feel, which allows one to participate in a democratic society as a free and equal participant.
Emotion is a psychological concept allowing specific individuals to live as citizens while preventing others, such as women and enslaved people, from doing so. Citizens are distinct from ‘war lovers,’ whose emotionality prohibits them from associating since they are incapable of friendship (philia), and naturally enslaved people, whose obedience or irascibility hinder them from participating as equal citizens in politics (Coelho, 2018). Based on Aristotle’s philosophy, citizens are also, by definition, distinct from women. Consequently, emotions play another part in thinking about the inherent distinctions between the citizen (man, adult) and the other family members. Women’s inability to lead does not result from a lack of psychic aptitude (Coelho, 2018). According to Aristotle, women recognize the good and even deliberate well—but their opinions are inevitably susceptible to male reasoning. This remark implies that women do not have a deliberative deficit (Coelho, 2018). The sovereignty absence in their deliberative ability stems from the essential structure of the family as a political organization: the male rule, and the woman are subordinated.
Therefore, relying on Aristotle’s vision, some, but not all, individuals can have a political life, which is also seen as an emotional capacity. Coelho (2018) notes that the philosopher believed that friendship based on emotions is a crucial benefit of polis since it avoids disintegration and civil conflict. For instance, people treat others and objects with care because they admire and cherish them. The absence of emotions in humans would ruin politics. Emotions may also serve as a faulty premise for political cohabitation. Coelho (2018) acknowledges that pathos can destabilize the polis when contemplating the possession of objects. Polis could not exist if people did not care about things, yet love for things is perhaps the greatest dangerous threat to the unity of the polis (Coelho, 2018). Love for money both roots and threatens political life. It is essential to understand that human flourishing (eudaimonia) is impossible without external personal and communal commodities to understand the practical significance of love for money (Coelho, 2018). Therefore, money is not the source of happiness but a necessary condition.
Despite his focus on reason as a human ability, Aristotle stressed that political life would be impossible if men were not emotional. Coelho (2018) notes that emotions are a precondition for political life’s potential. Their absence, scarcity, or abundance in persons unable to participate in social or political life demonstrates that their existence, in the proper proportion, makes political life possible. When political philosophy focuses on the actual world, the emotional characteristics of the crowd serve to emphasize the supremacy of democracy because the crowd’s logic and emotional temper are required for accurate governing and appropriate judgment (Coelho, 2018). Emotions in ancient Greece enabled the polis while also endangering it.
Conclusion
According to Aristotelian philosophy, emotions are fundamental in ethics, rhetoric, criminal law, and politics. The rational world is intrinsically related to pathos. Emotion has intellectual significance and indicates a wide range of knowledge. Rhetoric is the art of convincing someone of a specific point of view, yet, emotions can impact an opinion formation. Additionally, pathos is intrinsically tied to ethics and morals and can indicate moral character. Emotions are addressed in criminal law because they play a causative role in provoking criminal behavior and an instrumental role during the trial as a persuasive manner of convincing the judges in court. Finally, pathos was seen as critical for establishing, defending, and extending politics in ancient Greece—and it might also be one of the main obstacles.
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