In her article, Laura M. Purdy disproves the assumption that surrogate mothering is a concept equal to baby-selling. She believes that a consequentialist approach should be taken to define and analyze the social aspects of this practice. To do this, the author addresses several common concerns presented by the opponents of the practice of contracted pregnancy. Purdy groups these concerns into three categories: “transferring burden and risk, separating sex and reproduction, and separating reproduction and child-rearing” (Vaughn, 2010, p. 424). One by one, she discusses each of these concerns, presenting convincing arguments that show the inadequacies in most of them. For instance, as she discusses the morality of transferring one woman’s burden to another, she claims that this practice is much more common in activities and procedures such as house cleaning and other services. Therefore, it should not be considered a prohibitive factor.
After disproving several arguments against surrogate pregnancy, she states that the real issue is “the disposition of the fruit of contracted pregnancies: babies” (Vaughn, 2010, p. 426). The morality of this action lies at the core of the question of whether it is wrong to separate reproduction and child-rearing. According to Purdy, there should be nothing wrong with this practice as long as the circumstances are appropriate for it. For example, when the surrogate mother fails to form an appropriate connection with the child, while other people manage to do it, separating reproduction and child-rearing should not be an issue. Finally, Purdy claims that surrogate mothering should not be compared to baby-selling (Vaughn, 2010, p. 427). Since babies cannot be considered property, they cannot be sold. All of these arguments seem convincing and strong because the author proves them in a cohesive and consistent manner, considering the various factors involved in surrogate mothering. In addition, she analyses both the benefits and costs of the practice, identifying the cases when it can undeniably be wrong, such as those involving coercion and the lack of regulations.
Reference
Vaughn, L. (2010). Bioethics: Principles, issues, and cases. Oxford University Press, USA.