Introduction
The Battle of Ia Drang was the first large military engagement in the Vietnam War between the forces of the United States Army and the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN). Conducted as part of the Pleiku Campaign, the Battle of Ia Drang occurred in the Ia Drang valley in two stages on November 14-19, 1965 (Galloway, 2010). The battle, known for its first large-scale helicopter assault and consistent air support, established the model of further military engagements by American forces and their tactics in the Vietnam War. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the historical event of the Battle of Ia Drang from the perspective of the operational art and design concept, Joint Planning, and other appropriate joint doctrinal publications.
Historical Data
On the morning of November 14, the troops of the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, initiated a heliborne assault into Landing Zone X-Ray with the purpose of preventing an attack on the Plei Me camp discovered by intelligence earlier. Towards the end of the second day, after successfully holding positions, the U.S. ordered the first use of B-52 carpet bombings, striking key positions of PAVN forces. Accurate artillery strikes throughout the battle also served as critical support for the troops, holding back PAVN forces that significantly outnumbered the Americans. On the third day, PAVN continued desperate attacks on the U.S. positions until, eventually, L.Z. X-Ray was secured. The U.S. forces lost 79 soldiers and had 121 wounded, while 634 PAVN soldiers were confirmed dead, with an estimated another 1215 dead from long-distance artillery and airstrikes (Cash, 2001).
As L.Z. X-Ray was secured, and units were dispersed to other locations. Under the command of Lt. Col. Robert McDade, the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry began its path towards LZ Albany approximately 2 miles northeast. McDade’s troops encountered the remains of the PAVN 33rd and 66th regiments, resulting in an ambush that spread the U.S. troops into small groups as the initial group marched in a single-file column. The battle lasted for nearly 16 hours near LZ Albany. Eventually, air support was able to bomb areas of potential PAVN encampments at a safe distance from U.S. troops while reinforcements arrived from other L.Z.s. In the clash at LZ Albany, 155 US troops were killed or missing, with 124 wounded, while 403 PAVN soldiers were confirmed dead (Cash, 2001).
Operational Art and Design
Cognitive Approach
Operational art is the cognitive approach used by military leadership utilizing their capabilities and judgment to develop strategies and operations to utilize military forces through the integration of ends, ways, means, and risks based on available information. Operational design is a methodology planner which provides the structure to support the operation and methods to address the problem (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2017). American operations in Vietnam began with Operation Rolling Thunder which consisted mostly of air bombardments and support for South Vietnamese forces. There was no clear consensus on the end to be achieved, the means that ground forces were to use, and the eventual cost. Pres. Johnson initially sought to pursue a limited war theory approach and minimize involvement (Rosen, 1982). The American commander in Vietnam, Gen. William C. Westmoreland, saw America’s commitment to military victory, and the initial troops of two battalions were present to protect U.S. airports.
Design Methodology
Operational design in joint doctrine consists of three components understanding the environment, defining the problem, and developing an operational approach. There was a need for large numbers of U.S. troop presence, especially with a division with offensive capabilities in the Central Highlands, which included the Ia Drang Valley. The primary concern of the MACV commander was that the North Vietnamese conventional units amassing in the region were preparing an offensive. This attack would have had the purpose of either destroying the South Vietnamese government, splitting apart their forces along Highway 19, or carving out an autonomous district and establishing a Communist presence in South Vietnam (Schifferle, 1994).
The three stages of the American campaign were designed to secure bases and L.Z.s for the deployment of forces, conduct deep patrolling in the vicinity of base areas, and conduct long-range search-and-destroy operations against enemy forces. All of this was meant to occur in four phases (Schifferle, 1994). Westmoreland understood the situation well that U.S. forces faced not only the threat from PAVN conventional forces but also massive guerilla warfare from the Vietcong, as well as insurgency among many rural populations, including that in South Vietnam. Operation Rolling Thunder also created the strategic requirement to guard and logistically sustain the bombing campaign. Westmoreland and other commanders believed in pursuing the ‘big-unit strategy’ with the aim of achieving the destruction of NVA main force units in Central Highlands, despite the high costs of casualties and funding it brought (Schifferle, 1994).
Finally, the operational environment (O.E.) is a key consideration for operational design. As highlighted in Joint Public 3.0, an O.E. is the combination of conditions, circumstances, and influences that impact the employment of military capabilities and the decision-making of command. This includes the physical space (land, water, air), information environment, and other factors such as social, political, infrastructure, political, and economic (Incorporating Change 1, 2018). The operational environment was hostile and challenging, with little information available; thus, the informational space was lacking. The U.S. troops had a basic understanding of the local geography but had little knowledge of the presence of PAVN forces until those chose to reveal themselves. The physical environment on land was in favor of the adversary, given the U.S. had not previously fought in jungle terrains, and most of the military preparations stemmed from the urban and open space warfare of WWII. However, the U.S. had the advantage of uncontested air space, which it could use to its advantage for surveillance, aerial bombardment, and heliborne assaults.
Operational Ends
End States
End states are the set of required conditions that must be met to achieve the strategic objective. Some of the end states for the engagement were a full defeat and pushback of PAVN forces in the Ia Drang Valley to prevent any further potential or planned assaults on U.S. camps and airports. Another end state was to conduct a successful heliborne assault of ground troops deep into enemy-controlled territory with the support of airborne strikes and artillery fire, being the first time the strategy was implemented into practice in this manner in Vietnam. Finally, the battle was meant to be the first primary engagement of U.S. troops with the NVA forces, marking a major escalation in the Vietnam War given that previously the U.S. engaged solely through bombardments or South Vietnam proxy forces (Warren, 2017).
Objectives
Objectives are objects that, by nature, location, purpose, and use, provide an effective contribution to military action. The objectives for the forces participating in the Ia Drang assault included securing key points such as landing zones in the area. The secondary mission was to locate and eliminate enemy forces, clearing the area for the potential further progression of U.S. forces and setting up camps for later assaults (Galloway, 2020).
Operational Means
Operational Reach
Operational reach is the distance and duration that a force can competently employ military capabilities. The U.S. forces were based in the Plei Me Camp, southwest of Pleiku. Gen. Westmoreland had secured the commitment of 300,000 troops; the build-up forces occurred in the summer of 1965. The U.S. forces were generally well-supplied as well as supported by South Vietnam battalions. U.S. aerial forces had an extensive range of several thousand kilometers at which they could conduct flights and bombardments. At Ia Drang, forces could be deployed either by foot or heliborne assault. However, they had to be located within a relatively short distance of the base camp to ensure the availability of reinforcements, supply chains, and otherwise effectiveness. It was an approximately 34-mile round trip between L.Z. X-ray and Plei Me (Schifferle, 1994). As evident by the battle, the U.S. forces could hold out against PAVN even as a small force for nearly a day and longer once reinforcements arrived.
Culmination
Culmination refers to the point at which a military force is unable to perform its operations. It is difficult to gauge accurately what the culmination point would be in the Ia Drang offensive. However, the battle occurred near the Cambodian border with Vietnam, and regiments of NVA forces took sanctuary in the nearby country. L.Z. X-Ray was located within 10-15 miles of the border, with the assault going in that direction. It can be safe to assume that the culmination point was the border since supply chains were likely only set up in the radium of the heliborne assault.
Operational Ways
Center of Gravity (CoG)
The CoG refers to the sources of strength and balance from which the force derives its freedom of action and will to fight, the source of power on which everything depends. Therefore, both one’s own force and the adversary have a center of gravity. For the U.S. forces in Vietnam, the operational center of gravity was its airports and the points dislocation for the aerial forces, critical to the U.S. strategy in the country and vital support for any troops on the ground. These had to be protected in the long term. The CoG of the adversary was, ironically, time. From a military strategy perspective, time is a significant advantage to weaker forces, particularly in defending their own territory. As a stronger force, the U.S. fighting abroad faced a much higher chance of decisive victory, the shorter the duration of the conflict, both the Ia Drang assault and the war in Vietnam in general. Otherwise, the more prolonged the conflict becomes, the time favors the PAVN as they can wear down U.S. forces little by little by hitting at hurtful points in infrastructure and troop morale (Hughes et al., 2018)
Decisive Points
Operational ways focus on the ‘how’ objectives are achieved. The decisive point of an operation is a place, event, factor, or function when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over adversaries. For Gen. Westmoreland, the Ia Dragen assault was the first step to hit at the NVA CoG, which is time. The assault was meant to be rapid and to secure key areas for a deeper assault into enemy territory. In a manner of speaking, the blitzkrieg type of warfare would have benefited U.S. forces while simultaneously achieving all key objectives of pushing back the PAVN, protecting military bases, and establishing positions of control in enemy territory.
The Risk
Risk is absolutely critical and central to the planning and execution of operations at any level. Joint Risk Analysis defines the concept as the “probability and consequence of an event causing harm to something valued” (United States Army War College, 2020). Using the model of ends, ways, means, and risks examined in this paper, it is necessary that all are balanced, meaning that leaders must weigh options to achieve desired objectives with the likelihood of adverse outcomes.
The Ia Drang campaign was, from the start, a high-risk endeavor. The heliborne assaults were the first of their kind in the Vietnam War, carrying a wide range of risk factors from technical to operational. Second, the forces were being helicoptered into L.Z.s located essentially in the enemy controlled territory, often just a few hundred meters from the PAVN. The troops being airlifted were far outnumbered, especially initially before reinforcements arrived; the risk of being overrun was high even if the Americans were better armed. The environment was largely unfamiliar to the forces and was utilized to the advantage of the PAVN, who was masterful at tactical guerilla-type warfare in the brushes and jungle. They used it for various tactics in the attempt to split or surround U.S. forces, which was seen both at the skirmishes at L.Z. X-Ray and later LZ Albany. The risk of the ambush was high in the context of the operational environment as well, which occurred at LZ Albany, resulting in heavy U.S. casualties (Galloway, 2020).
Despite the high level of risk, it can be argued that the campaign was justified and planned to the best ability of the available information. The assault was critical to secure landing zones needed to make further attacks against the PAVN in Central Highlands. Therefore, the strategic risk was weighed, that either the operation continue or the U.S. would be defeated before the war fully began with attacks on South Vietnam. The operation had the tactical support of aviation and artillery, which were crucial to the U.S. victory and the elimination of significant numbers of enemy soldiers. Undoubtedly, the military risk, particularly risk-to-force, was significant. If U.S. troops were killed or captured, it would create a significant military setback, as well as political and social backlash. In fact, the ambush at LZ Albany was hidden from the public initially so as not to generate negative press (Galloway, 2020). The campaign provided a clear indication to Defense Secretary McNamara that success in Vietnam would be unlikely due to the heavy casualties to U.S. forces (proportionally) based on the type of operation, but despite his recommendation, Pres. Johnson’s council, the White House, decided to further escalate U.S. involvement in the war.
Conclusion
The purpose of the paper is to analyze the historical Battle of Ia Drang from the perspective of joint operations and the concept of operational means, ends, ways, and risks. The Battle of Ia Drang was a strategically complex and planned battle scenario that involved sophisticated planning and in-battle decisions that ultimately turned the outcome in favor of American forces. This battle demonstrates the key importance of operational planning and execution, particularly in cases of unknown environments and rapidly changing dynamics of military encounters. The elements of operational design end, ways, and means were all present and closely interconnected in this battle to emphasize the vital use of the concepts and military doctrines in warfare.
References
Cash, J. (2001). Fight at Ia Drang. Web.
Galloway, J. (2010). Ia Drang – The battle that convinced Ho Chi Minh he could win. HistoryNet. Web.
Incorporating Change 1 (2018). Joint publication 3-0. Web.
Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2017). Joint planning (J.P. 5-0). Web.
Rosen, S.P. (1982). Vietnam and the American theory of limited war. International Security 7(2), 83-113. Web.
Schifferle, P. J. (1994). The Ia Drang Campaign 1965: A successful operational campaign or mere tactical failure. Web.
United States Army War College. (2020). Campaign planning handbook. Web.
Hughes, J., Gerson, J., McAvoy, T., & Grebos, T. (2018). Six months or forever: Doctrine to defeat an enemy whose center of gravity is time. Small Wars Journal. Web.
Warren, J.A. (2017). How the Battle of the Ia Drang Valley changed the course of the Vietnam War. The Daily Beast. Web.