The age of the building and the condition of the wall are some of the factors that contributed to the collapse of the structure. Engineering professionals argue that the wall could not support the wooden hoarding that Grocon had mounted to its front side. This made it possible for the high winds that came at the time of the accident to hasten the decrepitude of the wall.
This amounted to the tragic collapse of the Swanston wall that ended up killing three pedestrians, Alexander Jones, his sister Bridget Jones and a French researcher Dr Marie-Faith Fiawoo. The Carlton & United Breweries (CUB) had constructed the wall over twenty years ago, but has been deteriorating in its stature overtime (Devic & Rolfe 2013).
Surprisingly, the City Council of Melbourne and the Urban Design Departments had these facts in their records. These concerned authorities just ignored the fact that this wall would collapse any time, thus risking the lives of the people of Melbourne and construction employees. The nineteen-year-old Melbourne University student, Alex Jones died while he was trying to save his sister from the collapsing wall.
The rescuing team took her sister Bridget to the hospital where she tried to fight for her life, but she could not survive. Bricks and debris that constructors used in building the wall crushed the three passers-by along a footpath close to the advertisement board. The present status of the Swanston accident has led to four separate probes to investigate the cause of the accident, and, if possible, prosecute those responsible for the act.
According to professional design engineers, Melbourne’s City Council and the Urban Designers are responsible for this accident. In the first instance, urban developers gave ago ahead on the construction of the wall in the 1970s using different bricks, which further weakened the structure (Cunningham 2012).
In addition, the city council had full knowledge of the hoisting of the advertisement board that was far much higher than the weak wall. The council neglected the fact that the wooden board would at one time be dangerous to the citizens, as they could not control the design within the outdoor sign industry.
The city council did not put in mind the importance of safety in design as well as the necessity of making the public aware of the conditions of the wall. Around the time of the collapse, the wall had large cracks that were not visible to the public since the advertisement board had blocked it. This was evident four months before the tragedy occurred, with plants growths on the footings of the wall.
In terms of shearing, the cracks created points of weakness on the wall and the wooden hoarding accelerated the shearing process. Therefore, the 100km/h wind gusts in the neighboring areas was enough to topple the wall. The Thursday 3.00pm westerly winds are contributory factors to the collapse of the Swanston Street Wall. Built in late 1960s, the wall has remained with no renovation until the occurrence of the incident (Rolfe 2013).
This structure has been a major health and safety hazard for employees and the public, until after the incident did Grocon Construction Company agreed to bring down the remaining part. Negligence by the Grocon to give the weak wall due attention also contributed to the fall of the wall along Swanton Street in Melbourne’s CBD.
Ethically, Grocon did not care about workplace safety and overall productivity of employees. Such irresponsible acts warrant prosecution in a court of law. From the reports that the organizations had, it is evident that the tragedy was avoidable. Again, the photographs that showed cracks on the wall, the nature of design and erection of a high advertisement board made the incident foreseeable.
The incident has remained at the centre of investigation by the City of Melbourne, WorkSafe, Coroner, Building Commission, and Victorian Police with reports that some passers-by who sustain slight injuries left the scene before the experts arrived. Melbourne City has ordered for full investigations to all structures in order to prevent repetition of such an incident.
In the Australian continent, the planning ministry also directed the Building Commission to inspect all structures in order to ensure that they adhere to the standard building regulations. Since many companies have owned the building site at the center of Melbourne’s CBD at different times, investigators have to refer to the engineers’ reports that all the serial owners had in their possession during their times.
For instance, RMIT University sold the site and handed over audited reports to Grocon in 2006, and, at the same time, the institution had bought the property from CUB (Rolfe 2013). At the time of purchase, Grocon promised to begin construction and reconstruction in 2007; this did not occur implying that the tragedy could have not happened if the company kept its promise.
From this aspect, investigators have to know why the company had been reluctant at destroying the weak structures, which they had full status report. Moreover, the investigation has to reveal why designers used low number of metal ties in holding the bricks, as this was a primary mistake at the design and layout stage that constructors ought to have prevented.
Considering the Victorian OHS Act 2004, the ongoing investigations will lead to the prosecution of involved authorities, some of which include the city council as well as the Urban Designers. The involved designers of the Swanston wall were supposed to have detected the problem earlier and given a notice to the public in advance, this was not, however, the case.
They never took actions, which led some families losing their loved ones due to their negligence. In such situations, designers should be at the forefront in erecting billboards noticing the public of the potential danger in the areas. Lack of notices devastated the bereaved families claiming irresponsibility on the part of concerned bodies.
The Victorian OHS Act 2004 also looks into minor injuries and major injuries that victims incur in any accident (Johnstone 2003). There is a possibility that the court will order organizations responsible for the tragedy to compensate parents of the victims for the losses. The Victorian OHS also deals with fundamental human rights that cater for the employees and the pedestrians on the street.
From this perspective, the 2004 Act protects the interests of the public and employees at the workplaces. According to the Act, employers should understand that the safety provision touches on everyone, such as customers, employees, the public, and constructors among others (Occupational Health & Safety Policy n.d.).
On the part of Melbourne City Council, it failed to advice Grocon not to place the wooden board next to the weak wall and even failed to register the wall, constructed in early 1970s, as a heritage as per the legislation requirements. The construction company even went on to place an advertisement board on the weak structure that already had visible cracks.
At the same time, WorkSafe agreed to have visited the site in 2011, but failed to clarify on their areas of investigation during the visit. One wonders why the body entitled with enforcing laws that enhance everyone’s safety did not oversee the demolition of the 30 years old wall.
Here, many questions remain unanswered, and should form part of the evidence at the Coroner Court in order to prosecute those found responsible for occurrence of the incident. In allowing the heritage-wall to remain standing at the center of the CBD, WorkSafe, Grocon, and Melbourne City Council are liable for the deaths of the three people.
Further, the court is likely to prosecute the University of RMIT and CUB for neglecting the council’s report on demolishing the old wall, instead focussing on their own business interests – profit making (Rolfe 2013).
There are several lessons that one can learn from this tragic accident in Melbourne. The authorities need to take responsibility for all the city buildings as well as the public. Specifically, officials of government agencies must be strict in their dealings to enhance rule implementation. For safety of everyone, employers must read and comprehend the provisions of the Victorian OHS Act 2004 (Wilson & Sands 2011).
Additionally, it is unethical and illegal to engage in corrupt practices for personal gains while putting the lives of other people at high risk. For example, it is arguable that WorkSafe officials might have accepted bribes during their site investigation activity in 2011. Several companies still minted money from the weak structure through sales even though they had full knowledge of the wall’s status from the audit report.
If the Coroner Court finds the involved firms and institution as responsible for the loss of lives, they will use huge sums of money to compensate the bereaved families.
Therefore, it is advisable to eliminate health and safety hazards before they cause danger and result in company losses in terms of charges and compensations. Negligence can cause huge loss to employers, employees and the public; therefore, it can hurt goal achievement and economic growth.
Devising the best method to manage traumatizing conditions is a critical step in effectiveness of PTSD therapy. Collapse accidents can be so traumatizing and can cause considerable damage to lives of affected families. Currently, there are several approaches that counseling firms can use to manage individuals suffering from posttraumatic stress disorder (Hawkins 2006, p. 422).
The focal point of management is usually to assist them to accept the reality, devise a stress coping mechanism, and help such families resume their normal lives as it was before the traumatic events occurred. Counselors can do this by cooperating with the victims after identifying the root cause of the problem.
There are medication therapies used to manage the physical, emotional, and physiological signs and symptoms common among these patients. For instance, antidepressants prescription controls the levels of depression, anxiety, fear, and melancholic.
Another therapy used to manage posttraumatic stress disorder is trauma-focused cognitive behavioral method where counselors gradually expose victims to situations that revive the feeling and memories that led to trauma (Creighton & Rozen 2007).
The trauma management option is essential given the great loss of two teenagers from one family and a vibrant French researcher. The government should assist the families to come to terms with the changes through continuous counseling.
Workplace Relations Ministers’ Council (2004) estimates that for the past five years, there have been 17-compensated deaths due to falling objects, and close to 17,000 injuries. It is doubtless that engineering professionals have to maintain high levels of integrity in their profession to increase public’s confidence in their services.
For instance, in this case study, Australian citizens wondered WorkSafe’s responses and actions to the weak wall having received all information concerning the status of the structure.
Just like in the accountant profession where only the law can compel one to share client’s information, it should be clear for designers to share information that prove beneficial to the nation. Recently, a storey building collapsed in southeast Melbourne, killing one person and injuring another man.
Changes in the engineering professionals employed to carry out site constructions of buildings can play an effective role in bringing safety. WorkSafe and the Building Commission should do this effectively by assessing the services that professionals offer and looking at their background history of the past buildings they have constructed (Resolving OHS issues in the workplace: a guide 2003).
Melbourne’s City Council should also be strict on the quality of structures built in the city considering that the lives of the city dwellers are more important than other monetary gains. The Australian federal government and Victorian State should increase strictness of the OHL legislation and regulation by not giving construction tenders to fake engineers (Occupational Health & Safety n.d.).
Besides, the engineering company should fully register its services under the company act so that incase of anything, there will be a clear follow up on who is responsible for the accident (Butler 2010). For instance, the city council and the urban designers were in the limelight and the public came to know that they were responsible for this accident.
This is due their failure to take action when they had the opportunity to enforce the rules. The Australian Work Health Safety Strategy 2012-2022 that replaced Australia’s National OHS Strategy 2002-2012 encourages information sharing among designers, especially at the design phase of any construction. The change helps in eliminating faults that do rise at the primary stage of construction of layout and design.
From this aspect, injuries and deaths from collapse of structures and falling objects decrease tremendously. In addition, the new strategy holds designers, not companies, responsible for structure failures resulting from poor designs (Controlling OHS hazards and risks: a handbook for workplaces 2007). The provision makes designers careful at their workstations in order to produce quality products.
The Victorian OHS looks at the health of the Melbourne citizens at large, a reason to imply that if anything happens, they are also held responsible to some extent. This explains why the government should be in full support of such organizations to prevent future damage. Markedly, one way of punishing professionals who are responsible for such accidents is by compensating the affected families and taking them to court.
The Coroner Courts should also summon professionals to answer questions concerning such incidences. However, if the accident happens due to natural causes like wind gusts, storms, then, the court would give a ruling in their favor.
References
Butler, R 2010, Standard handbook of architectural engineering: a practical manual for architects, engineers, contractors & related professions & occupations, McGraw Hill, New York.
Controlling OHS hazards and risks: a handbook for workplaces 2007, Thomson Learning, Melbourne.
Creighton, B., & Rozen, P 2007, Occupational health and safety law in Victoria, Gareth Press, Melbourne.
Cunningham, S 2012, Melbourne, McGraw Hill, New York.
Devic, A., & Rolfe, P 2013, Teen fights for life after two killed in freak wall collapse in Swanston St, News Online from Australia and the World. Web.
Hawkins, S 2006, Current measures of PTSD for Children and adolescents, Journal of Pediatric Psychology, vol. 31. no. 4, pp. 420-430.
Johnstone, R 2003, Occupational health and safety, courts and crimes, Thomson Learning, Melbourne.
Occupational Health & Safety n.d., WorkSafe Victoria. Web.
Occupational Health & Safety Policy n.d., Victorian Government. Web.
Resolving OHS issues in the workplace: a guide 2003, Thomson Learning, South Melbourne.
Rolfe, P 2013, Wall Tragedy Parents Thank Strangers, Dallas Clarke’s Jewish News. Web.
Wilson, G., & Sands, P 2011, Building a city: 100 years of Melbourne architecture, Oxford University press, Oxford.
Workplace Relations Ministers’ Council: comparative performance monitoring: comparison of occupational health and safety arrangements in Australia and New Zealand. (3rd ed.) 2004, National Occupational Health and Safety Commission, Canberra.