Introduction
Federal judges are judges who are allotted via a centralized echelon of government. This is however contrasting to the state as well as regional echelon. This is conversely what is exercised in the United States of America. Here, individual judges are appointed by the president. The appointment is the confirmed by the senate before approval. Usually, America’s individuals appointed as judges emerge from the states upper middle and middle classes in terms of affluence. Some states have considered the abolishment and replacement of the election system of obtaining judges with the scheme of appointing. Nonetheless, the Americans propose the reverse. This paper will hence focus on arguing out that federal judges should be elected instead of being assigned.
The election of federal judges
First, it’s proposed that the election of judges can help the state as a whole to encounter the aspirations as well as objectives for a country to achieve the promotion of legal and sensible sovereignty. All the citizens of the concerned country will hence be part of the legalized judicial system. “The election of judges also serves as an assurance to all the citizens that all the duties undertaken in their system of governance are their responsibility” (Goldstein, 32). It also proves that the benefits accrued from the best service offered by the judges are for all the citizens. However, if citizens don’t participate in the election process, they will consider this as a benefit to only the president.
Promotion of legal and sensible sovereignty
Individuals who propose the implementation of the election process of selecting judges argue out that through this process, some prospective imperfections that could arise can be partly solved. “The appropriate verification progressions in the system of election can help a lot in providing solutions to the manifestation of any possible preconception” (Waldron, 19).
Solving of prospective imperfections
The appointment procedure of judges by the president encourages the surfacing of a larger amount of politics directed towards the judicial assortment course of action. This greater amount of opinions does not only have an effect on individuals of tolerant extraordinary interests but also leads to the disadvantages of loss of responsibility to the unrestricted group of individuals in the concerned state (Horowitz, 18).
Eradication of politicization
The election of judges can be capable of helping in eradication of activities of politicization in a state. This is where it’s made clear in this sound accounted faction that, those individuals who fail in the election process as well as individuals who are unfathomable experts with extra ordinary interests are recommended for an appointment practice. From this, politicization will be done away with.
The appointment of judges
In opposition, individuals who state that judges should be appointed support their conception basing on withholding of elections. During preservation of the elections, the judges tend to develop the accountability towards the electorates. They will have a tendency of working while supporting the group of individuals who voted for his succession. In this process judges usually lose their responsibility on the job. The job will not therefore be efficient, effective and of justice (Reynolds, 24).
Conclusion
In conclusion, on weighing the points personally, I discover that if individual judges are voted for, then the impacts to be encountered will be quite outrageous. First, the people chosen will lack the necessary qualifications to be a judge since majority of citizens doesn’t understand the qualifications. Corruption practices will also be high among the judges. I therefore recommend the appointment of judges as the best approach.
Works cited
Goldstein, Joel. The New Constitutional vice Presidency. Wake Forest Law Review 1995: 40. 545. Print.
Horowitz, Donald. The courts and social policy. Washington Dc: Brookings. 1997. 16- 22. Print.
Reynolds, Glenn. Is Dick Cheney Unconstitutional? Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy. 2007: 102:110. Print.
Waldron, Jeremy. The dignity of legislation. Cambridge: Cambridge publishers. 1999. 12-21. Print