Introduction
Public procurement has been one of the most often employed foreign policy strategies by the military in recent years to help rebuild governments after wars, secure military access, and quash insurgencies. This has become one of the pillars of current military doctrine in the United States. The fiscal triangle is used to regulate the use of budgetary money and the proper allocation of cash to a certain commander for a specified purpose in an ideal scenario (Department of the Army, 2014). The fiscal triad’s relative independence allows the opportunity for maneuvering and a reasonably transparent environment. The reliance on the unit commanders sparked the development of the complementary strategy, “Money as a Weapon System,” which became a focal point of the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns.
The Fiscal Triad
The fiscal triad is a method that establishes the relationship between contracts and financial management for critical tasks. These are examples of procurement management, internal controls, and tax laws applicable to the procurement process (Department of Army, 2014). A system of financial management, contracts, and legal guidance offers essential financial assistance. The unit commander, who formulates the mission’s criteria and begins the process, is at the heart of the fiscal triad (Department of Army, 2014). To avoid fraud and misuse of public funds, all members of the fiscal triad coordinate their efforts. Each part of the triangle is autonomous to ensure the separation of tasks, but they work closely together to procure items or services to suit the commander’s demands in line with existing laws and regulations.
The most likely scenario of employment of the fiscal triad occurred in Afghanistan, where unit commanders involved the system in fostering such humanitarian or rehabilitation operations as the repair of civic and cultural facilities. The commander, in this case, was the focal point generating mission focus, while the financial department ensured the acquisition of funds and transfer of them. It enabled the units to mobilize and operate effectively while sustaining their relative independence from the broader campaign goals.
Money as a Weapon System
The “money as a weapon” system (MAAWS) is based on the idea of utilizing money to destroy counterinsurgency targets without inflicting collateral harm. This is accomplished through urging anti-government groups to cease violent and non-lethal actions, as well as by providing and ensuring job opportunities (Department of Army, 2020). MAAWS was developed to establish standard operating procedures for funding operations and to serve as a financial roadmap to help commanders deal with any financial issues or problems that may arise (Egel et al., 2017). Other types of financial aid to the indigenous people, the rehabilitation or building of critical infrastructure, and the contracting of foreign enterprises in a limited-competition environment are also essential parts of the concept.
CERP, the key component of the system, was extensively applied in Afghanistan and Iraq, with a certain positive impact on the local population. Each initiative in Iraq and Afghanistan is required to provide a problem statement, a benefit to the local population, sustainability, the number of local individuals participating in the project, the number of local inhabitants benefiting, and the estimated length in order to give a benefit to CERP (Department of Army, 2017). The completed programs successfully fostered mutual understanding, ensured local citizens’ and coalition troops’ freedom of movement, and improved local government and security. In roughly 75 to 80 percent of instances, efforts to ameliorate these softer outcomes are reported to be successful (Egel et al., 2017). Both in terms of how it was governed by the U.S. Department of Defense and in terms of how it is executed on the ground, this initiative has considerable obstacles. Furthermore, while the Special Operations Forces community may draw on the Civil Affairs Teams’ experience in implementing the SERP in Afghanistan, these teams were frequently small in numbers (Department of Army, 2020). As a result, ensuring a more active role for the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and civil authorities would be useful in ensuring the project’s continuous execution and sustainability (Egel et al., 2017). Even though the success of MAAWS is controversial, it led to a certain result, which led to attempts of its adoption in other conflicts. Saudi Arabia, being crag mired in Yemen due to its inability to military defeat Huthis, is currently developing a similar system, aiming to use its massive financial resources to benefit unit commanders inside Yemen.
Conclusion
The financial triad intends to properly provide the necessary resources to support the host country’s forces and population during military operations and emergencies. In today’s military context, the triad competencies allow the commander to efficiently employ financial resources to execute assigned objectives and carry out procurement and life support activities. This triad is complemented by the crucial system developed by American strategists, “Money as a Weapon System.” In Afghanistan and Iraq, “Money as a Weapon System” has been a cornerstone of the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy. It attempted to boost the Iraqi economy and helped eradicate one of the reasons for the insurgency in Iraq: poverty and lack of economic opportunity. Similarly, the Afghan plan assumed that the availability of viable jobs would reduce the number of insurgent recruits.
References
Department of Army. (2020). How the Army runs. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College. Web.
Department of the Army. (2014). Financial Management Operations(FM 1-06).
Department of the Army. (2017). The Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (ATP 1-06.2).
Egel, D., Ries, C. P., Connable, B., Helmus, T. C., Robinson, E., Baruffi, I., & Mann, S. (2017). Investing in the Fight: Assessing the Use of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program in Afghanistan. Rand Corporation.