Changing the strategic understanding of the US Navy’s transition from relying solely on large multipurpose ships to using more maneuverable module combatant ships is today a discussion of extreme importance. However, not all parties understand the potential of medium and small modular vessels. Moreover, naval officers who work with large multipurpose ships take the discussion too personally, as an attempt to cut the funding allocated to their department. Besides, the hype in the press distracts the navy command from the correct understanding of the debate’s essence. Finally, there is still no political support for the LCS concept; on the contrary, the political establishment is generally conservative regarding the development of the US military potential. Those charged in the Navy, on the other hand, have finally come to a position of interest in the five concepts presented ahead of the Global 2000 War Game. This note presents strategies for changing the vector of debate. To be successful and to convey the idea and concept of the potential of medium and small vessels, it is necessary to return to the emphasis on their common participation in coastal missions together with large multipurpose vessels.
First, a presentation for the press needs to be developed for modular LCSs that work with existing models of warships and complete missions. It would be a good idea to use the five points developed ahead of the Global 2000 War Game. Journalists’ misinterpretation of the original concept makes it difficult to understand and deprives this idea of public support. At the same time, if wider society, which has also reached the point of high interest in the discussion, appreciated the scale and true meaning of the idea, it could get more chances for implementation.
Secondly, in view of the conservative mood of the political establishment, it is also necessary to adapt the concept in such a way that it arouses interest. For example, presenting the advantages of small-sized vessels with a high payload, one should not focus on their shortcomings against enemy fire, specifying this nuance only as “other notes.” On the contrary, pay more attention should be paid to the concept of multiple platforms and the wide application of new technologies. Since the new political establishment is generally opposed to war, attention must be paid to the potential for maintaining peace and protecting coastal waters, which was the basis of the original concept.
Thirdly, there is a need to try to convince officers who serve on multi-mission ships DD-21 that the concept of LCS implies joint missions of LCS and DD21 and is not ousting DD-21 ‘from the market.’ It would help if you showed them that you understand the benefits of the DD-21 and admit that without the support of large vessels such as the DD-21, no joint mission in littoral waters will be successful. The new capabilities that the LCS will bring to the DD-21 could also be described, and how LCS will complement the DD-21 vessels and expand its potential. Perhaps this will reduce the level of skepticism with which DD-21 officers perceive the LCS innovations.
Fourthly, it is necessary to consolidate the position among Navy senior officers who are now ready to support the concept of transition to multiple platforms, use the latest technologies and possibilities of vessels of various sizes. With this in view, an informal meeting with Navy senior officers could be organized, during which you will introduce the LCS concept and, again, describe the opportunities that this concept opens up for the Navy as a whole. However, there should be a shift in emphasis from risk avoidance to the overall powerful potential of using a broader ‘assortment’ of naval equipment. The five concepts prepared for the Global 2000 War Game are ideal for this. After the games, Navy senior officers appreciated your concept and are now open to innovation. This success needs to be consolidated by identifying the ways in which the various departments could be involved and the roles they will play.
The presented recommendations were developed in the context of theories of military innovations. In particular, the first recommendation considers the basic ideas of the Cultural Model of Military Innovation developed by Theo Farrell. According to this theory, the cultural background is of great importance in understanding new information. The scientist proved it by the example of the misunderstanding by the US intelligence of Germany’s plans for pursuing strategic bombardment capability. Likewise, journalists completely misinterpret the LCS concept, confusing the already complicated debates. The declaration of a clear position, which will list the priorities and directions of development, will allow the society to shift attention from the LCS design to the purpose and overall potential of the mission.
Further, since the political establishment is not familiar with hostilities’ nuances, it needs detailed and straightforward explanations. Information for this group should be presented with an emphasis on maintaining and securing peace, protecting coastal waters, and introducing technological innovations. Besides, this recommendation should be implemented within the framework of the Civil-Military Model of Military Innovation developed by Barry Posen, revealing civic leaders’ potential to influence the introduction of innovations in the military-industrial complex.
The third recommendation considers the importance of interaction between units within the framework of the Intraservice Model of Military Innovation. According to this model, one must accept that the Navy is not monolithic but consists of many agents – units that compete to innovate and fight for funding. Finally, the fourth recommendation appeals to the Interservice Model of Military Innovation, which implies that the relationship between military services within a state is excellent support for innovation and interpenetration of technologies.
Should you need more information about the presented recommendations, do not hesitate to contact me.