The National Command Authority, in its pursuit of victory in the “Long War,” faces numerous challenges arising from the key strategies that may be adopted in the war. These are counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and support to insurgency or antiterrorism. The United States Department of Defense should adopt a strategy that is cost-effective, acceptable, and does not create the impression that the country is overreacting (Wilden, 1987).
The main challenge is the choice of strategy that should ensure that the United States acts within its authority, while at the same time, it does not overact. Overreaction makes terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda seem to have legitimate claims. If this happens, the United States is more likely to lose domestic support, hence making it difficult for the country to conduct military operations in Afghanistan.
Overreaction also leads to loss of international support, which eventually makes the whole undertaking an expensive venture while, on the other hand, incompetence leads to a waste of resources. Counterinsurgency, though not the best strategy when dealing with terrorist groups, maybe adopted since counterterrorism may seem like an overreaction, while anti-terrorism is rather an expensive strategy. Alternatively, employment a hybrid version of these strategies is the best choice to win the war (Fulk, 2011)
Historically, antiterrorism activities that successfully surpassed earlier stages have been taking place for decades. To the American authority, the war started on 9/11/2011, while to the Al-Qaeda, the war began years back. Michael Howard states that that war would take decades, perhaps, as the Cold War, and thus he refers to it as a war of generations. This calls for real and in-depth budgeting and cost evaluation for the expenses to be incurred in the war. The United States faced a lot of criticism regarding the way it had spent in the Second World War. As a result, the application of caution is mandatory to avoid spending more, which is also being regarded as a threat to the security and stability of a nation. (Matloff, 1996).
The National Command Authority faces a challenge of fighting hard to reduce the harm of Al-Qaeda to the United States. While military personnel may be deployed in Afghanistan, other potential enemies to the United States may seize the opportunity to attack the states given that much attention is concentrated on Al-Qaeda. The threat posed by China and Russia cannot also be ignored. Thus, there may be a need to rely majorly on counterinsurgency, and in the process, try to change the general perception that western ideologies are unsuitable.
There is also the challenge of identifying probable future leaders and changing their general perception of the United States (Thompson, 1991). Counterinsurgency may weaken the funding enterprises within Afghanistan, but it can do little about the sources outside. Security information regarding Al-Qaeda points to scattered funding sources both inside and outside Afghanistan. This makes it hard to identify the main source, which makes it difficult for counterinsurgency to succeed unless the international community is involved. This poses a challenge since some countries can be against the United States and, thus, unable to assist (Dupuy, 1986).
References
Dupuy, T., N. (1986). Understanding War: Military History and the Theory of Combat. New York: Leo Cooper.
Fulk, B. (2011). An evaluation of counterinsurgency as a strategy for fighting a long war.Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute Press
Matloff, M. (1996). American Military History. New York: Combined Books.
Thompson, J. (1991). Lifeblood of war: logistics in armed conflict. London: Brassey’s Classics.
Wilden, A. (1987). Man and Woman, War and Peace: The Strategist’s Companion, New Jersey: Routledge.