The organisation of labour inspection of workplaces has been approved by many countries. Bestowing to Chinaâs Labour Law and Labour Contract Law, the authority and the accountability for labour inspection lay on the labour administration (Shi, 2011). The Chinese system has some discrete peculiarities that might help Lee Wang in resolving the issue of her being underpaid by the employer.
To begin with, Wang can freely turn to the labour inspection for help for the reason that the labour inspectorate has no permission from the law to inspect workers for law defilements. The point in this case is that the main purpose of labour inspection is to correct the violation of labour ethics by employers, such as a company underpaying its employees, and to defend the employeesâ legal privileges and benefits (Galbraith, 2012).
Wang can file a written complaint that would require the labour inspectorate to perform their duties which would normally include handling her request, reviewing it, and, finally, paying a regular visit to the company to check the current set of circumstances. When the desecration is found, the inspectorate is going to command the employer to make the compulsory correction, pay Wang a reasonable compensation, and officially raise her wage (Ngok, & Chan, 2015).
If the problem is not settled in a responsive manner, it is going to be taken to the court. Even though it is critical to keep the relations between Wang and her employer good-natured, if there is a disagreement, the relationship is most likely to be spoiled. In the best case scenario, the company is going to revise Wangâs contract and provide her with a gratifying salary.
In the worst case scenario, Wang and labour inspection will strive to get the most from the employer by pledging for an objective and honest judgement in the court (Anwar, & Sun, 2012). The goal in this case of such an oppositional perspective is to find the resolution that would let avoid any losses on both of the ends, and satisfy them both equally at the same.
There can also be another situation, where Wang can first address the issue in the workplace and find out whether there are any other employees who encountered the identical problem (Wang, & Gunderson, 2012). If the problem exists, all these employees are in the full right to file a collective complaint to the labour inspection. The set of conditions in this occasion turns the issue into a court case with no other options possible. This is a major employee rights violation for which the company has to be punished in the juridical order, and the measures should be taken to the fullest extent of the law (Jia, 2014).
It is worth mentioning that this example proves that labour inspection plays an important role in labour protection in China. This may be good for the employee, but it can also generate problems that have to be correctly envisaged with the intention of settling the conflict in a professional manner.
References
Anwar, S., & Sun, S. (2012). Trade Liberalisation, Market Competition and Wage Inequality in China’s Manufacturing Sector. Economic Modelling, 29(4), 1268-1277. doi:10.1016/j.econmod.2012.03.013
Galbraith, J. K. (2012). Inequality and Instability: A Study of the World Economy Just Before the Great Crisis. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Jia, P. (2014). Employment and Working Hour Effects of Minimum Wage Increase: Evidence from China. China & World Economy, 22(2), 61-80. doi:10.1111/j.1749-124x.2014.12062.x
Ngok, K., & Chan, C. (2015). China’s Social Policy: Transformation and Challenges. New York, NY: Routledge.
Shi, J. (2011). Employment Effect of Minimum Wage in China â Research Based on Construction and Manufacturing. Communications in Computer and Information Science Advances in Applied Economics, Business and Development, 78-82. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-23020-2_12
Wang, J., & Gunderson, M. (2012). Minimum Wage Effects on Employment and Wages: Difâinâdif Estimates from Eastern China. International Journal of Manpower, 33(8), 860-876. doi:10.1108/01437721211280353