In his article on the near-miss marine reporting fails, Hildeburg talks about the need to collect other data types to identify safety problems. The article’s author defines a strategy for creating and developing reports for receiving and processing ship messages. The main idea of such near-miss reporting is that back-office functions can establish reporting systems to learn about what is happening on ships. The purpose of this strategy is to provide organizational training to prevent accidents with severe consequences on ships. Even though the idea of near-miss reporting is well intended, it seems to have minimal effect or sometimes has adverse consequences.
The overall effectiveness of the thesis and the article is high, as the author talks in detail about the existing problems in the topic he is covering. First, there is no stable definition of what a “near-miss” is that separates routine work problems from something reported. The lack of a purpose that can be put into effect creates a reporting practice determined by the fact that the vessel is trying to meet reporting requirements. As a result, there are reports of everyday events with little potential for learning.
Secondly, the author’s research has shown an apparent underestimation of information about events that can occur in such cases as close collisions and landings, falling asleep on watch, incorrect assembly of engine parts, etc. These events are kept secret due to the lack of accountability management in shipping companies. Thus, the reporting system gives a distorted view of the vessel’s work – hiding structural problems that no one mentions. Thirdly, the idea that near-misses are harbingers of serious accidents can be questioned. The investigation of ship-related accidents is essential to obtain information about specific accidents and gain knowledge about the effectiveness of existing risk reduction strategies at sea.