The Poona Pact and the Issue of Dalit Representation Essay

Introduction

It has become usual to denounce Gandhi’s “fast-unto-death” defying the British Award. This slogan offered to divide electorates to Dalits, referred to as Depressed Classes, and the Poona agreement established 1932 as the biggest betrayal of the Dalits¹.The discussions involving Ambedkar and Gandhi resulted in approving the deal as a negotiation between them. Instead, people perceive that Gandhi blackmailed Ambedkar into abandoning the plan of separating electorates to replace with reservation for Dalits.

This concept importantly oversees the continuous efforts of the British agents to separate the citizens of India into several groups with particular issues at blockheads within them to deform the national movement. The Poona Agreement widely increased Dalits’ representation in the legislatures that led to Ambedkar greatly praising Gandhi and naming him Mahatma ². This name was because Gandhi offered a significant share for the Depressed class by reserving seats more than Ambedkar had requested. Although the British thought the Communal Award is okay to apply in Indian, Gandhi and Ambedkar disagree with it. This problem leads to the rising Poona Pact, which advocates for changes in the Award as discussed below intensively.

The British Communal Award

This Award was developed by British leadership considering their interests and oppressing the Indians. Ramsay MacDonald, the British Prime Minister, announced the Communal Award on August 16, 1932³. This Award led to separate communal Dalits’ electorates, Muslims, Sikhs, Europeans, Indian-based Christians, and Anglo-Indians⁴. This Award, assumed to provide the foundation for a reliable government in India through a public residence, was an authorized settlement that would divide the electorate of India. The Communal Award was built to separate electorates that the British rule had already been activated through the Morley- Minto reforms of 1909 and the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms of 1919⁵. This British did not involve the Dalits therefore, the Award only favoring themselves.

This idea of divide electorates brought by British rulers in India petitioned the Indian society during the immediate steps of recent politics for elections. The Communal Award resulted in two or more nations’ theories⁶. Society’s wrangles during elections and in legislative councils were separate electorates because voters and the candidates were members of the same community. The candidates in the polls did not require votes from other societies, and the voters also tend to believe and vote to depend on their organization. Gandhi started thinking that dividing the electorate for Dalits would aid the colonialists to divide, rule, and exploit the people of India⁷.

He possessed an intense issue saying that distinct Muslims’ electorate in India had been divisive, introducing a class of politicians whose purpose was separatist politics⁸. This reason led Gandhi to start opposing divide electorates for the Dalits.

Discussion between Indian Viceroy, Sir Frederick, and Lord Willingdon Sykes on government Position

Intense discussions had to be carried out, emphasizing the government’s position on this situation. This meeting happened among the Indian Viceroy, Lord Willingdon, and the Governor of Bombay, Sir Frederick Sykes⁹. Willingdon reported that the colonialists’ purpose was to divide the Indians of the province from the Congress movement, convert their interest to reforms and revive the normal situation as quickly as possible. Sykes accepted that colonialists should narrow down on the minorities’ side because there is confidence that the minorities will organize on the Government side¹⁰.

Sykes said the only way is by influencing Indians to lose trust in the power of the congress that will encourage other parties to organize themselves. He explained this concept to Willingdon three months before the communal award declaration in April 1932¹¹. This arrangement will form a robust and effective opposition in the future.

Sykes insisted that the untouchables should be regarded as a society distinguished from Indians. Their leadership should be handled as a deduction from the Hindu selection for political purposes. He addressed this issue through information sent to Willingdon on June 7, 1932¹². He also conveyed the message to Viceroy that there should be no efforts used to defeat the congress. The reason behind it was that the measures would unavoidably alienate the Muslims and other minorities. As quoted in Communal Award, the need to divide electorates for the Dalits was established by the government.

The Inspector-General of Prisons E.E Doyle claimed Gandhi informed him of the Dalits being given separate electorates against their desire¹³. Very few minorities, the Mahars, under Ambedkar leadership, insisted on separate electorates. Instead, they were not supposed to advocate for Dalits in the united provinces, Bengal, and anywhere else that had been declared for joint electorates. The private discussions between the British leaders were similar to what Gandhi was implying¹⁴. The debate reflects no widespread yearning in the Dalits for finding separate electorates, vie the Communal Award.

Most of the Dalits rarely knew about the Award announcement, seemingly for their manumission. The British were under the unwanted assumption of supporting the Dalits. Their open purpose was to use them to introduce yet another opening among India’s people to oppose the increasing wave of the national movement. The divided electorate was a critical tool that makes the Dalits assert their divisiveness, a concept that the British had applied with victory to separate the Muslims from Hindus since the late 19^th century¹⁵. This idea implied the intentions of the British to divide the Dalits.

Gandhi Resistance to British Machinations of Diving Indians

Gandhi was informed of the British government’s clever scheme to divide the Dalits. He conveys a message to Rajkumari Amrit Kaur describing Communal Award as an ill-motivated conspiracy defying Indian Nationalism several years later¹⁶. Gandhi also implied that this Award was attempting to divide the Indians. He emphasized that the Dalits should be elected via a joint and broad electorate through universal adult voting rights. A course behind this belief, as a separate electorate, would guarantee that untouchables remained to be that way in endless durations¹⁷. He explained that what was needed was the total elimination of the entire untouchability.

Gandhi challenging the Communal Award was because it was dividing the Depressed class and weakening the national movement. The colonial rulers and their critics referred to this as the involuntary will to equip the depressed class. Responding to the critics on these issues, he stated that the Harijans would not correctly use their right to vote. They will also not understand that the country’s interests are to take charge of the primary part of the democratic principles¹⁸. Gandhi insisted that the concept is like elites telling the peoples that they are not ready for democracy and will never explore the proper application of the right to vote.

Gandhi emphasized that mistakes are always made, and therefore people only progress through mistakes they do, which does not imply that the Indians are not supposed to have them vote¹⁹. The practice of this franchise will in itself be a lesson learn for the Harijans. He also adds that it would not be to imply that the Dalits would not understand national interests. Gandhi has never resisted for the depressed class to have members of Parliament in the Legislature or even their more representation. Instead, he was eager to save their adequate about it²⁰. He even talked about his readiness, under particular situations, to ensure by statute one specific number of seats to be occupied by them.

Gandhi’s Fasting to Death Move to Objecting the Communal Award

Gandhi requested Ramsey MacDonald, the colonial Prime Minister, to announce his message to inform his plans to proceed with fast unto death. He argues that he wants people’s interests to be influenced by the separate electorate. The colonial rulers granted him the request and published the information on September 13, 1932²¹. A few days before Gandhi, this event was to commence his plan, sending shock waves across the country. The state was shocked on receiving information of his plans to fast unto death concerning offering divide electorates to the Dalits²². This plan was an excellent move for a leader to pursue the demands of his people.

Gandhi’s fasting immediately pierced the Hindu caste consciousness. Referring to the development of Madan Mohan Malviya, efforts were applied to start a negotiation among the Hindu leader²³. This dialogue includes Tej Bahadur Sapru, Ghanshyam Das Birla, and Chakravarti Rajagopalachari forming one group and Ambedkar and other Dalits forming the other group²⁴. The colonial leadership actively participated in exploiting the depressed class leaders.

M.C Rajah expressed his feeling to Gandhi, stating that some people did not know the amount of pressure for him to carry. He claims distress was put on him by top leadership, including Viceroy, Home Member, and the Indian Law Member²⁵. During fasting time, this situation stopped him from promoting and causing his followers to agree with the joint electorates above where the soul was placed, and without it, it was worthless to live.

The rulers prolonged their hidden advocacy to stop any effort towards correspondence among Hindu members of Parliament and the untouchables. They were speculating that the Pact may be the probability that the British rulers announced more spokespeople of the Dalits other than Rajah and Ambedkar²⁶. The colonialists also stated that it would require any organization which Dalits may come to, having the back up of entire communities to which they belong.

Finally, the representatives signed an agreement named the Poona Pact, and agreed terms were forwarded to Gandhi, and he approved it. This information was sent to the government immediately, then British Prime Minister Ramsey MacDonald, with his Cabinet, agreed to amend the Communal Award to include this information. Gandhi stopped his fast when the notification of changes reached Yeravda Jail on September 26, 1932²⁷. This action signifies that Gandhi agrees with the decisions, and they are suitable for the Dalits.

The Poona Agreement Effect on the Dalits

Concerning the Poona agreement, the British had to change the allocation of positions for Dalits. They offered 148 seats in the Legislature against the previous 71 slots allocated in the Colonialist’s Award²⁸. There was more substantial development on how the Depressed class members of Parliament were selected, and this process was to happen in two steps. During the initial event, the Dalits in the reserved constituency chosen a group consisting of four candidates.

Then during the event that follows, the members of the entire constituency, regardless of their society affiliation, were to vote for the candidate they want to be their member of Parliament. This Pact adhered to what Gandhi had been advocating for in the Legislature. For example, he would offer tithe to stop the government’s move from separating the Hindu community eternally²⁹. The most advanced achievement was that Poona Pact was arrived at involving the Indians themselves without any participation of the Colonial leadership.

Gandhi and Ambedkar Agreement on the Poona Pact

The aim was to look for an agreement to pledge an alternative plan. Ambedkar implied that he would not be a party to any proposal that is against the needs of his people to save the life of Gandhi. He also took the Poona Agreement as a success for him by writing that the failure of the fast³⁰. Gandhi was grateful to approve this agreement which accepted the political needs of the Depressed class.

Rajmohan Gandhi had questions about the issues of the Poona agreement. He appropriately questioned if Ambedkar was forced to agree with Pact in 1932, what about 1949, when he participated in introducing the agreement with constitutions³¹. This statement was a reply to his critics, who implied that Ambedkar had been blackmailed into signing the Poona Agreement. In 1932 and 1945, his battles with Gandhi had risen to the high point, Ambedkar did not deny the Poona Pact terms. Even after resigning in 1951 and clashing with Jawaharlal Nehru and the government³². He never made any attempt aiming to nullify the Poona agreement.

During this period, remarkable efforts to solve problems between Gandhi the two leaders happened. He introduced him into the nationalist fold, regardless of Ambedkar participating in the Viceroy’s Committee during the Quit India Movement of 1942 to 1945³³. He was involved in formulating the Indian constitution, despite having a significant disagreement of opinion with his Colleague Gandhi. Later on, he was even introduced in independent India’s first Cabinet, although Ambedkar’s infusion electorally did not necessarily get the slot.

The Castes Federation of Ambedkar

The castes Federation was established to improve the representation of Dalits. This plan was not successful in elections held in 1946³⁴. It did not yield any candidate in Bombay and resulted in only one Bengal and Central Provinces government leader³⁵. The assembly had won many Dalit positions in elections held in 1946 and had no excuse to make Ambedkar included the Cabinet³⁶. Its Gandhi who influenced Ambedkar’s selection into the 1947 cabinet.

He requested Vallabhbhai Patel and Jawaharlal Nehru to appoint Ambedkar in India’s first Cabinet³⁷. Ambedkar was very surprised when he learned that he was included in the Cabinet. After Gandhi’s death, two months later, Ambedkar married Sharad Kabir, a Brahmin doctor. Patel passed a message saying that he was sure that Banu was living, he would have offered Ambedkar his blessings³⁸. In his reply to the letter, he agrees to that statement implied by Patel.

Ambedkar’s Point on Political Representation

Ambedkar’s opinions on the political representation of the Dalits were formed over three decades. This process started with his submission to the Southborough committee in 1919³⁹. His faith in the common voting right, revolutionary at that time, was based on Dalits getting cheated of their franchise. Ambedkar refurbished the political impression of leadership for the untouchables, relocating from joint to divide electorates and resolving the quality measure of first and second elections⁴⁰. These actions showed his persistent defiance against British exploitation.

His Independent Labor party won in elections help in 1937, during the second round in 1946, the Dalits assembly did not perform well⁴¹. Ambedkar would proceed firmly inspired Gandhi, and the leadership, more so on political legislation, claimed that congress dissolved the agreement in 1945⁴². This act was done by selecting few authentic candidates who would depend on the party for votes to make it to Cabinet.

Conclusion

The British tend to set mechanisms of ruling the Indians by introducing the Communal Award, which tends to minimize Indians’ representation. Gandhi interprets this move as a dictatorship way of ruling and disagrees with it. Gandhi plays a massive role in advocating for the rights of Indians by all means to the extent of fasting. This action is to stop the colonialist from exploiting the Dalits. This event results in a Poona pact that is an agreement between Ambedkar and Gandhi. The agreement’s primary purpose is to go against the British movement and establish policies that will improve the representation of the Dalits in the Legislature. The plan wins as the British agreed to make amendments in the Award were allocated a better number of seats in Parliament.

References

Basu, S. (2018). Unit-30 National Movement and the Dalits.

Biswas, S. (2018). Gandhi, Ambedkar, and British policy on the communal Award. Studies in People’s History, 5(1), 48-64.

Chambers, T. (2020). Network, Labour and Migration among Indian Muslims Artisans. UCL Press.

Chandrachud, A. (2020). The Informal Constitution: Unwritten Criteria in Selecting Judges for the Supreme Court of India. Oxford University Press.

Charlton-Stevens, U. (2017). Anglo-Indians and Minority Politics in South Asia: Race, Boundary Making and Communal Nationalism. Routledge.

Drephal, M. (2019). Biography and Imperial Governance. In Afghanistan and the Coloniality of Diplomacy (pp. 117-171). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.

Khalifa, F. A. (2020). Visualizing the Fractured Nation: Narratives of (Un) belonging in 21st-century Indian and South Korean Media (Doctoral dissertation, Duke University).

Kumar, A., Bapuji, H., & Mir, R. (2021). “Educate, Agitate, Organize”: Inequality and Ethics in the Writings of Dr. Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar. Journal of Business Ethics, 1-14.

Manoharan, K. R. (2020). In the path of Ambedkar: Periyar and the Dalit question. South Asian History and Culture, 11(2), 136-149.

Mendiola-So, M., Larson, R. E., & Vernier, D. (2017). A systematic review of whirlpool as an adjunctive treatment for cellulitis. Wound Medicine, 19, 47-74.

Misrahi-Barak, J., & Thiara, N. (2019). Interview with director Jayan K. Cherian. The Journal of Commonwealth Literature, 54(1), 96-104.

Roy, A. (2017). The Doctor and the Saint: Caste, Race, and Annihilation of Caste: The Debate between B.R. Ambedkar and MK Gandhi. Haymarket Books+ ORM.

Soomro, S. A., & Chandio, J. A. (2018). Muhammad Iqbal and Division of Sub-continent. Journal of History Culture and Art Research, 7(2), 319-327.

Thorat, S. (2019). Ambedkar’s Proposal to Safeguards Minorities Against Communal Majority in Democracy. Journal of Social Inclusion Studies, 5(2), 113-128.

Vundru, R. S. (2017). Ambedkar, Gandhi, and Patel: The Making of India’s Electoral System. Bloomsbury Publishing.

Footnotes

1. Manoharan, K. R. (2020). In the path of Ambedkar: Periyar and the Dalit question. South Asian History and Culture, 11(2), 136-149.
2. Manoharan, 139.
3. Charlton-Stevens, U. (2017). Anglo-Indians and Minority Politics in South Asia: Race, Boundary Making and Communal Nationalism. Routledge.
4. Charlton.
5. Charlton.
6. Soomro, S. A., & Chandio, J. A. (2018). Muhammad Iqbal and Division of Sub-continent. Journal of History Culture and Art Research, 7(2), 319-327.
7. Soomro, 323.
8. Soomro, 327.
9. Biswas, S. (2018). Gandhi, Ambedkar, and British policy on the communal Award. Studies in People’s History, 5(1), 48-64.
10. Biswas, 51.
11. Biswas, 60.
12. Drephal, M. (2019). Biography and Imperial Governance. In Afghanistan and the Coloniality of Diplomacy (pp. 117-171). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.
13. Mendiola-So, M., Larson, R. E., & Vernier, D. (2017). A systematic review of whirlpool as an adjunctive treatment for cellulitis. Wound Medicine, 19, 47-74.
14. Mendiola et al., 56.
15. Drephal, 140.
16. Khalifa, F. A. (2020). Visualizing the Fractured Nation: Narratives of (Un) belonging in 21st-century Indian and South Korean Media (Doctoral dissertation, Duke University).
17. Khalifa.
18. Chambers, T. (2020). Network, Labour and Migration among Indian Muslims Artisans. UCL Press.
19. Chambers.
20. Chambers.
21. Biswas, 62.
22. Biswas, 64.
23. Chandrachud, A. (2020). The Informal Constitution: Unwritten Criteria in Selecting Judges for the Supreme Court of India. Oxford University Press.
24. Chandrachud.
25. Chandrachud.
26. Chandrachud.
27. Chandrachud.
28. Misrahi-Barak, J., & Thiara, N. (2019). Interview with director Jayan K. Cherian. The Journal of Commonwealth Literature, 54(1), 96-104.
29. Misrahi & Thiara.
30. Basu, S. (2018). Unit-30 National Movement and the Dalits.
31. Vundru, R. S. (2017). Ambedkar, Gandhi, and Patel: The Making of India’s Electoral System. Bloomsbury Publishing.
32. Vundru.
33. Vundru.
34. Roy, A. (2017). The Doctor and the Saint: Caste, Race, and Annihilation of Caste: The Debate between B.R. Ambedkar and MK Gandhi. Haymarket Books+ ORM.
35. Roy.
36. Roy.
37. Roy.
38. Roy.
39. Kumar, A., Bapuji, H., & Mir, R. (2021). “Educate, Agitate, Organize”: Inequality and Ethics in the Writings of Dr. Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar. Journal of Business Ethics, 1-14.
40. Kumar & Mir, 5.
41. Thorat, S. (2019). Ambedkar’s Proposal to Safeguards Minorities Against Communal Majority in Democracy. Journal of Social Inclusion Studies, 5(2), 113-128.
42. Kumar & Mir, 8.