Executive Summary
Many scholars and observers have claimed that President Ronald Reagan was more of a facilitator than a spectator. These sentiments could be attributed to his success in handling crises, notably the air traffic controller’s strike in 1981. Reagan treaded on murky waters of going against what other presidents had feared and avoided before; confrontation with union workers, managing to successfully fire Air Traffic controllers. The threat came in Reagan’s early time in office, testing his ability to maneuver such a crisis, with the workers union that had put its position rigid for any further agreement.
Many have argued that the incident expressly exposed Reagan’s willpower, while others cite effective communication that the President employed to his favor, winning the support of ordinary Americans. While both claims may be true, it is also important to note that the union’s early hard stance could have played a role in Reagan’s response, countering ‘hard stance’ with ‘hard stance’. Realistically, the President may have assessed the ability of the Union in terms of communicating their message and noted that it held no substance, considering the fact that the strike was against the law.
Introduction
History tells us that every administration has its defining moments; others experience several of those moments. It is possible to remember Reagan Administration for many things, but the one event that remains in the psyche of every American is the discharge of federal air traffic controllers for failure to follow a presidential directive to return to work. During the summer of President Reagan’s first year in office, the Professional Air Traffic Controllers employed by the Federal Aviation Administration, called a strike to start on August 3, 1981, to demand higher wages, a shorter work weak, and better retirement benefits (Nordlund, 1998). The Threat of a strike became a test of Reagan’s famous willpower and his stated position that unions alone would not determine what happens in labor-management disputes (Nordlund, 1998). Emphasizing that it was illegal for them to strike, Reagan left no doubt beforehand that if the controllers went out, they would be fired. In fact, President Ronald’s stand was that there would be no compromise- there would be ‘no amnesty’ for those participating in a walkout, nor would there be any negotiations during a strike (Nordlund, 1998). Nordlund (1998) states that Reagan showed a strong will in the way he communicated his messages, hence instilling a notion of goodwill and power (p.12).
The drama leading up to the event and the national trauma that followed provide a poignant picture of misjudgments in the negotiations. In fact, some economists and federal officials predicted that a prolonged strike would have a devastating national economic impact (McCartin, 2008). Probably they were drawing their judgments from historical examples of workers in critical industries that struck and made it stick. Teachers, police, postal workers, sanitation workers, and others, had used the strike weapon effectively as a vehicle for squeezing more concessions out of management- generally public sector management (Edwards, 2006). This paper critically highlights how President Reagan used his constitutional power to successfully dismiss the air traffic controllers and the weakness of the union that represented these workers, The Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO).
Breakdown of Communication
There are differing opinions as to how the Federal Aviation Administration Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (FAA-PATCO) situation evolved into one of overt and direct confrontation. How did the situation gravitate into one from which there was no return? Some people argue that the president was simply looking for a vehicle to use in making his inflexible opposition to union visible, and the air traffic controllers happened to be the first in line (McCartin, 2008b). Whether this assessment is true remains to be seen; however, there is no doubt that the event was a culmination of the breakdown of communication between two feuding parties. This is because there can be no question that the PATCO and the FAA were in conflict over just about every issue, as several types of research had shown (McCartin, 2008b).
Approaches Negotiating Crisis
The FAA-PATCO debacle is a perfect example of how personalities can change the approaches to conflict resolution and negotiation. Long before formal negotiations began, the FAA administrator was on a whirlwind tour of the country making speeches about the overpaid and underworked controllers (McCartin, 2008). Klein (2008b), citing the sentiments of White House Press Secretary Larry Speakes, states that the decision to fire the controllers had been made a few days earlier and; the president was firm from the outset (p.19). As federal employees, the controllers were subject to a no-strike clause in their contracts. The derivative of this law stemmed from a congressional action in 1955 that made such strikes a crime punishable by fine or one year of incarceration. In 1971, this law was tested but upheld by the Supreme Court (Nordlund, 1998).
In an interview, Speakes recalled, “I told the press that the President was doing the right thing- he is enforcing the law” (Nordlund, 1998). The press secretary had to emphasize the news to blame the union for breaking the law. “I told the press that everything would be alright and that the striking controllers would be replaced as quickly as possible. I said the president would not bend. It was a show of strength. I said that it’s good for the country” (Nordlund, 1998). The union, on the other hand, attempted to argue that its working conditions, retirement program, and other aspects of the work environment, for example, the old and unreliable Automated Data Processing equipment, were the major issues important to PATCO members (McCartin, 2008). While many people outside the PATCO would confirm that all or most of these problems had merit, the union was unable to counterbalance the administration’s public relations program effectively. It, therefore, followed that the American people were unable to determine what parts of the controllers’ agenda were real and that the one-dimensional caricature provided by the government, that is, money, was easy to understand (McCartin, 2008).
It may be that the air traffic controllers union was large enough to be visible, but not large enough to be irreplaceable in a relatively short period of time. The controllers may have been in an occupation in which the skills and training necessary to be effective are easily transferable to other motivated and capable employees.
Practically, people negotiate every day; conflict is an everyday event and reaching consensus is a critical destination only achieved through negotiations Fisher, Ury & Patton (1991). Fisher, Ury & Patton (1991) say that everyone wants to participate in decisions dictated by someone else; people differ and they use negotiation to handle their differences; and that although negotiation takes place every day, it’s never an easy process (p.xvii). People find themselves in dilemma. They see two ways to negotiate: soft and hard. Those who prefer soft negotiation will try to prevent any form of “confrontation and personal conflicts”, hence will easily give in to make consensus faster (Fisher, Ury & Patton, 1991). Conversely, the hard negotiator looks at all the situations in the perspective of competition and thus takes an “extreme” side and prolongs the process in the hope that a better outcome will emerge at last (Fisher, Ury & Patton, 1991). Fisher, Ury & Patton (1991) say that a hard negotiator wants to win; yet he or she often ends up producing an equally hard response that exhausts him or her, or even the resources at his or her disposal. Other standard negotiating strategies fall between hard and soft, but each involves an attempted trade-off between getting what you want and getting along with people (p.xviii).
Harvard Negotiation Project developed a third way of negotiation: Principled negotiation. This form of negotiation has been described as “neither hard nor soft, and both hard and soft” (Fisher, Ury & Patton, 1991, p. xviii). It, therefore, demands that the parties on the negotiating table should focus more on the inherent “mutual gains” and in case the individual demands conflicts, there should be a middle ground that is free from the influence of the two parties (Fisher, Ury & Patton, 1991).
The president’s Powers and Tactics
Several studies on the acrimonious relationship between the FAA management and its employees have been documented. Edwards (2006) observes that no one should believe that the union was without some responsibility in the creation and continuation of this difficult relationship. Many other studies also suggest that the union failed to calm the disagreement by aggregating it further and preventing the negotiation with FAA that would see important issues resolved (Klein, 2008b; Klein, 2008; McCartin, 2008). The President, through the power of the law, realized the weakness of the union and remained firm, probably in response to PATCO’s hard negotiation approach.
The president’s order ensured that major airlines reduced their operations by half to ensure the probability of unsafe incidences is minimized (McCartin, 2008). More than 45,000 people applied within four weeks after the strike began, and in a matter of weeks, approximately 80% of airline flights were operating as scheduled, while airfreight remained virtually unaffected (Klein, 2008b).
One would argue that Reagan’s tactic as represented by Speakes’ press statement was successful because the public did not support the strikers. Instead, it sided with the government and, in doing so, helped Speakes to enhance Reagan’s image as a strong and courageous leader. It did not take long before full service was restored and by 1984, air traffic increased by 6% while there were still 20% fewer controllers than had been on the job prior to the walkout (Klein, 2008a).
The Law and the Situational Bargaining
As observed, PATCO took an earlier stand on the unwillingness to change putting their positions that they would not accept anything less (Klein, 2008a). According to Hunt (2004), despite the fact that the initial position taken may be against the law, the negotiator’s continual hard stance on positions tend to lock them further into those positions; that the more you clarify your position and defend it over the attack, the more committed you become to it. Hunt (2004) states that at that point, “your ego becomes identified with your position…you now have a new interest in ‘saving face’- in reconciling future action with past positions- making it less and less likely that any agreement will wisely reconcile the parties’ original interests (p. 132).
While the factors leading to the strike and the government’s response to that strike are complex, the single aspect of the controller strike that seemed to cause the president the most distress was that controllers violated their written, signed an oath not to strike against the government of the United States (Edwards, 2006). The oath stated as thus:
“I am not participating in any strike against the government of the United States or any agency thereof, and I will not so participate while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof” (Edwards, 2006, p.49).
This statement may seem deceptively simple, but it became the driving force towards and during the period of strike, and evidently was the strength behind President Reagan’s decision to fire the controllers and not permit them to return to federal employment. Transport Secretary, Drew Lewis argued that the president considered the strike a “moral issue”, hence suggesting that the president felt that the controllers took an oath of office and failed to live up to their responsibilities to the American public (Edwards, 2006, p.58). Further, the President asked the rhetorical question, “If ever we feel that our oath of office need not be kept, how long would we have this society?” (p.59). Indeed, no one would deny that the controller’s strike was illegal; a violation of federal law. The Civil Service Reform Act of 1977 and Section 305 of the Taft-Hartley Act outlaw strikes by federal employees (Edwards, 2006).
Conclusion
The culmination of the controllers’ strike is a clear indication that the problem had reached a point of no return. While others may argue that the president was putting a hard-line stance to save his new power, it could be argued that the president’s reaction was simply a response to PATCO’s tough onset conditions that limited any opportunity to reach a consensus. The two sides’ tough stance led to communication breakdown and subsequent confrontation.
This is a classical example of personalities can transform the negotiation process. In fact, none of the earlier presidents had attempted to confront the labor unions successfully. The decision to fire the controllers was evidently based on the law of the United States. But this law was set earlier before the Reagan era and yet several unions had launched their strike successfully, paralyzing the operations of the state corporation.
It thus leads us to some critical negotiation strategies employed by negotiators; soft and hard negotiations strategies. Although many would argue that the action was more of a gamble than a strategy, it is possible to hypothesize that President Reagan assessed the ability of PATCO to paralyze the operations of the transport sector and came to a conclusion that it was minimal. He, therefore, responded to the hard negotiation tactics, backed by the law and the public and the desire to save face, to counter the union’s actions.
Reference List
Edwards, G. (2006). On Deaf Ears: The Limits of the Bully Pulpit. New Haven Connecticut: Yale University Press.
Fisher, R., Ury, W. & Patton B. (1991). Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In (2nd edition). New York: Penguin Books.
Hunt, J. (2004). Organizational Behavior. London: Sage Publishers.
Klein, W. (2008a). All the Presidents’ Spokesmen: Spinning the New. Washington, DC: Greenwood Publishing Group.
Klein, W. (2008b). Silent Skies: The Air Traffic Controllers’ Strike. New York: Greenwood Publishing Group.
McCartin, J. (2008). Ronald Reagan, the PATCO strike, and the revival of the Imperial Presidency. Washington, DC: Georgetown University.