Introduction
The future of the British policy depends on, whether the choice in favor of Europe or the US will be made, – a popular thesis among the British political scientists whose number of supporters was increased after the 2003 war in Iraq. In fact, already half a century, after the beginning of the decline of the British Empire, there is a dilemma of a problem of the choice of the policy format in the field of defense, safety and foreign affairs. “Special relations” with USA long time compensated for the inevitable easing of the international weight and prestige of Great Britain after the end of the Second World War, where the rigid corset, in which the system of the world’s balance of power in the days of the cold war has been concluded, did quite natural the position of Western Europe as their protectorate. However, these days “special relations” are represented to many analysts by a doctrine, not only exhausted its resources but also harming the interests of the United Kingdom. The end of the world’s bipolarity in the past has opened for the uniting Europe the possibility to turn into an independent center of force in the world. This paper addresses the issue of the USA- Britain “special relations”, providing historical background as well as their recent advancements during Tony Blair’s government, and the criticism stating that Britain’s special relationships despite the criticism are the main component of Britain’s foreign policy.
Foreign Policy in the Post War Era
Traditionally, the foreign policy of Great Britain was based on two opposite tendencies: the preservation of tradition and the ability to change. For a long time, Britain played a special intermediary role between the USSR and the USA. However, after the breakdown of the Soviet as well as the disintegration of the British Empire, Great Britain, compelled to introduce a corrective amendment in foreign policy, formed a special course assuming both preservation of the relation with the USA, and the integration with Europe. After World War II, the labor government led by Clement Richard Attlee cardinally reconsidered the foreign policy doctrine of the country. The head of the foreign policy department Ernest Bevin first put forward the idea of “the third force» – the creation under the leadership of Britain of a block of the West European countries and their colonies which could act on equal with the Soviet block and the USA. However, owing to objective reasons, these claims have quickly given way to a course of rapprochement with the US and the retraction of Washington in the West European system of security as its core. Another component of this policy was the participation in global confrontation with the Soviet Union. The specified tendencies have been issued publicly in March 1946 when with the consent of the British government the leader of opposition Winston Churchill made a speech in Fulton which became an indicative event of an initial stage of the cold war. The image of the Iron Curtain used by Churchill turned into one of the integral attributes of the developing bipolar world. In Foreign Office (FCO) it was understood, that in the post-war world setting, the USA occupy high positions, and for Britain, in order to minimize the loss of the international weight and influence, it was necessary to divide the palm of superiority with the transatlantic neighbor and to strengthen the positions in Europe as its main ally. After the first episode of the cold war – after the Fulton speech, there was the first “thaw” in international relations. Churchill, again becoming the prime minister in 1951, brought up the question of cooperation renewal between power-winners. The participation of England in the Korean War crossed out these undertakings. In 1955 at the initiative of the British management led by Anthony Eden, a meeting at the summit took place with the participation of the USSR, Britain, USA and France, after which in the next year Khrushchev visited London. However, after some months, the rapprochement between the leading powers was interrupted by the Suez war against Egypt. After the Suez crisis, Britain refused to make attempts to form the foreign policy without taking notice of the US and the USSR and was unwillingly integrated into the two-polar system of the world, where the first place in this system was taken by the relations with the US. The disputable moments of the foreign policy of Margaret Thatcher in 80s were an echo of the imperial mentality leaving in the past, as well as a forerunner of difficulties that Britain faced on the international scene for the next decade. The relations with the US were more serious arguments in the issue of the restoration of Britain’s positions in the world. On the background of the personal friendship of “the iron lady” with Ronald Reagan, the “special relations” between the countries went through new blossoming, although still were filled with symbols, instead of real content. At the same time the strengthening of the hostility and the suspiciousness of Thatcher toward the European integration as a whole, and to France and Germany in particular, not only cost the chair of the prime minister and led to the split of the Conservative party, but also crossed out Britain from the list of the European leaders in the 90s.
Special Relationship during Blair’s Era
After the victory of the Labor Party in the elections of 1997, the evolution of the views of the government in the field of defense and security was accelerated. In the program speech on the principles of modern British foreign policy, Tony Blair confirmed the role of Britain as “the bridge between the US and Europe”. He declared that the global interests of Britain will be realized further by the means of such levers as, “Security Council, NATO, the G8, Europe and the Commonwealth, not to mention our close alliance with America.” The government underlined the importance of the coalition character of the solution of the external problems with support both on constant, and on tactical coalitions. The role of Britain as axial power – a regional power with global responsibility which without having the possibility to dominate in the world, creatively carries out the second classical principle – to strike stronger than the own possibilities. There were also other innovations. It was provided for that Britain will return to the heart of Europe and will take the lead position. The program of Preventive Diplomacy, which priority, unlike the Gunboat diplomacy, is diplomatic, not the military means of solving the conflicts, was developed.
At the same time, in this program the strategic contradiction was underlined. London applied not only for the “special relations” with USA, but also for the leading part in the European Union. British political establishment felt the necessity of strengthening the positions on the continent in the process of the consolidation of the EU as the world center of force, but at the same time did not wish to leave the reputation of the nearest ally of the USA. The specified tendencies were distinctly shown in the Strategic defense program accepted by the Labor party in 1998.
The arrival of the Labor Party to the power was also accompanied by another innovation – “ethical foreign policy”. Having faced complexities in joining ethics and national interests, the government addressed this theme less often. The attempt to return was undertaken in the connection with Kosovo Crisis. Robin Cook and Tony Blair repeatedly underlined, that force against Belgrade was applied for the protection of human ideals. However the understanding of “ethic” was changed. The Labor Party did not apply anymore for the vital differences in their foreign policy from the foreign policy of other western countries. Values, on which it was based, began to mean the values of “the western civilization”. The discrepancy of character and the consequences of the war against Yugoslavia, later episodes connected with the decision not to extradite the former Chilean dictator Pinochet to Spain, and the doubtfulness of the motives of the British government in its actions in the Iraq crisis definitively buried the project of “ethical foreign policy”. Events around Iraq in 2002-2003 highlighted with new force the difficulties of London on the coordination of “special relations” with USA with the aspiration to return to leading positions in Europe.
In fact, British diplomacy, which traditionally was considered as one of the most skilful in the world and which successes were based on the principle of constant interests and temporal alliances, showed, especially recently, obvious dogmatism. The reputation of the British foreign policy was based on the ability for flexibility, and the balance of interests, however in practice after the coming of the Labor government to power in 1997, it became subordinated to one purpose – following the foreign policy of USA. The interpretation of “special relations” never was so is rectilinear. If in the sphere of trade, protection of the economic interests London was ready to defend them categorically, including by the means of EU mechanisms, in the questions of foreign policy and defense, London with an enviable stubbornness refused its sovereignty.
Advancing British National Interests
On the problem of Iraq, London once again chose the US side, despite the fact that US policy led to the deepest crisis in the history of the Euro-Atlantic community, undermined the authority of the United Nations, and split the EU and NATO. In a moment Tony Blair’s long-term diligence on the restoration of positions of the country as a high-grade European partner was ruined. Moreover, the prime minister did not consider the reasons for internal political expediency. With his actions, he considerably worsened electoral prospects of his own party, was on the verge of losing his post, provoked unprecedented manifestations of protest in London, and caused a split in the parliamentary fraction of the Labor Party and the resignation of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.
Critics of “special relations” specify that even during the epoch of power countries the relations almost always were “one-sided”, serving more US interests rather than Britain’s. In this tandem, the State Department was guided by what the Foreign office was proud of by word of mouth- upholding national interests.
After World War II, the USA without notice stopped the lend-lease program, which put the exhausted by war Great Britain in an extremely difficult position, refused the continuation of the cooperation in the field of developing nuclear weapons, originally refused to support Britain during the Falkland war, and for many years operated contrary to London on the problem of the North Ireland settlement. There are many more similar examples.
The Future British foreign policy
The affinity of the Great Britain and the USA, especially in the past, could be explained by difficult interlacing of emotionally-psychological and very practical reasons. It is not a coincidence, that the special relations between the Great Britain and the USA, could be explained among other factors by the special role of allied relations in the days of the Second World War and the role of bipolarity, putting the Great Britain in dependence on the USA in the sphere of security and a conscious position of the younger partner. Traditions and principles of gratitude, fidelity to the ally which provided security to Europe throughout many decades, until today are important components of the formation of the British foreign policy toward the American direction.
Works Cited
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- “Pm Speech at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet 1997”. 2003. Number 10.
- Riddell, Peter. Hug Them Close: Blair, Clinton, Bush and the ‘Special Relationship’. London: Politico’s, 2003.
- “Special Relationships Notes.” 2009. 30.