Background
President Trump’s “America First” policy, as outlined in the 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS), is a principled realist approach to national security. It holds that peace, security, and prosperity can only exist amongst independent states that treat their inhabitants with dignity at home and work together to spread stability abroad. The National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2017, the National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the National Military Strategy (NMS) of 2018 all built on these tenets to further promote US partnerships with Europe and the Trans-Atlantic NATO.
This “America First” strategy has been seen as dismissive of Russia’s interests and principles in particular. Events like Russia’s assault on Ukraine and seizure of Crimea, and continuous cyberattacks on the Baltic States and Western elections, have put the geopolitical security of the Euro-Atlantic region in jeopardy. Russia’s disruptive rhetoric and actions in the Baltic Kaliningrad enclave should be more widely recognized.
The purpose of this information brief is to provide Congress with arguments in favor of continuing funding for EUCOM’s regional strategy. The plan’s goals are to maintain a constant presence of ready troops, ensure strategic access, prevent conflicts, fortify the NATO alliance, and combat transnational threats. The policy’s impetus comes from Washington’s desire to ensure the safety of its own national interests while also supporting Europe’s efforts to remain united, free, and at peace.
Strategic Environment
Kaliningrad is a region of Russia that is stuck in the middle of the Baltic Sea, Poland, and Lithuania. To put it another way, it is almost 400 kilometers from “mainland” Russia. As the westernmost area of the Russian Federation, it changed hands from the Germans to the Russians after World War II. On an area of around 15,100 square kilometers or 5,830 miles, about 950,000 residents speak Russian. A primary A2/AD danger in the enclave is Russia’s naval, army, and air forces, and they are utilizing Kaliningrad oblast as a staging ground for their military development and posturing.
Russia is using its economic and cultural clout in this Baltic province, in addition to its military might, to destabilize the surrounding area. Because of their closeness to Kaliningrad and to NATO, the governments of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are easy targets for cyber exploitation. Russia also actively promotes disinformation and other subversive actions among the ethnic populations of these nations. Russia’s antagonism has been reported even by nations farther away, such as Finland and Sweden, due to their leanings toward NATO.
These deteriorating ties in the Baltic and Nordic areas are further exacerbated by non-state players, including huge Russian natural gas businesses and criminal networks that engage in drug and people trafficking. There are Russian-funded NGOs with a history of stirring up tensions among the Baltic States’ Russian-speaking citizens. NATO, the EU, OSCE, and the Council of the Baltic Sea States are all harmed by these non-state players.
As a whole, the strategic environment is characterized by a number of unique factors. Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Russia, and Belarus are all enemies. Sweden, Finland, and the OSCE are on the side of neutrality, while the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) and Poland make up the friendly troops.
Strategic Direction
Following the lead of the NSS, NDS, and NMS plans, EUCOM has formed a single strategic direction. This coordinated strategy has three interrelated goals. The first is safeguarding US soil, people, way of life, and economic prosperity. The second is preserving peace on a global scale by military might. The third is maintaining US hegemony over the world’s democracies. Thus, EUCOM’s ultimate goal is to maintain an effective and lasting rivalry with Russia, sustain regional international order, and safeguard security and peace in Europe.
To this end, EUCOM lobbies Congress to support a strategy that makes use of the full range of US national authorities. The Department of Condition’s Enhanced Partnership in Northern Europe (E-PINE) and the Department of Defense’s European Deterrence Initiative are two concrete strategic ideas aimed at reaching the desired state (EDI). All of the DIME, as well as security partnerships with NATO, the EU, and the OSCE, as well as partnerships with Nordic, Baltic, and American collaboration and organizations like chambers of commerce, will be included in the available resources.
Strategic and Operational Challenges
The possibility of Russian military action against the Baltic States and NATO’s preparedness to counter it are major strategic and operational problems. Concerns have also been raised about Russian ethnic minority activism and cyberattacks in the Baltic republics. The presence of Russian air and naval assets in the Baltic Sea region also poses a threat. Moreover, the inefficiency of the existing infrastructures for US military operations in and around the Baltic area, coupled with the lack of openness on Russian military troops and the development of Russian A2/AD at Kaliningrad.
Potential Opportunities
As a result of Russian aggression, cooperation between the Baltic states has been re-energized. There has been a growth in both the funding and capability of these governments’ security forces. Similarly, there has been a shift in opinion away from calling for a further decrease of US forces in Europe and toward advocating for a more robust presence, such as with Operation Atlantic Resolve. It is possible that the United States may take advantage of this situation by expanding its shipment of LNG to the Baltics in response to Russia’s threat to shut off its natural gas supply in Europe. EUCOM has come up with three suggestions after considering all of these possibilities.
The first method is a diplomatic one, and it includes things like using security organizations like the OSCE to stop people trafficking and engaging in bilateral and international diplomacy based on shared interests. It combines this with monetary tools, including international investment, bilateral business mentoring with US business firms, and World Bank loans.
Intelligence collecting is used in conjunction with informational techniques, such as public displays of US support for democracy in the Baltic States. All of these may have an impact on enduring US strategic alliances like E- PINE and on efforts to resist transnational threats. The second is strictly military, such as maintaining a permanent US Militia heavy division in Poland. The emphasis here is on a larger military presence from the United States.
It lacks the resources to conduct diplomacy or spread information. It is more effective to position ready force to prevent Russian (military) aggression and likely enable the NATO alliance, despite the lack of particular economic means in this alternative. The third option would include expanding the employment of rotational forces to boost regional security with rising economic activity. It includes the full complement of national power tools that the DIME US may use to great effect when facing operational issues.
Assessment of Risk
There are three clear risks to weigh in relation to these choices. Russia’s aggressiveness and tendency toward rash behavior are the first risks. The second is NATO’s hesitation to react to minor Russian aggression. The third is Russian leverage on the Russian minority in the Baltic States via hybrid warfare. The first threat is crucial, high, and probable but may be reduced by diplomatic engagement and economic pressure aimed at negotiating risk reduction with Russia.
The second possibility is somewhat alarming but low in likelihood. The third threat, although serious and strong, has a rather low probability. The second and third dangers may be reduced by encouraging partners to remain aware of the full scope of Russia’s threats and by providing resources to help the Baltic States detect and respond swiftly to emerging threats.
Conclusion and Recommendations
Recommendation
The third of the three given alternatives is the most recommended course of action. It incorporates the whole of national power instruments outlined in the strategic orientation. Therefore, it is more conducive to the national interests and security of the United States.
Validity Assessment
The first strategy consists of extensive diplomatic, informational, and economic tools but very few military means. Although it is appropriate for countering transnational threats, it is impractical and hence inappropriate for deterring Russian aggression or positioning ready troops. The second alternative entails a considerably bigger force; it is too expensive to be an acceptable strategic choice.
It has no economic means, just a proclaimed economic punishment; it has no concrete enforcement resource. The third alternative, however, is a composite instrument of national powers with balanced DIME. It allows for the integration of diverse strategic tools and methods. The methods are comprehensive, relatively viable, acceptable, and appropriate.
Risks Mitigation
There are two recommended strategies to limit or lessen the likelihood and severity of Russian aggressiveness and risky behavior: Negotiating with Russia for risk reduction and armaments management and procedures and maintaining diplomatic and economic pressures. The first alternative is infeasible due to a lack of precise military means to bring to the bargaining table and for managing procedures with Russia.
Similarly, the second choice is inappropriate. It has neither diplomatic nor particular economic instruments to exert pressure on Russia. The expected enormous cost of military measures to accomplish outcomes is unacceptable. Comparatively complete with all aspects of national power, particularly the military means to negotiate risk reduction while simultaneously using diplomatic and economic pressure on Russia.
Justification
Option Three provides sufficient means within a viable strategic idea (method) to achieve each strategic objective of the theater. Within the strategic, operational concept of allies and partners paired with bilateral and multilateral exercises, activating Division HQ in Germany and increasing rotational ground troops in theater are acceptable military tools to prevent Russia’s aggression. The lack of efficient facilities to activate German troops and conduct maneuvers in and out of the Baltic area is a possible operational obstacle.
Economically, this difficulty may be mitigated by encouraging US financial institutions and EU multinationals to expand infrastructure development. ‘Preserved US Strategic Partnerships’ will result from the integration of the military operation described above with diplomatic ideas such as allowing for multilateral forums and wide interaction among Baltic States, as well as country cooperation plans and coordination. Similar integration under the third option will affect the other strategic objectives, such as deterring Russian aggression and enabling the NATO alliance, among others.
Conclusion
Russia is not a new foe for the United States, and it does not try to disguise what it wants. These threats are conveniently not limited to the United States alone. There can be no doubt that Russia’s military buildup in the Baltics and the strategic role played by the Kaliningrad enclave contribute to regional threats and tensions.
US national security is affected by changes in Europe’s strategic domain, necessitating a more serious commitment from the EUCOM’s area of responsibility. Congressional leaders should be aware of the dangers in the EUCOM region and maintain funding for ongoing operations there. In order to maintain US national interest and support for a free, healthy, and peaceful Europe, the armed forces are dedicated to selfless service in an effort to match national priorities.
References
Donald J. Trump, National Security Strategy (NSS) (Washington, DC: White House, 2017), Web.
General Curtis M. Scaparrotti “Statement” United States Army, Commander United States European Command, United States Senate, Committee On Armed Services, (2019)
Alexander C. Diener, et al., “Borderlines and Borderlands: Political Oddities at the Edge of the Nation-State.” Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, ProQuest Ebook Central, 2010. Web.
Department of the Army, CGSC, Blackboard, “C299 CBI,” Department of Defense and Theater Organization and Processes. Web.
Flanagan, S. J., Osburg, J., & Kepe, M, “Deterring Russian aggression in the Baltic states through resilience and resistance” RAND Corporation. (2019).
Omand, D, “The threats from modern digital subversion and sedition” Journal of Cyber Policy, 3(1), (2018): 5-23.