The Iranian nuclear aspirations have culminated in descent of relations between Iran and the Western superpowers. Particularly, the US has been critical of the nuclear aspirations of the nation. The nuclear aspirations of Iran began in the 1950s. The US, Germany and France availed apposite technical expertise for the realization of the above ambitions. The program began based on civilian objectives.
However, intelligence exposed that Iranian authorities had prolonged their ambition towards weaponry manufacture (Mustafa, 2006). However, the opposition by the US culminated from a sequence of chronological events.
Initially, the 1979 switch of regime resulted in a rule that had countless ideological disparity with the US. Secondly, the abduction of US citizens in that nation dented the relations between the two states irreparably. Consequently, the US petitioned the French and German entities contracted to build nuclear facilities to abandon the undertaking.
This culminated in temporal stalling of the nuclear program. Nonetheless, with the minimal expertise that Iran acquired, they revived their nuclear aspirations by building two facilities secretly. The disclosure of progress in the Iranian program raised concern amongst the superpowers. Subsequently, the United Nation (UN) instituted diverse resolutions.
The resolution aimed at containing Iranian nuclear aspirations. The US aspires to depress the Iranian nuclear ambitions of creating weaponry based on this expertise. Evidently, the US has some means of halting this program. This write-up will elaborate the tactics that the world superpower can institute (Inbar, 2006).
Iran is under countless sanctions, consequently; the American can appeal for the suspension of the sanctions. Appealing against the sanction will be a lengthy process that will facilitate the American administration to monitor the advancement, which the Iranians have accomplished in their nuclear endeavours. The lengthy duration will result from the prolonged process of passing such a resolution in the UN assembly.
Dropping of sanctions will allow Iran to enlarge its trade since the nation only trades in minimal merchandise due to the sanctions. This option is exceedingly viable as Iran is seeking to be the prevailing state in Middle East. However, accomplishment of such status requires economic empowerment of the state.
Ahmadinejad seeks to be the Middle East most prominent president, as such; it is vital for his nation to possess relevant political and financial persuasion. However, the above emanates predominantly from economic might. Wavering of sanctions will allow this nation with colossal natural recourses to amass wealth hence, altering the power balance in the region. Consequently, Iran will challenge Saudi Arabia’s supremacy.
This would result in fresh centre of power. Additionally, lifting of sanction would facilitate proper exploitation of the civilian nuclear potential that the nation possesses. Wavering of sanctions would have sizeable influence on Ahmadinejad since it would uplift the standards of the citizenry whom he wishes to capture.
Nonetheless, Iran has survived despite the sanctions. As such, the Iranian administration may overlook the incentives to lift restrictions. Evidently, Ahmadinejad’s fundamental objective is challenging the supremacy of western nations particularly America. In sum, lifting of restrictions presents a tactic that Americans can utilize to persuade Iran to ditch their nuclear program (Inbar, 2006).
Ahmadinejad is the prime stabling block to the realization of the American objective of halting uranium enrichment. This leader has solely shaped the ideology of the Iranian republic. The state has assumed a confrontational stance with most nations as it seeks to attain supremacy in Middle East.
Ahmadinejad is central to the enrichment of Uranium as he endeavours to challenge other elite nations. Visibly, Ahmadinejad is pursuing personal ambition in pretence of the national good. Attainment of nuclear armaments under this administration possesses an eminent risk to the planetary peace. As such, removal of Ahmadinejad would present the state with an opening for a fresh beginning.
Consequently, America can utilize this opportunity of transition in leadership to persuade the fresh leader who would be seeking international acceptance to halt nuclear enrichment. Nonetheless, such an undertaking would demand sizeable funding to champion an American friendly leader. Furthermore, such an undertaking would result in far-reaching criticism since American authorities would be overstepping their directives.
Conversely, this measure can also culminate in the disintegration of the nation. As such, the measure would have counterproductive results since this would enlarge the prospect of nuclear propagation owing to the absence of a stable authority. Conclusively, this presents a viable option that will fundamentally rely on success of replacing Ahmadinejad with friendly president willing to negotiate (Mustafa, 2006).
If non-military strategies fail, then America can adopt military action. However, adoption of this option would be in extreme circumstances. Additionally, institution of military action would generate vast criticism. Similarly, the American regime would be averse to adopting such a measure since it has undertaken several military invasions that have culminated poorly.
The utilization of this measure would depend on a consensus settled at the UN. The extreme circumstances that would necessitate such measure would entail endangering of the universal peace. Conclusively, lifting of sanctions presents the best tool to halt the progress of Iranian fortification of Uranium. This measure would cause minimal political volatility.
Moreover, it would require negligible financing and would represent a fair bargain to both parties involved. Unlike the military option or removal of Ahmadinejad, waiver of sanction will be peaceful. However, implementation of this tool would encounter enormous hurdles since Iran has coped brilliantly despite the sanctions (Pedatzur, 2008).
Inbar, E. (2006). The need to block a nuclear Iran. Meria, 10(1), 85-105.
Mustafa, K. (2006). Good for the Shah, banned for the Mullahs: The west and Iran’s quest for nuclear power. The Middle East Journal, 60(2), 207-232.
Pedatzur, R. (2008). The Iranian nuclear threat and the Israeli options. Taylor Francis Online, 28(2), 513-541.