The socio-political and economic development experience of Latin America has been remarkably unique and unforgivable. While many countries in the region painstakingly continue to democratize and reform their institutions, others like Venezuela – under the leadership of its charismatic leader, President Hugo Chavez– are heading in the opposite direction (Weyland, 2001). This essay will critically evaluate Venezuela in different aspects –in the following order–: democratic principles and the constitution, political systems, economic policies and institutions, the media, and civil societies to show how Chavez is weakening democracy in the country.
Hugo Chavez assumed power in 1998 through the ballot box, after an earlier attempt to topple the government failed to materialize –through a coup d’état in 1992– (Class notes). Prior to his ascension to the highest office, Venezuela enjoyed a relatively functional constitutional order and growing support for democratic principles (Corrales, 2006). Indeed, the democratically battered nation was once hailed as a perfect model of consensual democracy in the region (Weyland, 2001). But being a cunning and charismatic firebrand, Chavez heavily relied on the failures of his predecessors to ignite the masses, particularly the poor majority, to rally behind him on the ballot.
The major political parties –Acción Democrática or AD and COPEI– were increasingly being blamed for mismanagement –in the oil industry– and corruption. The masses, especially the impoverished, attributed the nation’s sudden economic downturn to incompetence and graft. According to Weyland (2001), around 80 percent of the country’s population lived below the recognized poverty level despite the government’s oil revenues. Chavez easily convinced the angry masses to elect him to power after he promised a purge on all political elites that had contributed to the economic downturn. Other figures within the region, namely Carlos Menem of Argentina and Alberto Fujimori of Peru, had previously won power using the same strategies (Skidmore & Smith, 2005).
Parallels can be drawn between Hugo Chavez and several other leaders that assumed the same role throughout history –namely Hitler, Castro, and Mussolini–; However, Chavez’ ability to hoodwink the masses into believing that his government is founded on democratically constituted pillars can only be termed as ‘magical’, if not ‘supernatural’ (Weyland, 2001). Although reviled by western nations for his unprompted criticism of their democratic values and capitalistic leanings, President Chavez has cultivated a way to make his own authoritarian rule stylish, if not with the general population, with at least the number of voters required to win in the ballots (Corrales, 2006). Against a backdrop of valid accusations from democratic nations that Chavez is running an autocratic establishment in Venezuela, the leader has been able to counteract such contradictions by winning consecutive elections.
Hugo Chavez’s charismatic abilities to rally the impoverished masses and refashion his authoritarian rule to pass as a democracy has found favor in many quarters. The recently deposed Honduras President, Mr. Manuel Zelaya, is one of his students. Some of his ardent supporters feel that a complete revolution to a socialist state will definitely assist the impoverished masses to access the resources needed for development (Boudin, 2006). The president’s antics have enabled him to earn a generous crown from the masses as the man who has worked overboard to assist the country’s long-abandoned poor majority (Noriega, 2006). Some regional leaders are more than willing to support Hugo Chavez due to his generosity in spreading the country’s oil resources to rally support for his anti-American revolution. Due to his oratory prowess, Chavez has also been able to entrench a philosophy among the impoverished population that he is the only one capable of housecleaning the socio-political and economic scene, in the process bring sustained economic growth, create job opportunities, and overcome increasing social challenges (Weyland, 2001). To date, this remains a pipedream.
The challenges bedeviling Venezuela’s democratic systems and institutions are well disguised by Chavez’s administration. During his tenure, Venezuela has not experienced mass murders, concentration camps, state-sponsored terror, the disappearance of civil society, and other golly experiences shared by its neighbors. Indeed, elections in Venezuela are held more than it is legally necessary, and the opposition and civil society have not been overly repressed like in other dictatorships (Corrales, 2006). However, democracy is slowly sliding back to oblivion due to the excessive lack of accountability exhibited by Chavez’s government. The president has taken over all democratic institutions, including electoral authorities, effectively relying on his unlimited control of the legislative assembly to derail all initiatives that have any iota of democracy (Noriega, 2006). No single state institution is mandated to check his actions. In this perspective, the president is answerable to no one other than to his own ego.
Democratic institutions in Venezuela started the long road of being transformed into autocratic institutions when Chavez masterminded the 1999 constitutional amendment. This amendment heralded a new era of participatory democracy –instead of liberal democracy– (Class notes). However, this devalued representative democracy across Venezuela weakened the reputation of political parties as articulators of the country’s political will and converted the military and other cronies into crucial players with the ability to introduce themselves and their negative manipulations into any sphere of public life (Kornblith, 2005; McCoy, 2005).
Upon his ascending to power, many of Chavez’s cronies and former coup plotters were honored with plum positions in many state-run institutions charged with the responsibility of nurturing democracy in the country. Indeed, Chavez’s ideology was to develop a new model of increased military participation in a government that was being led by his own proxies. Chavez must have had an intricate obsession with the military since he went ahead to delegate civilian duties to inexperienced military personnel. Crucial institutions that are supposed to remain autonomous and democratic such as the National Election Commission (CNE) and the judicially have been politicized under Chavez’s watch. This can only serve to weaken democratic structures in the country (McCoy, 2005).
The Constitution of Venezuela has been changed numerous times to strengthen the incumbent president’s grip on power, as it weakens opposing voices. According to Crisp and Levine (1999), a constitution is often used to define a country’s formal sources of authority, including the obligation to initiate legislation, the power to hire and fire cabinet ministers, the percentage required to overrule a presidential veto, and other matters geared toward the smooth running of institutional structures of a country. However, President Chavez has, on several occasions, disrespected the country’s supreme legal document to bring about constitutional changes geared towards entrenching his tyrannical rule at the expense of democracy. His use of historical figures and symbolism –namely Simon Bolivar and the cross– to justify some of his actions and promote his desired changes legitimizes, to a certain extent, his actions in the eyes of his supporters (Class notes).
During his first year in office, the President tampered with the constitution with the express aim of strengthening his presidential powers (Weyland, 2001). The tampering saw Chavez reclaim absolute authority to call for elections in 2000 that were aimed at hoodwinking the world that he was running a democracy. He won the elections by 59 percent of the votes cast. Such gesticulations only serve to constrain democracy. In February 2009, Chavez was at it again when he amended the constitution to eradicate presidential term limits. 54 percent of the voters voted in favor of the new constitutional amendment (Carroll, 2009). This was abuse of democracy as the president can now be re-elected indefinitely.
President Chavez also dampened Venezuela’s democratic structures by changing the Constitution in 1999 to effectively abolish the senate and create a unicameral legislative assembly with no real powers to check on his decision-making (Weyland, 2001). This way, Chavez has been able to command allegiance by promoting the military and old cronies for political expediency rather than for the benefit of his subjects. Through Chavez’s advice, the roles of Congress were revised to ensure that he was able to pass important congressional laws using a simple majority as opposed to a two-thirds majority (Corrales, 2006). Chavez also amended the Constitution to affect a congressional approval seeking to expand the Supreme Court from 20 judges to 32. As usual, the created posts were filled up by his loyalists, further weakening democracy.
Although the media enjoyed significant freedom of expression during the early days of Chavez’s rule, the situation deteriorated later on. Media laws that mandate the state to supervise and control media content came into effect (Corrales, 2006). Journalists and private media houses are increasingly being subjected to harassment and sanctions due to their unequivocal demands for sanity to return to the county’s leadership. Chavez’s government has successfully learned the art of using the public airwaves to entrench its agenda and instill socialist ideologies on the masses. This week alone, the government has already shut down over a dozen privately-owned radio stations as part of Chavez’s aggressive attempts to continue his socialist revolution and implement policy changes (Morrison, 2009). Government agencies claim that closures of the radio stations were aimed at democratizing the airwaves. In reality, the opposite is true.
President Hugo Chavez has actively pursued an agenda of weakening political institutions in the country to entrench his rule (Weyland, 2001). He derives his power from pursuing strategies that leave opposition political parties more divided and confused. The president is well known for concentrating political authority within the executive branch at the expense of the other branches. Due to weak political institutions, Chavez has invented a way of appealing to the masses by inciting hyper-nationalist outrage against countries seen as critical of Venezuela’s political institutions. Due to his insatiable appetite for power, Chavez dislikes any institutionalized party arrangement and instead opts for loose movements like the MVR-led ruling coalition. Again, this has served to weaken democracy in Venezuela (Millet, Holmes, & Perez, 2008).
Some of the President’s actions can be considered benevolent, but they are a double-edged sword because they superficially help the poor, but they really exist because of Chavez’s need to maintain electoral support from those who are benefited from the programs. For instance, in 2004 Chavez implemented a number of social programs that included: Bolivarian Missions –Mission Robinson– and the creation of Bolivarian Circles –to ‘distribute government information’–, health care services –accessible to the common citizen–, and Mercales or Mercados –discount supermarkets subsidized by the government–. It is also important to notice that the Bolivarian Circles significantly supported Chavez in the short-lived coup that took place in 2002. This illustration demonstrates that the purpose of these social programs is not to benefit the people but to maintain the government and the president’s electoral support (Class notes).
The political machinations of the autocratic president have also penetrated the economic front in Venezuela. Through the culture of cronyism, the government has continued to spend its resources irresponsibly by coming up with ill-hatched programs. Many of the economic development projects implemented by Chavez’s military friends and cronies have no real value to the long-term development of the country (Weyland, 2001). In the same vein, many investors are shunning the country due to poor policy decisions, inept fiscal policies, and Chavez’s populist demeanor. This is not good for a democracy worth it’s salt. The president is also firmly in control of PDVSA –the institution designated with the mandate of collecting oil revenues–. More often than not, an economic decline brings about a political crisis. As such, the democratic institutions in Venezuela have continued to be weakened by an impoverished population. Chavez knows too well how to influence and manipulate an impoverished population to gain political (Vanden, 2004).
Finally, the country’s civil society has been penetrated by populist politics to deny it its rightful duty of checking against the excesses of government. The president has actively debilitated, marginalized, and controlled major interest groups that could have given the president some sleepless nights (Corrales, 2006). Major trade unions, church organizations, non-governmental organizations, and business associations have been silenced. According to Vanden (2004), civil societies are important in any democratic process as they bring about more egalitarian values and principles. In addition, they act as vehicles through which individuals can be actively recruited into the political scene. Unfortunately, this is not the case in Venezuela due to government crackdowns on civil society (Millet, Holmes, & Perez, 2008). This is not healthy for democracy.
Through the analysis of the following factors: democratic principles and the constitution, political systems, economic policies and institutions, the media, and civil societies, it has been proved beyond any reasonable doubt, that the administration of Chavez has weakened democracy in Venezuela. Undemocratic leadership has occasioned great polarization and divisions among citizens. It is up to the opposition to come up with strategies and solutions that will enable the state to return to a democratic rule, for the sake of healing and reuniting the nation. This can only be achievable through the combination of understanding, compromise, and negotiation (McCoy, 2005).
Works Cited
- Boudin, C. “Letter from Venezuela: The Land of Chavismo.” The Nation 2006.
- Carroll, R. “Chavez Wins Venezuela Referendum.” The Guardian, 2009. Web.
- Corrales, J. “Hugo Boss” Foreign Policy. (2006): 32-40.
- Crisp, B.F., & Levine, D.H. Venezuela: The Character, Crisis, and Possible Future for Democracy. 1999.
- McCoy, J. “One Act in an Unjustified Drama.” Journal of Democracy Vol. 16 (2005): 109-123.
- Millet, R., Holmes, J.S., & Perez, O.J. Latin American Democracy; Emerging Reality or Endangered Species, Taylor and Francis. 2008. ISBN: 0415990483
- Morrison, V. “Venezuela shuts down Radio Stations.” Reuters, 2009.
- Noriega, R.F. Venezuela under Chavez. 2006.
- Skidmore, T.E., & Smith, P.H. Modern Latin America (6th ed). Oxford University Press. 2005. ISBN: 13-978-0195170139.
- Weyland, K. “With Chavez loose his Luster.” Council of Foreign Relations, Vol. 80 Issue 6 (2001): 73.
- Vanden, H.E. “New Political Movements and Governance in Latin America.” International Journal of Public Administration Vol. 2, Issue 13 (2004): 1129-1149