Weimar Democracy History Analysis: Why the Organization Failed Essay

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Updated: Feb 27th, 2024

Democracy failed because its organization proved unequal to the task of engaging in frequent elections. Beneath the three men who led the party from 1919 to 1933, a coterie of lesser party officials, who had remarkable staying power, were unable either to recruit new members or to energize the old ones. Above all, they failed to raise the necessary money to maintain the organization and its press.

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Thesis

The collapse of the Weimar Republic was caused by political crisis and economic instability in Germany affected the state and the society after the WWI.

The election of president von Hindenburg was the attempt to reconstruct power and strong political image of the Republic. Hindenburg represented virtues and sentimental associations for which most Democrats had profound respect. Only the tiny pacifist group and those who agreed with the values of the major newspapers supporting the Party not share these feelings (Bessel, 2002). Following the election, which Hindenburg won narrowly–if the voters had supported Marx rather than their own candidate, Marx would have won–there were bitter recriminations between the parties and within the Party Democratic over the outcome.

Stresemann came under attack because he had opposed Gessler; the choice of a Catholic as the Weimar Coalition candidate was seen as a horrible mistake; the Center party saw itself the victim of religious bigotry. Within the Party Democratic, placating Hellpach’s wounded ego proved impossible since he never forgot the Party Democratic’s inadequate work on his behalf. The basic mistake, however, was that the Weimar Coalition parties failed to agree on a candidate in the first election; that was what opened the door for Hindenburg (Berger, 2004). The election results seemed to prove to contemporaries how little Germany had changed and that it still longed for a kaiser. It seems apparent that Democrats voted for Hindenburg because he was a Protestant and a national hero, not because he was a monarchist. Within the Party Democratic, the drawn out campaign and the bickering and recriminations seemed to have widened the gap between the left and right wings of the party, separating the emotional anti-Catholics and strong nationalists from those who still believed in the Republic and the spirit of the Weimar Coalition (Bessel, 1990).

The most active business representatives other than Fischer were Dietrich, Dernburg, Wieland, August Weber, Hamm, and Carl Melchior. Dietrich had been a NLP member and, from the formation of the Party Democratic, he was on the extreme right of the Fraktion. Although Dietrich’s business card described him as a peasant from a small village in Baden, and he did own land and forests there, he was a rich businessman with varied interests who entertained in a palatial house in Berlin (Berger, 2004). Although he posed–not insincerely–as the spokesman for the small peasant and Mittelstand, his greatest concern was to create a favorable climate for business in Germany.

He became the party’s most important representative on the Reichstag budget committee from 1920 to 1930 when he became minister of agriculture in the Hermann Muller government (Bessel, 1990). As minister of economics, minister of finance, and vice-chancellor under Heinrich Bruning, he was partially responsible for the disastrous deflationary policies of the Bruning government and became tied in the public mind–and in that of the Party and the DStP–with unpopular taxes and the Osthilfe program to bail out Junker landlords at public expense. Dietrich had favored agricultural protection in 1925, unlike the Party, and after 1930, he abandoned other traditional left-liberal positions on taxes and tariffs. The most active Democrats in the Anschluss crusade included former Naumannites such as Heile, Bäumer, Heuss, and Jäckh. Stolper, who had been active in the Austrian Left-Liberal party, bridged the two parties and the two countries and forcefully advocated Anschluss. Heuss, a close friend of Stolper’s, was also a major figure in the pro-Anschluss agitation Bessel, 1990).

The war had produced fundamental economic and social changes which disrupted the economic and social relationships for the middle classes, altering the structure of the middle classes and their psychology. Possessing classes had been influenced by the inflation, which he viewed as an outcome of the war, and this had radicalized them and turned them toward narrow interest groups and political extremists (Carr, 2006). It had produced–along with technological changes–structural changes in the middle classes which had shrunk the size of the group the Party relied on for supporters. He emphasized, as well, the failure of the “bridge approach,” the party leaders attempt to unite the working class with the middle class in one political party (Berger, 2004). When the party lost the trust of the electorate, the leaders lost confidence in themselves. Many young people also found liberalism an irrelevant ideology in the postindustrial era and in the circumstances of the Republic. Women found that they were not treated as equals and often were dismissed in a condescending manner.

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Critics underline that the party was hurt by sharing in the burden of responsibility for the government and by its partnership with the Center party and Social Democratic party in the Weimar Coalition. In 1919, it was forced to participate in controversial decisions on taxes and social policy which many of its voters abominated. The continued enforced close association with the Social Democratic party of Germany at most levels of government offended most Democrats (Carr, 2006). Although the Democratic Party sometimes deserted the Weimar Coalition in order to remain close to the German Racist Freedom party, the partisan enemies of the Party successfully linked it with the socialists, and conservative Democrats repeatedly called on the leadership to put more distance between itself and the Social Democratic party of Germany.

Wiessner, for example, wrote to Koch-Weser in 1931, recalling that he had always felt that the Party Democratic should have more clearly separated itself from the Social Democratic party of Germany. What, however, was the alternative? The only options were a Great Coalition, which the Democratic Party preferred but differences generally prevented, or a Bürgerblock government, which the Party Democratic majority repeatedly rejected. The founders of the DStP were determined to show how little they had in common with the Social Democratic party of Germany, but their tactics only succeeded in driving many moderates from the party along with the offending left wing that was so difficult to distinguish from the Social Democratic party of Germany (Carr, 2006).

The Republic’s flag and its ceremonies, such as Constitution Day, received less and less support from Democrats themselves; by 1929, some Democrats began to look for alternatives to the Republic. At first they focused their hopes on the aged president and an increase in executive powers, but a few were looking for a strong man who might replace the Republic (Kolb 1988). Growing ambivalance toward the Republic may be seen in its changing attitude toward the Reichsbanner Schwarz-Rot-Gold. When the Reichsbanner was organized in 1924 as a paramilitary support for the Republic and republican parties, most leaders of the Party Democratic joined it. The election of 1924 showed the dangers on the right. By 1929, however, only a small number remained active in the Reichsbanner because most Democrats perceived it as a Social Democratic party organization. While this did not unduly disturb figures in the left wing, including Lemmer, Cohnstaedt, or Erkelenz, or moderates like Haas, Luppe, or Hauff, it alarmed the right wing and leaders such as Koch-Weser and Stephan, who wished to merge the Party Democratic with the German Racist Freedom party’s left wing (Peukert 1992).

Even such staunch republicans as Baumgarten refused to join it, ostensibly because of its paramilitary trappings, although he applauded its flaunting of the flag, which he saw as a symbol of class reconciliation. Others found other excuses to keep their distance from it, but the real reason was its connection to the Social Democratic party (Carr 2006). In March, 1928, the Vorstand contended that the Party Democratic ‘s ties to the Reichsbanner hurt the party and, in December 1929, the Organization Committee, attempting to explain the party’s setbacks in the communal elections in the autumn of 1929, blamed the Reichsbanner connection as well as a case of political corruption involving some Berlin Jews active in the Party Democratic. Although the ties to the Center party were never as controversial as those with the Social Democratic party, especially after the death of Erzberger and the rapid slide of the Center party to the right, they did not enhance the popularity, and in some places they probably hurt the Democrats (Mommsen 1998).

From its founding, the democracy and the Democratic Party had fatal flaws in its organization. Historically, as we have noted, the liberal parties had been weak, poorly funded, locally based organizations (Carr, 2006). The Naumannites attempted to build a mass organization modeled on the Social Democratic party, but the Democratic Party had only moderate success in establishing a large dues-paying membership and a strong Zentrale (Bessel, 1990). The effort soon collapsed because of inadequate financial support and the legacy of deep-rooted traditions of political organization: when the plan to build a broadly based organization failed, local notables simply regained their prewar role in the organization.

Increasingly, a few donors assumed much of the financial burden, and organizations such as the HB and the Kuratorium traded financial contributions to the party for political influence. In later years, candidates financed their own campaigns. As the money dried up and voluntary work diminished, the basis for the political organization disappeared. The young people and women who had done much of the voluntary work in the early years–the so-called “little tasks” of party work-apparently tired of being ignored or treated in a condescending manner, either turned to other parties or abandoned politics. The middle-aged male “establishment” of the Democratic Party generally was too busy or felt too selfimportant to perform the minor tasks. As a result, the Democratic Party’s organization virtually disappeared (Mommsen 1998).

In 1919, the state had well-known parliamentary leaders with major national reputations. It also included several beginners in national politics who seemed to have qualities which promised a supply of future leaders. In 1919, Naumann, Haussmann, and Fischbeck were the brightest lights among the parliamentary leaders, while Koch-Weser, Gerland, Schiffer, Luppe, Gessler, Heuss, Erkelenz, and Bäumer seemed promising newcomers. Unfortunately, several of the veteran leaders soon died or retired, while the new leaders never fulfilled their early promise, and by 1924 the party had no popular leader of great stature (Bessel, 1990). Schiffer proved too conservative and duplicitous, while Koch-Weser lacked the charisma needed to endear him to the membership. Petersen, who succeeded Naumann as the party leader, could deliver long and emotional speeches and evoke pathos for the Naumann ideals, but he lacked organizational talent and intellectual rigor.

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Moreover, he was never able to achieve much success outside of Hamburg. Erkelenz was too far to the left and possessed too brusque a personality, while Bäumer had neither a common touch nor common sense and became increasingly illiberal. Hellpach, the party’s choice as a presidential candidate in 1925, became an eccentric liability to the party, while Dietrich, who succeeded Koch-Weser as the party’s leader in 1930, had a limited appeal in the right wing of the party (Carr, 2006). The party failed to attract outsiders with leadership talent or to promote young people quickly enough to retain them (Bessel, 1990). In time, the younger leaders in the party such as Heuss, Landahl, Maier, Stolper, Lemmer, and Friedensburg might have developed as popular and effective leaders on the national scene, but there was too little time. While Haas had most of the qualities necessary to be a major concensus leader, he was a professed Jew and an emotional supporter of the Weimar Coalition and the Republic. As a result, he never received the leadership posts in the party he deserved, although he became the Fraktion leader in 1929-1930, shortly before he died (Bessel, 1990).

The failure of the democracy to produce a nationally recognized and respected leader undoubtedly hurt it, but the struggle for power among the leaders damaged it even more. The ambitions of party leaders and their bitter differences over principles and policies produced an unedifying exhibition of pettiness and jealousy which strengthened the impression that the Democratic Party was too divided to warrant public respect and popular support (Mommsen 1998). The relations between Erkelenz and Koch-Weser, to cite only the most glaring example of the struggle between leaders, to some extent was the consequence of personal differences more than contrasting political philosophies. Erkelenz’s hatred for Koch-Weser became paranoid and destroyed his health as well as his political career. Koch-Weser controlled his emotions better than Erkelenz, but he sometimes resorted to actions and used words against his left-wing opponents which cost him respect in the party. Hellpach, never a stable individual and always a lone wolf, became so embittered by the inadequacies of the party leadership that he resigned his mandate.

Tantzen, another irascible personality, followed him out of the ReichstagFraktion because of his opposition to the party’s policies. The leadership of the party became increasingly angry and divided in 19291930. Figures such as Heuss and Petersen, who were amiable and polite and had a sense of humor, as a result were often seen as weak and vacillating (Bessel, 2002). Other causes of the failure of the Party Democratic were the reluctance of the leadership to promote younger figures to leadership positions and its inability to attract able outsiders to the party. In general, the leaders of the party refused to give young members or women positions commensurate with their contributions to the organization (Berger, 2004). To some extent, of course, this resulted from the local control of the nominating procedure by notables, but the national organization did not improve on the record of local organizations. The leadership bemoaned its failure to bring new talent into the party while clinging to every position of power. No wonder that women, younger people, and newcomers gained the impression that the party was controlled by a small, ingrown group. Another factor that explains the failure of the party was its relationship to the Jewish community. The relationship affected the unity and spirit of the party in subtle ways and contributed to personal feuds and misunderstandings (Carr, 2006).

In sum, because of the continual struggle of personalities, the style and tone of the leadership were sufficiently offensive to drive many from the party. The German middle classes also began to see that they could only preserve a moderate voice in German politics by banding together in a Sammlung. Although the liberal parties made half-hearted efforts to cooperate with other moderate forces, the death of Stresemann ended whatever hope there had been for such an alliance. The middle-class parties proved unable to make the necessary concessions to pool their resources and members in a viable political organization. Political instability and economic problems raised by the state was unable to resist them and improve the satiation.

Bibliography

Bessel, R. 2002, Germany after the First World War. Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Berger, S. 2004, Inventing the Nation: Germany. Arnold, London.

Bessel, R. 1990, ‘Why did the Weimar republic collapse?’ in Ian Kershaw (ed.) Weimar: why did German democracy fail? St. Martin’s Press, New York.

Carr, W. 2006, History of Germany 1815-1990. Fourth edition, Arnold, London.

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Kolb, Eberhard, 1988, The Weimar Republic. Unwin Hyman, London.

Mommsen, Hans, The rise and fall of Weimar democracy (University of North Carolina.

Peukert, Detlev J.K. 1992, The Weimar Republic: the crisis of classical modernity (Hill and Wang, New York.

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