Supposing of USA
The Iraq war was supposed to show the power and skill of the United States of America not just in combat and war operations but in rebuilding a country and helping the country develop and run independently as well. The war was viewed as not just a show of force and as an occupation of a country for the benefit of Americans. The goal of the war was to liberate Iraq and return the power to whom it rightly belonged to, the Iraqi people.
Ending the Saddam Hussein regime was the primary objective of the US-led war in Iraq. At the same time, the war was a way by which a new democratic government could be established in Iraq. In a way, the victory in the Iraq war will not simply be a victory for America, it will be a victory for democracy as well.
Something get Wrong
However, as it turns out, the war was not smooth-sailing for the Americans. Many mistakes were made on various fronts. Criticisms abound with regards to the war itself and to the decisions made in the middle of the battles. In the article, “What Went Wrong,” Richard Lowry investigates the possible mistakes that were committed as the Iraq war progressed on.
The article is not the usual anti-war sentiments that many writers have written since the beginning of the war. In fact, the writer utilized sources that were not opponents of the war. They were supporters and active participants on various fronts of the war. As such, the use of such sources can somehow guarantee the lack of bias against the war effort and that the information provided is first hand and experienced by the sources themselves.
The primary contention of the writer was that the United States government, including the Pentagon and the State Department made mistakes on several occasions and on several vital issues pertaining to the plans for the war efforts.
Basically, Lowry contends that the American government did not have enough information with regards to what was going on in Iraq. It did not know how Iraq was. There was insufficient background study on the possible effects of the combat operations on the Iraqi society. Finally, there were little contingency plans just in case things did not go as planned or expected. Lowry expressed such sentiments by saying, “The Bush administration didn’t know what it was getting into in Iraq, and then found itself stumbling into exactly the sort of heavy-handed occupation many American officials wanted to avoid.” (Lowry, 2006).
In other words, there was insufficient intelligence on Iraq which then led to the change of plans in terms of how to handle the post-war situation. It was never intended that US-forces impose an occupation-like presence in Iraq. US forces were only supposed to liberate Iraq and assist it as it gets back on its feet. However, due to the numerous unforeseen circumstances, Lowry argues that US forces were left with no choice but to increase and impose a greater presence in Iraq.
Intelligence Mistake
There were various flaws in the intelligence with regards to Iraq. One major flaw that Lowry pointed out was that the intelligence services of the US government failed to identify the possibility that wide-spread looting will occur in the Iraqi towns and cities. Looting posed as a major problem for US soldiers since they were not prepared to handle policing work. US soldiers were not supposed to handle the police tasks in Iraq. This was supposed to be handled by Iraqi forces. However, with the unanticipated breakdown of all Iraqi forces, US soldiers were left with no choice but to take on the responsibility of policing the towns and cities. To support his argument, Lowry quoted one senior administration official as saying:
“The intelligence community got a lot of things wrong, not simply the WMD. They did not understand the role of Iraqi police. They thought the police would be usable. We had no other basis for knowing that, to the contrary, police were viewed as political and an instrument of oppression.” (Lowry, 2006).
The effect of such intelligence mistake was that US forces relied on Iraqi police when they should not have relied on them. Lowry (2006) quotes another official who stated, “We based the plan on standing up the Iraqi police. It turned out that the corruption went so deep into the ranks that the police were useless. It meant a major recalibration of our plan that is going on to this day. It was an intelligence failure of the first magnitude.”
Intelligence mistakes were likewise committed with regards to the state of infrastructure in Iraq. The intelligence community was not able to assess the state of the infrastructure facilities in the country. They made the mistake in considering the Iraq infrastructure as vital. Based on intelligence reports bombing activities were planned in such a way that all infrastructure facilities would be spared as such facilities were deemed vital to the post-war operations in Iraq. However, as it turns out, Iraqi infrastructure was outdated and deemed useless. Lowry (2006) quoted one official as saying,
“We were shocked. Saddam skimmed the money off the Oil for Food Program and spent it on his palaces and basically nothing else. That was never picked up on. The infrastructure was so dilapidated. It added billions and billions to the reconstruction job.”
Based on the sources used by Lowry, I would have to agree that the mistakes in the intelligence efforts had much to do with the errors in judgment made with regards to the war efforts in Iraq. I agree with the author that intelligence flaws are one of the primary reasons why US forces have not accomplished its goals in Iraq and are still in the middle of the war.
My agreement with the author’s argument stems from the logical reasoning that in planning any task or operation, background information is vital to mapping out the appropriate plans of action. The accuracy of the information can spell the success or failure of the operation. With inaccurate or flawed information, the plans that may be drafted and the courses of action that may be taken may not be in agreement with the situation.
For instance, in planning a trip, the clothes that are brought along must coincide with the weather forecasts and the activities that are planned for the trip. However, if the weather forecasts are inaccurate, the trip may turn out to be a failure.
In the case of the Iraq war, planning the operations rely primarily on the intelligence information that the officials are provided with. Such information becomes the basis of all planning from the number of troops to be sent, to the activities to be undertaken once the war is over. However, with flawed information, as what Lowry pointed out, mistakes are committed which are detrimental to the war effort.
In fact, it is pointed out in Lowry’s article that mistakes in the intelligence services gravely affected the post-war planning and efforts of the United States in Iraq. As Lowry (2006) describes, “Combine the rottenness of the infrastructure with the looting, and we were left to start almost from scratch…The food-distribution network was so backward and irrational, it was almost incomprehensible. As one official puts it, ‘It was a process which a First World person from, say, USAID, would look at and say, I don’t even know how a person would work through these problems.”
The Iraq war was not totally unsuccessful. Indeed it was able to topple and bring down Saddam Hussein. However, many of its miscalculations are seen in the post-war efforts. Flawed intelligence had dire effects on the post-war operations in Iraq. If only intelligence information was more accurate, the errors could have been avoided and a more suitable post-war plan could have been developed.
Reference
Lowry, R. (2006). What went wrong: The miscalculations and missteps that led to the current situation in Iraq. In D. T. Canon, J. J. Coleman, K. R. Mayer (Eds), The ensuring debate: classic and contemporary readings in American politics. 4th ed. (pp 614-628). New York: W.W. Norton & Company.