Introduction
Insurgence is the most diffused form of war today. Certainly, despite the fact that the military persists in viewing it as “irregular” or “eccentric,” insurgence has been the commonest of war throughout history, happening in one variety or another in almost all known societies (Kilcullen, 2010). However, since insurgence creates particular intelligence challenges, so intelligence must be all-source, focused, and distributed to various political powers involved in the counterinsurgency effort, due to these facts, as noted by Galula (2006) “Politics is an instrument of war which tends to take a back seat and emerges again as an instrument, when the fighting ends (p.4).
Though, the seamless incorporation of military action is also important, since their capability has always been essential in destroying insurgent political undergrounds. This paper will discuss why political power should have primacy over military power when organizing a counterinsurgency.
Main Body
In solving the issue of primacy between political power and military power over organizing counterinsurgency, the military’s connection and the supported political power is always a concern. This is because the insurgency is an “armed theater” where the opponents are playing to listeners and simultaneously interacting with one another, it is occasionally proposed that military power is considered necessary to run information activities (Cassidy, 2008).
This may not be the most effective way out. A better plan is to create a political power where every part of the government is aware of the spatial relation of information, the need to adapt messages, and the consequence of developing strategies, actions, and tactical plans derived from desired psychological and political effects (Galula, 2006).
In line with this, the full integration of political power is the only way to control the elements of national power successfully on the issue of counterinsurgency. To the possible extent, political power must have primacy over military power when organizing a counterinsurgency. As Galula (2006) stated, “this is because most of the controlling influence that must be employed is political and not military (p.3). Furthermore, giving primacy to the military when organizing a counterinsurgency runs the risk that the problem will request special military solutions.
Another reason why political power must have primacy over military power when organizing a counterinsurgency is that maintaining commitment is a significant part of political power packaging. Successful counterinsurgency is long-term, so, deliberation must therefore be given to ration procedures. This strikes directly against one of the primary challenges in counterinsurgency.
History has repeatedly informed that temporary deployment of the military is futile in counterinsurgency since units and individuals are unable to develop satisfactory situational responsiveness and local knowledge, however in the current military power, it is difficult to sustain long-term deployments in hardship locations. Somewhat, in particular, anxiety can be reduced by political powers since many of the educational programs, counsel, and preventive programs to put an end to counterinsurgency must not necessarily be organized by the military.
Conclusion
In conclusion, despite the fact that military power is compulsory in organizing and making a decision at the beginning of counterinsurgency debate, however, the military power of little primacy, behind a larger political power is the most successful approach that subjugates insurgency. In most cases, the military power of little primacy is more acceptable. The illustrated points prove why political power should have primacy over military power when organizing a counterinsurgency.
Reference List
Cassidy, R. M. (2008). Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular War. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Galula, D. (2006). Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Publishing Group.
Kilcullen, D. (2010). Counterinsurgency. London: Hurst.