Introduction
The central precept behind propagation optimisms is that, the main impact of the use of atomic bombs by the U.S. was to dissuade war between their possessors. Atomic bombs are assumed to have a stabilizing effect because even a small atomic arsenal can deter potential enemies from attacking the proliferators. Deterrence is essential because the risk of vengeance by even a small number of atomic weapons overshadows any probable gain of a military attack.
Optimists also argue that new proliferators were least expected to suffer the same domination and to have power over problems as the powers used during the cold war. Atomic bombs have at all times been seen as an immense equalizer in intercontinental relations. One may dispute that Japan would not be dissuaded from using unadventurous weapons to meet a predictable American assault. This paper gives the reasons that forced President Trauma to order the use of atomic bombs on Japan during the Second World War.
Desire to Put an End to the War
The U.S. dropped atomic bombs on Japan in order to end the war that had become aggressive. It invaded Japan because of the desire to subdue it and put an end to the war. Japan was determined to turn its island into a fortress and it was not even concerned that its own citizen’s lives were at risk. The U.S. had to put to an end what Japan was planning because if it went ahead with its plans, more than one million American and British would have lost their lives. It is believed that the bomb saved the lives of allies and some Japanese.
Much discussion has taken place over the American decision to drop the atomic bomb on Japanese cities. For Harry Truman, this was not a hard decision. Losses in an attack of Japan would have been great. Following the dropping of the atomic bombs, American public opinion was extremely supportive of Truman’s decision. The Japanese were referred to as “japs”, and were depicted with unsophisticated racial stereotypes, and were seen as devious and definitely not to be trusted.
Force Japan to Surrender
Another reason why the U.S. used the atomic bombs was to force Japan to surrender the war. Japan responded to this as it surrendered immediately thereby saving the lives of over one million Japanese and more than one hundred American soldiers who would have lost their lives if America invaded Japan.
Earlier attempts to put to an end the war by use of nuclear weapons had failed to bear fruits as Japanese military were not willing to back off the fight. This forced the U.S. to use atomic bombs since it perceived that many lives would be lost if Japan if the war continued. It is believed that, President Harry Truman used atomic bombs on Japan as a way of intimidating Stalin, and to keep him out of the war. However, the general officers did not approve this move and they denounced their commander-in-chief.
Takaki, Ronald, in his book “Hurishima: Why American Dropped the Atomic Bomb” noted that by 1944, the war had noticeably turned against the Japanese. In late October, General MacArthur went back to the Philippine island of Layette. The Japanese started to use kamikaze pilots in an anxious attempt to obliterate Allied ships.
Quite a few more bloody battles waited ahead for American forces. America suffered twenty five thousand casualties at the battle of Iwo Jima and another fifty thousand at the battle of Okinawa. After these battles, though, nothing was left to stop an Allied invasion of Japan[1].
These extremely bloody battles deeply disturbed military officials who were planning for an attack of Japan. Japanese resistance to such an attack would have been fervent. Franklin Roosevelt had unexpectedly died in late 1945; the new president, Harry Truman, was updated in July 1944 about the atomic bomb.
The actual planning for this bomb was the reason of the Manhattan project, started on August 1942. Production of this bomb took place in Los Alamos, New Mexico under the direction of J. Robert Oppenheimer. The bomb was effectively tested in the New Mexico desert on July 16, 1945.
By dropping the atomic bombs, the United States only accelerated the surrender of an already conquered enemy. Long before the dropping of the bombs, Japan’s leaders were determined to surrender and were taking beginning steps to that end, the U.S. leaders knew from marine aptitude interception of Japan’s to-secret codes. As secretary of war, Henry Stimson had been intimately concerned with the discussions on the use of the bomb.
In 1947, at the urging of government officials worried about the growing number of people puzzled by the use of the bomb, Stimson wrote an article titled “The decision to use the atomic bomb” [2]. He argued that the decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima was made only after vigilant deliberation by Truman and his advisers of all the courses of action open to them to end the war at the lowest possible cost
Economic Reasons
However, the question arose as to whether there was anything like a decision to use the bombs, or whether Truman and his advisers were carried along by events. According Gaddis, Lewis, in his book “The United States and the origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947”, Truman prearranged the dropping of the atomic bombs to give good reason for the cost resources used to build them.
The bombs cost more that two billion dollars, and required the work of scores of top scientists, thousands of workers and several industrial firms. After all this time and spending, Truman had to use the atomic bombs at one time and the war proved to be the best time to use them. Upon hearing of the victorious explosion over Hiroshima, Truman appeared relived and noted that, “We have spent two billion dollars on the greatest scientific gamble in history and won”[3].
The dropping of the second bomb gave the impression of having its own momentum. Truman’s July 24 strike order authorized the use of the bomb as they were all set, and the technicians on Tinian Island worked agitatedly to drop the second bomb in response to the order. Prevalent detestation of and vengeance against the Japanese for the bombing of Pearl Harbor may have produced the impetus for dropping the atomic bombs.
To many Americans, including Truman, it warranted almost any act against it in vengeance. Expressing his feeling of revenge, Truman said in a private letter written soon after the bombing of Nagasaki, that nobody was more bothered by the use of the atomic bombs than him, but he was deeply troubled over the uncalled-for attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor.
Protect U.S. Dominance
Alperrovitz, Gar, in his book “Atomic Diplomacy: Hurishima and Potsdam: The use of the Atomic Bomb and the American confrontation with Soviet Power” argued that the United States dropped the atomic bombs not to overcome Japan but vigorously to protect U.S. dominance in the already brewing Soviet-American disagreement, which has, of course, prearranged the postwar worldwide order.
Their analyses of planning for the postwar world, from 1942 forward, underline official description of the Soviet Union as the primary menace to U.S. primacy in world affairs. Nonetheless, while the U.S. military had shattered Japan’s capacity to fight violent war beyond her borders, distressed major cities, and blocked access to critical materials; it had neither secured Japan’s give up nor broken the will to battle of the Japanese military[4].
There seems no motive to choose between analyses that view the bomb as a weapon to force Japan’s surrender and those that emphasize its value as a weapon to threaten the Soviet Union and establish U.S. hegemony, and both were sufficiently served by dropping the atomic bomb.
Conclusion
As discussed above, many optimists believe that, the use of atomic bombs by the U.S. was to deter or escalate the chances of nuclear war between the United States and Japan. However, pessimists hold that deterrence balances are not intrinsically constant.
The sagacity dilemmas shaped by atomic deterrence circumstances are aggravated at the local level because local powers are short of the refined technology that kept the tranquility throughout the World War II. The skepticism raised by top military commanders encouraged historians to argue that the United States dropped the atomic bombs on Japan in order to loosen the muscle at the Soviet Union, which it known as a prospective postwar rival.
According to this view, the bombing of Nagasaki, in particular, had little tactical value and was anticipated to threaten Soviet leaders. Most Americans, however, accepted Truman’s explanation that atomic bombs were used to end the war as speedily as possible and to save lives by avoiding an invasion of the Japanese homeland.
Bibliography
Alperrovitz, Gar. Atomic Diplomacy: Hurishima and Potsdam: The use of the Atomic Bomb and the American confrontation with Soviet Power. New York: Penguin, 1985.
Gaddis, John Lewis. The United States and the origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947. New York: Columbia University Press, 1972
Stimson, Henry. “The decision to use the Atomic Bomb”. Harper’, February 1947.
Takaki. Ronald. Hurishima: Why American Dropped the Atomic Bomb. Boston: Little, Brown, 1995
Footnotes
- Ronald Takaki. Hurishima: Why American Dropped the Atomic Bomb. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1995), 10
- Henry Stimson. “The decision to use the Atomic Bomb”. Harper’, February 1947, 2.
- John Lewis Gaddis. The United States and the origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 40
- Gar Alperrovitz. Atomic Diplomacy: Hurishima and Potsdam: The use of the Atomic Bomb and the American confrontation with Soviet Power. (New York: Penguin, 1985), 395.