Introduction
Over the past few decades, the Middle East has witnessed an unprecedented shift in power dynamics. For thousands of years, cities such as Baghdad, Cairo, and Damascus remained prominent and influential Arab civilizations (Lacher, 2020). They have now been surpassed by the previously insignificant nations like Qatar and The United Arab Emirates (the UAE). The developments have bothered the leaders of Turkey, who envisage the reemergence of their country into religious and political dominance (Ramani, 2020). In order to realize this goal, they have adopted a foreign policy geared towards reasserting the country in regional affairs. Wealthy monarchies in the Arabian Peninsula, and especially the UAE, have been taking proactive measures meant to deter Turkey from further encroachment into what they see as their new areas of control (Kardaş, 2020). Nevertheless, they have failed, as evidenced by the fact that Turkey has intervened in Libya in support of parties aided by the UAE.
Turkey has intervened in Libya in support of the Government of National Accord (GNA). It is the UN-recognized administration in the fragmented country where no party seems to be the de facto authority. The First Libyan Civil War was relatively short as it lasted between 15 February 2011 and 23 October 2011 (Kurban, 2020). Indeed, it was brought to an end by the death of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi on 20 October 2011 (Cagaptay, 2021). Since then, however, various belligerents have fought over the control of the country. At the moment, the most prominent ones are the GNA and the House of Representatives. Turkey is supporting the former, while the UAE, alongside Russia, Saudi Arabia, Greece, France, and Egypt, aid the latter (Lacher, 2020). In spite of the international condemnation of the Turkish meddling in the affairs of Libya, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan persisted, arguing that it is in his country’s interest.
President Erdoğan’s government wishes to increase its leverage over Mediterranean Basin. Turkey is in a major dispute with Cyprus over which country has the right to drill for oil and gas in the waters close to the latter’s shores. Her leaders hope that if the GNA takes control of Libya, their maritime agreement with the authorities in Tripoli will be honored (Ramani, 2020). In addition to the search for economic opportunities, Ankara is also aiming at countering the Emirati and Egyptian influence over the Middle East and North Africa (Kurban, 2020). The UAE leaders are disturbed by the possibility of being dislodged from Libya by Turkey, yet they have been on the ground since the beginning of the crisis in 2011. Ankara’s engagement commenced in late 2019 but was officially recognized and approved by the GNA on 2 January 2020 (Cagaptay, 2021). Turkey is unlikely to withdraw from Libya until her aspirations are realized.
Crucial Event and Aspect of the Bilateral Relationship Between Turkey and the UAE
The UAE has been keen on stopping Turkish involvement in regional political squabbles. Deterrence is the process of discouraging an event by instilling fear of repercussions or doubt about any potential gains (Huth & Russett, 1984). It may also involve the deliberate escalation of costs in order to dissuade a competing party from proceeding with its aspirations (Levy, 1988). The demoralization of an adversary can only succeed if they can perceive real threats. At the moment, though, significant reprisal attacks by the UAE on Turkey seem to be improbable.
The disagreements between Turkey and the UAE are often de-escalated by the fact that the two countries are economically intertwined. Their bilateral economic activities amount to at least US$9 billion, and this is an increase of above 800% over the past 10 years (Cagaptay, 2021). There are over 400 Turkish companies operating in the UAE, with most of them being involved in construction. Turkey also sources aluminum, gold, jewelry, chemicals, iron, and petroleum oil from the UAE while exporting electrical devices and machinery, motor vehicle components, and petroleum products to the monarchy (Kurban, 2020). Therefore, there is a lot at stake, and this is why the political squabbles between the two nations are sometimes addressed with due precaution.
Turkey and the UAE have always had strained diplomatic relations. Tensions have escalated over the past 4 years with senior Emirati officials regarding the former’s foreign policy as a threat to both the West and the Arab world (Kurban, 2020). Ankara has been accused of historical injustices against the societies of the Middle East, and some senior government officials of the UAE consider Turkey as a foe as dangerous as Iran (Lacher, 2020). They argue that the two countries have been exerting undue pressure on Arabs, and they have hence caused partisan and sectarian tensions (Kardaş, 2020). Such assertions are inflammatory, and they undermine any chance of sensible political dialogue between the Turks and the Emiratis. Turkey disregards the concerns of the UAE and perceives them as imprudent.
The relations between Turkey and the UAE further worsened when the latter supported the successful ouster of Egypt’s democratically elected President Mohamed Morsi. The deposed leader was an Islamist, just like Erdoğan, who actually perceived this move as an attempt to undermine the success of religiously affiliated parties in the region (Lacher, 2020). The Emiratis have supported Abdel Fattah el-Sisi ever since he became President in 2014 (Cagaptay, 2021). The UAE had funded the anti-Morsi protestors as well as the military factions opposed to their leader. While still a significant regional power, Turkey’s budget is constrained and hence cannot afford to fund every ally in the region as their foe does (Kardaş, 2020). This could be the reason why she has often preferred to exert military influence.
In addition to undermining Turkey’s regional allies, the UAE voiced support for the attempted coup against President Erdoğan. The 2016 revolt by some members of the armed forces ended up compelling Ankara to assume a more aggressive approach to foreign relations (Kurban, 2020). Turkey’s leaders felt the need to avoid appearing to have been intimidated by the mutineers and their backers (Ramani, 2020). It is challenging, though, to prove that the UAE was involved or what role the Arabian Peninsula’s monarchy actually played. Operations of this nature are usually covert due to the risk of triggering serious hostilities between the nations involved (Sönmez & Üstün, 2021). Nevertheless, the fact that they are on a mission to prove that their country cannot be subdued by the small neighboring states makes the Emiratis’ deterrence endeavors ineffective.
The Contribution of the Empirical Case to the Debate About Deterrence
The UAE sees Turkey’s military deployment into Libya as a violation of international law. The latter perceives this argument as ill-informed and has actually accused the former of routinely meddling in the internal affairs of countries across the Middle East and North Africa (Sönmez & Üstün, 2021). In essence, the charge is enfeebled by the fact that the UAE has not only intervened in Libya but also in Iraq, Yemen, Egypt, Tunisia, and Syria as well (Kardaş, 2020). The primary reason why the UAE has been among the main opponents of the activities of the Erdoğan administration is that they are competing to dominate the same nations.
The UAE Foreign Ministry has indicated the involvement of Turkey will undermine efforts to stabilize Syria. President Erdoğan argues that his country never caused the crisis he is seeking to resolve (Sönmez & Üstün, 2021). Indeed, Turkey remained largely neutral until late 2019, while the UAE has been actively engaged in the North African country since 2011 (Ramani, 2020). The latter is, therefore, more blameworthy than the former. The leaders of the UAE seem to be projecting their own culpability onto Turkey, and Ankara recognizes this possibility.
The UAE has also argued that Turkey is aiming at undermining Arab unity and security. Moreover, Ankara’s foreign policy threatens the stability of the Mediterranean Basin (Cagaptay, 2021). Turkey has disputed these assertions and insists that they have the same rights as every other country to pursue its own interests (Sönmez & Üstün, 2021). President Erdoğan opines that foreign relations cannot be defined along the narrow racial lines as the UAE implies.
The leaders of Turkey are now confident that their country has the power to exert its influence throughout the Middle East and North Africa. The UAE, as well as its allies like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, are opposed to Ankara’s aggressive foreign policy (Kardaş, 2020). Nonetheless, Turkey’s military strength is unmatched by regional countries and is certainly far superior to that of the UAE (Cagaptay, 2021). While the Emiratis have the financial resources to fund their preferred agitators, these parties may never do much without advanced weaponry.
The UAE is mistaken in its belief that it can instill guilt in the Turks by citing violations of international law. They are also frequent violators of the same rules and regulations. Had they been as restrained as the Omanis, Turkey could have been prompted to consider their opinions (Sönmez & Üstün, 2021). At the moment, though, these suggestions do not seem to be made out of goodwill, and hence the reason Turkey has remained undeterred.
Turkey considers the UAE as a threat to its internal stability, particularly because the latter is believed to have supported the mutineers against the government of President Erdoğan. Indeed, Ankara has invested heavily in surveillance, and the most prominent targets include the UAE and any party believed to be affiliated with her government (Kurban, 2020). While the two countries have strong and mutually beneficial economic ties, Turkey is unlikely to appease the Emiratis by withdrawing from the regional countries.
The fact that Turkey intervened in Libya in spite of all the efforts by the UAE to stop such development is indicative of how ineffective the latter’s deterrence endeavors have failed. Ankara is bound to continue its aggressive policy in the Middle East and North Africa. It is a dominant military power, while the UAE is ranked a distant 6th. Turkey has interests her leaders consider to be legitimate and will be undeterred in seeking them. The only way the UAE may succeed in stopping Turkey’s hostilities is by observing international law and seeking broad-based and worldwide support.
The episode supports the theory that when an adversary is powerful, deterrence does not work. Turkey knows that the UAE cannot inflict significant repercussions unless it is aided by countries such as the US. Literature also shows that the tactic of projecting one’s own weaknesses onto others is ineffective. This is what Dubai is doing to Ankara, and hence the latter’s behavior is consistent with what the theory implies.
References
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