The federal government of the United States has been grappling with the problem of nuclear waste disposal for some time now. In February 2002, the Department of Energy (DOE) made recommendations to President George W. Bush to set up a nuclear waste repository in Nevada. The former president assented to the construction of the nuclear handling facility on the proposed Yucca Mountain; a windy, deserted mountain ridge located about 160 KM Northwest of Nevada. The mountain was to become home to thousands of tons of highly radioactive nuclear waste produced by more than 100 commercial nuclear reactors and other military installations in the US (Macfarlane, 2003). The nuclear waste was to be stored in hardened containers, buried deep in the ground, and surrounded by an impervious stratum of volcanic rock.
However, work on the proposed site has been continually delayed due to various policy issues and environmental concerns. The situation is threatening to spiral out of control as nuclear power plants struggle with the problem of handling around 58,000 metric tons of potentially lethal nuclear waste that has been pilling up in the industries. In February 2009, most of these companies made a passionate appeal to President Obama to commission a blue-ribbon panel aimed at coming up with new ways of handling nuclear waste. But by cutting federal funding for the Yucca Mountain project, the president seems to have abandoned the idea altogether (Scott, 2009). Many proposals have been forwarded for consideration on the best way to deal with the menace of nuclear waste in the US. This essay purposes to inform policy by looking at the pros and cons of using Yucca Mountain as a repository for commercial nuclear waste and evaluating some of the existing alternatives.
Two opposing sides – science and politics – seem to be at play in the Yucca nuclear waste repository debacle (Macfarlane, 2003). As such, a broad range of issues needs to be evaluated to ensure the interests of all stakeholders are sufficiently taken care of. According to DOE, the Yucca site topped other alternative sites that were being considered for a long-term repository of nuclear waste when geological and environmental dynamics were considered. Factors that included seismic constancy, hydrology, volcanic eruptions, and radioisotope transport were all considered when the sites were vetted (Potter et al, 2004). Viability studies conducted by the DOE over the last 15 years revealed that the proposed Yucca site was best placed to isolate the nuclear waste from human habitations than any other site under study (Katz, 2001).
The underlying premise that informed the decision to find a final resting place for nuclear waste was that nuclear materials would continue to be used in the US to produce electricity and nuclear weapons. It was therefore imperative to provide a permanent dumping site for the high-level nuclear waste churned out from the industries (Macfarlane, 2003). As such, geologic and scientific evidence put Yucca Mountain above other proposed alternative sites. The benefits of Yucca Mountain arose from the virtue of its location, semi-arid climate with sparse vegetation, limited population, and a deep groundwater table. The site is conveniently located in a region that does not have any surface drainage outside the Great Basin. This is important for any site selection procedure since rain and grain water can cause great ramifications to the human population in the event of a nuclear leak. Water is considered the principal means by which nuclear components can be transported from a repository (Macfarlane). At Yucca Mountain, the water table is nearly 1000 feet below the proposed repository and sips into a closed basin rather than going into any streams that would eventually reach the ocean.
However, the risks associated with constructing the dumping facility at the site far outweigh the stated benefits. First, it is imperative to note that risk estimation in any technical or scientific project such as the Yucca Mountain project presents one of the biggest challenges for policymakers. It becomes more challenging to make a correlation between science and societal choices since safety and environmental issues are often based on social judgment rather than technical orientation (Macfarlane, 2003). It is a well-known fact that nuclear materials can remain active for millions of years regardless of their concealment hundreds of feet below the ground. Such a project would therefore bring disastrous results in the event of a strong earthquake or volcanic eruption as the ripples may end up spilling the dangerous radioactive elements to unsuspecting Nevadans. The scientific guarantee that the region is free from any seismic activity may not hold much water a million years from now (potter et al, 2004).
Another risk factor in the Yucca Mountain project originates from the fact that the water table could rise beyond its current levels, effectively flooding the repositories underneath. Such a scenario is capable of igniting a major disaster – worse than what was witnessed in Hiroshima and Nagasaki during the Second World War. Also, transportation of the hazardous nuclear waste poses high health and environmental risks (Riddel, Dwyer, & Shaw, 2003). Ethical issues arise too as Nevadans will feel shortchanged in the whole process. The leaders and constituents within the region have made it clear that they are not interested in earning the dubious distinction of being the country’s nuclear wastebasket. Further afield, no one will ever know if the nuclear waste has indeed decomposed to a latent level since it takes millions of years to do so. Burying it in the ground will therefore be synonymous with setting up a potentially lethal snare for future generations.
The potential risks posed by the Yucca mountain project are not acceptable at all. Many other alternatives that have been fronted by scientists and politicians to deal with nuclear waste have also failed to pass the test of viability. Such alternatives include sub-seabed disposal, space disposal, and ice-sheet disposal of nuclear waste (McCermick & Bulletin, 1998). It seems that the only most effective means of addressing this menace is by reprocessing nuclear waste using advanced technologies to make it safer and reusable (Scott, 2009). At present, this is the only alternative that offers maximum benefits while ensuring risks are kept at a minimum. Although the techniques for reprocessing are extremely expensive and complicated to develop, policymakers must start thinking along that line if the problem is to be successfully dealt with.
Those against the reprocessing alternative will argue that such a project will take years, and perhaps decades to develop, test, and commission. This is indeed true as reprocessing nuclear waste requires an intricate set of mechanical and chemical preparations and treatments to separate the hazardous elements (Tanaka, 2001). But this does not mean that the process is unachievable. Also, the alternative will be criticized for sending the wrong signals to troublesome countries such as Iran and North Korea to start reprocessing their own spent nuclear fuel. But against all odds, reprocessing still offers the best alternative for disposing of the over 60,000 metrics tons of nuclear waste lying at our facilities. It should be made useful. Research on green sources of energy such as solar and wind should also be stressed to ensure the country is not overly reliant on fossil fuels to cater to its energy needs (McCermick & Bulletin, 1998).
How fast the problem of nuclear waste is solved in the US will ultimately depend on how all the stakeholders are willing to give and take in the process of finding a consensus that will be all-binding. No policy can be ideal enough to lack some loopholes in its composition. The government must move with speed and implement the policy that has the least level of shortcomings and risk. The only alternative that is presently viable is reprocessing nuclear waste into useful sources of energy. Science has shown that it is possible to reconstitute nuclear waste into fresh fuel pellets that can be used to generate electricity (Tanaka, 2001). This way, the federal government can be a major importer of spent nuclear fuel from other nations to extract plutonium and other useful elements for its military and energy uses. Talk about turning potential threats into opportunities!
Works Cited
- Katz, J.L. “A Web of Interests: Stalemate on the Disposal of Spent Nuclear.” Policy Studies Journal 29.3 (2001): 77-89
- Macfarlane, A. “Underlying Yucca Mountain: The Interplay of Geology and Policy in Nuclear Waste Disposal.” Social Studies of Science 33.5 (2003): 783-807. Web.
- McCermick, J.M., & Bulletin, D.B. “Disposing of World’s Excess Plutonium.” Policy Studies Journal 26.1 (1998).
- Potter, C.J., Day, W.C., SweetKind, D.S., & Dickerson, R.P. “Structural Geology of the Proposed Site Area for a High-level Radioactive Waste Repository, Yucca Mountain, Nevada.” Geological Society of America 116.7-8 (2004): 858-879.
- Riddel, N., Dwyer, C., & Shaw, W.D. “Environmental Risk and Uncertainty: Insights from Yucca Mountain.” Journal of Regional Science 43 (2003): 435-458
- Scott, J. “An End to the Yucca Mountain Nuclear Waste Site Debates?” Vermont Journal of Environmental Law. 2009.
- Tanaka, S. “Nuclear Waste Disposal, Reprocessing, Partitioning and Transmutation in Japan.” Journal of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Environment 7.1 (2001): 73-74