The concept of justice’s jurisprudential philosophy is a rather complex constellation of ideas that are linked both to the nature of justice and the specifics of the case considered (Rahman et al. 275). At this point, the concept of decision-making and the concerns that are traditional attributed to it deserves to be mentioned. Indeed, a closer look at the processes that occur in the court room and in the process of passing the judgment will reveal that the justice’s jurisprudential philosophy, in fact, is based on the process of negotiation and the adherence to the principles of right and freedoms that people are entitled to constitutionally (Wisconsin v. Yoder 71).
At the same time, it is imperative that justice’s jurisprudential philosophy should be rooted in everyday practice instead of relying solely on the tenets of the theory (Curzon 6). Herein the significance of the concept lies; instead of remaining an untouchable set of principles that the law and order must be guided by, the jurisprudential philosophy becomes a flexible tool for addressing the cases that are very ambiguous and may seem rather convoluted (Frank W. Turney, Petitioner, v. Margaret Pugh, Commissioner, Respondent para. 1).
The synapse of the ideas of the nature of justice in general and the appropriateness of the measures to be taken in a specific case, therefore, makes justice’s jurisprudential philosophy a very complex phenomenon. More to the point, it could be argued that the justice’s jurisprudential philosophy depends on the values that the institution in question is guided by. Hence, the phenomenon of jurisprudential philosophy as a part and parcel of the present-day judicial system can be considered rather dynamic. More to the point, with the evolution of the society, the jurisprudential philosophy evolves as well (Rahman et al. 281).
Monetary gain is the final bullet to the judicial independence (McKoski 770). A judge or any court officer accepting favors, gifts, or money from persons whose interest may come in handy before the same judicial officers counters public perception on legitimate expectation to judicial impartiality. The latter is fundamental to a robust judicial system as opined in the model code of judicial conduct. Building the image of any effective judiciary begins with this virtue. It forms the basis from which the people (consumers of judicial services) build their trust and faith to the system. Therefore, the system needs to adopt and implements the codes that not only builds its reputation on the public eye but also maintains that trust. However, free speech is a fundamental human right that judiciary should be upheld at all cost (John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v O’Shane para. 15).
Ensuring judicial impartiality
The growing need for lawyers, prosecutors, and judges to uphold integrity in their profession and exercise responsibilities in utmost independence is often combined with the pressure that sometimes deviates and compromises their professional opinion (Klein and Baum 710; Bonneau 110). One threat to this is the existence of some amendments and codes that limits their potential when seeking certain judicial posts. The ban imposed by the state to attorney or any judicial candidate soliciting campaign funds presents mixed reactions from the legal fraternity. This ban has serious ramifications on free speech, integrity, and the efforts used by judicial system to remain water proof from corruption (Schenck v. United States para. 2). Legal minds referred this prohibition as content based limitation that attempts to curtail and violate first amendment on campaign speeches.
The case of Lanell Williams-Yulee as a respondent to referee recommending the court to find her guilty for violating Canon 7C (1) raise many questions on preserving the integrity of judiciary system without interfering with the first amendment. In a rejoinder, the respondent filed a challenge to the verdict in the Supreme Court dismissing and rejecting violation of the first amendment (Bolado para. 2).
Justice cannot be read in isolation. In fact, barristers will agree that laws codes encompass many facets of life. But there are occasions when facts and law are misread and misunderstood. Even the most qualified attorney may find it hard to interpret facts and laws and to clearly bring out their intended purpose. In her submission Lanell Williams-Yulee submitted that the sole function of the code in contention is to prevent biasness and corruption but is rather undermined by limitations of prohibition.
In reference to previous practices that signified restrain among judicial officers, judges were advised to decline goodwill presentations from the advertised public domains. In a paper referring to the episodes that ensured during a civil association dinner, which hosted a fundraising exercise, was viewed as extreme application of anti-soliciting rule (Hall 320; Alfini 11). However, New York Comp. codes R and Regs abrogated this notion advising judges to decline presentation as extreme understanding of judicial ways to stem corruption and uphold impartiality. This jointer argues that any charitable fund raising occasion or unadvertised awards does not merit favorism or selected justice from that officer to the donor (Alfini, et al. 207). The question one would pose to ask is whether the situation of Lanell Williams-Yulee warrants a similar approach in application of justice. Matters of justice and law are borrowed from states with good practice. And the case of Lanell Williams-Yulee cannot be treated in isolation.
The state seems to contradict its courts. Michigan court gave a determination on the contentious clause that prohibits judges from soliciting funds from donors. The court concluded that the state shall not prohibit judges from seeking funds. This was not limited to judges alone but cuts across attorneys, and those seeking judicial offices (Klein and Baum 710, Alfini, et al. 207).
The first amendment elaborates on the view of the public opinion on judicial practices. However, if judges have constitutional protection on the right to solicit financial favors in form of contribution for personal advancement, it is not conclusive to justify ban on other solicitations based on religious affiliation (Klein and Baum 710 Alfini, et al. 20). It is common knowledge that religious solicitations do not merit direct benefit to any judicial officer. The argument from this school of thought is that lawyers directly under the judge are the likely contributors of the funds but are unlikely targets for religious solicitations. This can be viewed from two perspectives. One, that a judicial officer seeking funds to spearhead his or her election to a post may not pose serious ramification on the impartiality of the judicial system. In any case, the law itself is very clear that the state should not interfere with these individuals unless there is a form of advertisement to the same (Bonneau 110). Second, that the officer has the honor to send a thank you feedback message to the donors expressing her gratitude. These reasons have no merit in compromising dispensation and consumption of justice. In any case it builds the confidence of the public that judicial officers are entirely powerless in their attempt to execute the law (Christopher 279). Looking at the situation from the perspective of public participation in providing crucial evidence to a high profile case, the public would be more willing to take part in the process because they feel a sense of belonging to the system they helped in building.
The integrity of judicial system
Promotion of public confidence to the judicial system has shaped the way judges and other judicial officers conduct themselves in front of the public. One of the opined approaches involves prohibiting judges and other officers from engaging in activities that imparts adversely on the integrity, impartiality or independence of judiciary (Klein and Baum 713; Bonneau 110). Damages to both the integrity and public trust originate from off-bench and on-bench activities. Existing codes of conduct attempts to restore sanity in the legal profession. Among the activities outlined in the code of conduct as potential risks to public confidence in the judiciary are charitable endeavors, religious activities, social life, business dealings, private speeches, partisan political activities (Christopher 280).
Recent supreme court case involving Lanell Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar that recommended the court to find Lanell Williams-Yulee guilty for violating Canon 7C (1) for soliciting campaign funds for a judicial post elaborates on the extent that public can go to to use supreme courts in preserving the integrity of judiciary system (Christian Legal Society Chapter of the University of California, Hastings College of the law, aka Hastings Christian Fellowship v. Martinez et al. 2).
Another interpretation to this code is that the likelihood of a funding agency to expect returned favor is limited. The first amendment raising contention in the case pitting Lanell Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar cannot be isolated from the provisions of Canon 4C (1972) and subsequent provisions that are not substantially different like 1990 and 2007 codes. Though these codes were subjected to criticism, nothing was amended in the subsequent codes. These codes say that “a judge may solicit funds from governmental agencies and nonprofit organizations for programs to improve the administration of justice” (“Rules of the Supreme Court of the State of New Hampshire” para. 2; Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings v. Harriet Bouslog Sawyer, Petitioner para. 4).
Evolution of activities to fundraise in the judicial domain dates back from the ABA model describing codes of conduct (McKoski 779). The beginning starts from 1924 through to 1972 and later in the year 1990 with elaboration in 2007. Looking back at the genesis of these codes, 2007 takes a centre stage because it supports the rationale by the state to limit judges’ extra-judicial activities like fundraising (Hall 320; Bonneau 25). Some of the restrictions placed on extra-judicial activities are merited and worth implementing. The public eye on the judiciary should guide the codes and conduct of the judicial officers.
From a legal background, a case applied by the Supreme Court pitting Citizens v. Federal Election Commission (40) concluded that spending of by corporation and unions from a political point of view falls under the protection of speech outlined in first amendment. Though this was a very controversial decision, it was not unanimous. This is a typical approach in legal matters that issues touching elections are contentious and cannot be coined to specific amendment or codes of conduct without consulting the constitution holistically (Bonneau 23, 110; Alfini, et al. 23). One would agree that controversies witnessed in the Supreme Court case of Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. (7) in which the judge is accused of failing to rescue respondent after parting with significant contributions towards the judges fundraising raises concerns on dispensation of justice. This could have violated the plaintiff’s right as enshrined in 14th amendment.
Integrity of the judicial system is the basis for a functional justice system. This case relates well with Lanell Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar involving violation of amendment to code 7C (1). In fact the Supreme Court case of McCutcheon v.FEC examined the merits of imposing similar limitations which were founded. The legal fraternity has seen these efforts by the state as a means of undermining individual contributions on state officers who deserves similar treatments like other law abiding individuals interested in other political posts (Hall 320; Alfini 11). Similarly, in the Supreme Court case of SBA List v. Driehaus, the state exercises similar discretion. These efforts were interpreted as states attempt to not only undermine judicial personnel but also regulate the truth of political campaign.
This amendment seems to brush shoulders with professionals in the legal profession. Considering that 3rd and 7th U.S Circuit appellate courts are upholding these codes and conducts prohibiting some extrajudicial activities as well as supreme courts of Arkansas, Oregon, and Florida, more controversies will continue coming out. Interestingly, federal appellate courts representing the 6th, 8th, 9th, and 11th circuits contradict these codes as a restriction that violates freedom to speech.
Impropriety in judiciary
Justice applied in isolation from other cardinal laws might not reflect the desires of the society. While laws and codes of conducts are there to maintain the public image and reputation of the court and the entire judicial system, it may draw mixed reaction to the legal professionals. Exercising of impropriety in preserving the image of the judicial system should take into account other rights likely to be denied. The right to free speech is fundamental human rights that need serious protection. The case of Lanell Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar draws a number of issues that violates the freedom to speech. This was not taken into account by the Supreme Court. Legal professions agree that in deed there is a concerted effort to ensure the public confidence and faith in the system is at the peak but this should not violate other rights.
The bar agreed that despite winning the battle, the Supreme Court ruling were not in agreement with the eleventh circuit. This was evidenced because the circuit conflicted a previous ruling on Georgia judicial candidate with a similar facts on fundraising. This contraction does little to uphold the faith and confidence the judicial system is trying so hard to preserve. A uniform method of applying and consuming judicial services is needed to build public opinion of courts. These should be in agreement with the freedom to speech and association. However, one threat to this concerted effort comes from amendments and codes that limit freedom to speech which by itself is impeding justice (The New York Times Company, Petitioner, v. L. B. Sullivan. Ralph D. Abernathy et al., Petitioners, v. L. B. Sullivan para. 5).
In summary, the situation of Lanell Williams-Yulee warrants a similar approach in dispensation of justice. Matters of justice and law are borrowed from states with good practices. The lower circuits contradict the Supreme Courts in the dispensation of this contentious issue because Supreme Court is seen as a mechanism of the state. Ostensibly, the case of Lanell Williams-Yulee cannot be treated in isolation from the mission of the state. This will remain an issue for the legal professionals to ponder in years to come.
Works Cited
Alfini, James J., Shailey Gupta-Brietzke & James F. McMartin , IV. Dealing with Judicial Misconduct in the States: Judicial Independence, Accountability and Reform. Texas Law Review 889 (2007), 48. Print.
Alfini, James J., Steven Lubet, Jeffrey M. Shaman and Charles Gardner Geyh. Judicial Conduct and Ethics. New York, NY: Lexis Nexis, 2007. Print.
Bolado, Carolina. “Judicial Fundraising Ban Violates Free Speech, Justices Told.” Law 360. 2014. Web.
Bonneau, Chris W. ‘‘Patterns of Campaign Spending and Electoral Competition in State Supreme Court Elections.’’ Justice System Journal 25.1(2004):1–38. Print.
Bonneau, Chris W. ‘‘What Price Justice(s)? Understanding Campaign Spending in State Supreme Court Elections.’’ State Politics and Policy Quarterly 5 (2005):107–25. Print.
Caperton et al. v. a. t. Massey Coal Co., Inc., et al. No. 08–22 Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. 2009. Rpt. in Legal Information Institute. Web.
Christian Legal Society Chapter of the University of California, Hastings College of the law, aka Hastings Christian Fellowship v. Martinez et al. No. 08–1371. The U.S. Supreme Court. 2009. Rpt. in Supreme Court of the United States. PDF file. 2014. Web.
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. No. 08–205 The United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 2010. Rpt. in Supreme Court of the United States. PDF file. 2014. Web.
Curzon, Peter. Jurisprudence Lecture Notes. New York, NY: Routledge, 1998. Print.
Eisenstein, James. “Financing Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court Candidates.’ Judicature 84.1(2000), 10–19. Print.
Frank W. Turney, Petitioner, v. Margaret Pugh, Commissioner, Respondent. No. 03-35165. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. 2005. Rpt. in Open Jurist. 2005. Web.
Hall, Melinda Gann. ”State Supreme Courts in American Democracy: Probing the Myths of Judicial Reform.” American Political Science Review 95.1(2001), 315–30. Print.
John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v. O’Shane. NSWCA 164. Supreme Court of New South Wales – Court of Appeal. 2005. Rpt. in Australian Legal Information Institute. 2005. Web.
Klein, David, and Lawrence Baum. “Ballot Information and Voting Decisions in Judicial Elections.” Political Research Quarterly 54.1(2001), 709–728. Print.
Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings v. Harriet Bouslog Sawyer, Petitioner.No. 26 360 U.S. 622. The Supreme Court of the Territory of Hawaii. 1959. Rpt. in Public Resource, Org. 2014. Web.
McKoski, Ray. “Charitable Fund-Raising by Judges: The Give and Take of the 2007 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct.” Michigan St. Law Review. Chicago, IL: The John Marshall Law School. 2008. 769-841. Web.
Rahman, Mohammad Mohammad Aktaruzzaman Khan, Mohammad Nour & Mohammad Osiur Rahman. “Cyberspace Claiming New Dynamism in the Jurisprudential Philosophy: A Substantive Analysis of Conceptual and Institutional Innovation.” International Journal of Law and Management 51.5 (2009), 279–290. Print.
Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F. 536 U.S. 765 Supreme Court of the United States. 2001. Rpt. in Legal Information Institute, 2002. Web.
“Rules of the Supreme Court of the State of New Hampshire.” New Hampshire Judicial Branch. n. d. Web.
Schenck v. United States. 249 U.S. 47. The United States Supreme Court, 1919. Rpt. in Student Central. Web. 2014.
The New York Times Company, Petitioner, v. L. B. Sullivan. Ralph D. Abernathy et al., Petitioners, v. L. B. Sullivan. 376 U.S. 254. The United States Supreme Court, 1964. Rpt. in WorldLII. Web.
Wisconsin v. Yoder. 406 U.S. 205 The Supreme Court of the United States. 1972. Rpt. in Legal Information Institute. Web. 2014.
Witko, Christopher. “Measuring the Stringency of State Campaign Finance Regulation.” State Politics and Policy Quarterly 5.1(2005), 295–310. Print.